II. Gender, Sex, and Sexual Orientation  
(Continued from Previous Reader)

October 18th - Sex Work
- Loitering Case - *Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss - Natasha Martin et al. v. The City of New York* - *Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Partial Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint*. United States District Court - Southern District of New York.

October 23rd - Decriminalization of Sex Work
- Amnesty International *Policy on state obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of sex workers*
- Lambda Legal *LGBT Rights Organizations Join Amnesty International in Call to Decriminalize Sex Work*, August 20, 2015
- Frankie Mullin, *The difference between decriminalisation and legalisation of sex work*, Newstatesman 19 October 2015.

October 25th - Is there a Right to Non-Reproductive Sexuality?
- *Williams v. Attorney General of Ala.*, 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)
- *Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle*, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008)
NEW YORK

The NYPD Arrests Women for Who They Are and Where They Go — Now They’re Fighting Back

by MELISSA GIRA GRANT
November 22, 2016
When two officers of the New York Police Department came for her, Sarah Marchando was on a moving bus.

It was May 7, 2015, around 7:30 in the morning. Marchando, who was 27 at the time, had just boarded the B6 in East New York after seeing her boyfriend. He watched her get on the bus. She swiped her MetroCard and took her seat with the morning commuters.

“Then, five minutes later, I get a phone call,” Marchando told the Voice. It was her boyfriend, “telling me, ‘You know you have got a detective car behind the bus?’ ”

Moments later, “they cut the bus off,” Marchando says. “It wasn’t like the bus was at a stop.” Two officers in plainclothes rushed on. They wouldn’t tell her why they were there when she asked, according to a recent lawsuit detailing her arrest. When Marchando didn’t immediately go with them, Officer Joseph Nicosia grabbed her and pulled her down the stairs. She tried to stop him from grabbing her arm, the suit says, and one of the officers put her in a chokehold. Six officers ended up involved in the scene. Officer Michael Doyle, the suit states, remarked to the others, “She’s back,” and “we got her.”

“It was just a complete struggle,” Marchando said. Cops had wrestled her to the ground. Passersby recorded her arrest as she told police she couldn’t breathe.
Marchando was charged with violating a vaguely worded New York law prohibiting “Loitering for the Purpose of Engaging in a Prostitution Offense,” a misdemeanor she had been arrested for seven times between 2013 and 2015 in that same precinct. In one loitering case in 2012, she served 45 days on Rikers Island.

“It has been to a point where I have come home from Rikers Island and caught a case less than two days later,” she said. “I felt like I was being watched.”

That’s because she was. Officers in the 75th Precinct knew Sarah Marchando, who is Latina and cisgender, from prior arrests. According to a sworn court complaint, Officer Kelly Quinn said police had observed her for forty minutes that morning before they arrested her, and claimed they saw her “beckon to multiple vehicles passing by with male drivers,” “approach a vehicle,” and “engage in conversation with a male inside of said vehicle.” This was all supposed to be evidence of her “purpose” to commit a prostitution offense. Marchando and her attorneys contest this. She was waiting for a

Sarah Marchando had lived in a few places in the 75th. For a short time, she was in hotels around an area police told her — after an arrest — was “the Combat Zone.” That’s the same nickname the police in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where she grew up, used for the old red-light area in Downtown Boston. “Then I moved to Dorchester, started messing with the bad boys. Started getting in trouble.” She said Massachusetts was boring, though, and so she came to New York. But now she’s had to leave Brooklyn, too.

“It is enough for me to know this is not a safe situation. This is not an OK situation,” Marchando said. “I can’t continue to be intimidated to come outside, to know that even at seven o’clock in the morning, I am still a target and a priority.”

These targeted and repeated arrests are part of a much larger pattern within the NYPD. From 2012 through 2015, nearly 1,300 individuals were arrested in New York City and charged with loitering for the purposes of prostitution. The vast majority are women. Such arrests are not the result of stings, in which undercover officers attempt to solicit sex for money. Neither are they the result of investigations that produce evidence — emails, text messages, online ads — that the women had intended to sell sex. With a loitering arrest, a woman’s crime need only exist in the arresting officer’s head.

Whether or not she was engaging in prostitution in that moment, or in the past, Marchando still has constitutional rights. So she, along with seven other plaintiffs backed by the Legal Aid Society of New York (which has represented them in loitering cases), filed a class-action civil rights suit this past September, challenging the constitutionality of New York’s law on loitering for the purposes of prostitution. Enforcement of the statute, they state, is “based solely on a police officer’s subjective determination that the activity was ‘for the purpose’ of prostitution.” That is, if police believe a woman’s “purpose” is to sell sex, they will arrest her.
“This is a law that is four decades old,” said Kate Mogulescu, a supervising attorney in the Legal Aid Society’s Criminal Defense Practice, adding that enforcement is “arbitrary and targeted and abusive.” Asked about its enforcement of the loitering statute, the NYPD referred the Voice to the Law Department, which is defending against the Legal Aid suit. “We are not discussing any aspect of this matter while litigation is pending,” Law Department spokesman Nick Paolucci said.
Anti-loitering policing is highly concentrated in five precincts, according to arrest data from Legal Aid and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services' arrest statistics. Between 2012 and 2015, the majority of the arrests — 68.5 percent — were made in Bushwick, Belmont/Fordham Heights, East New York, Hunts Point, and Brownsville, neighborhoods where residents are predominantly people of color. In a Brooklyn court where prostitution cases end up, 94 percent of the defendants facing charges of loitering for the purposes of prostitution were black, according to a court monitoring project conducted by the Red Umbrella Project in 2013 and 2014. Overall, according to the State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 85 percent of those arrested for loitering for prostitution between 2012 and 2015 were black or Latina.

Police say these neighborhoods are “prostitution prone.” Mogulescu believes that designation is “a self-fulfilling cycle. They make an arrest in a place, therefore that place becomes ‘prostitution prone’ — and they can make more arrests in that place, because they have already identified it as prostitution-prone.” Loitering arrests don’t reveal the places sex work happens in the city, only the places where women are most likely to be arrested, whether they are engaged in sex work or not.

Police also cite the women’s clothing as evidence of their “purpose” to engage in prostitution: Is it “revealing” or “provocative” clothing? How tight are their leggings? Can you see their cleavage? Officers document this on preprinted supporting depositions, which also ask: How many people was a suspect “engaged in conversation” with? How much currency did she have at the time of arrest? How many condoms? On sworn depositions provided to the Voice by Legal Aid, officers itemized the following attire as evidence:
women do not often fight these charges. Of the close to 1,300 loitering cases between 2012 and 2015, according to Legal Aid, “nearly 400 of the arrests did not lead to convictions.” This could mean charges were never filed, or a case was dismissed, or the accused was acquitted. But, as Sarah Marchando and others point out, even if their record is sealed, police do not expunge from their memory the face of a woman they have previously arrested. As a result, they say, they are unable to go out in public without fear of another arrest.

Which is why the Legal Aid suit contends that the city of New York “chooses to enforce” the loitering law “in an unconstitutional manner by using it to police expressions of gender identity and sexuality based on outdated and paternalistic notions of what clothing NYPD officers deem ‘revealing’ or ‘provocative,’ with a disproportionate impact on women of color.”

“When you have factors like an article of clothing, or the fact that you are one gender and you are talking to people of another gender,” Mogulescu said, “you have to expand your view and ask, where is this happening that’s not being policed? And our answer with the loitering case is, everywhere, except these places when the police decide these are the arrests they are going to make.”

PO Telesca, September 14, 2016, said the woman he arrested was wearing “tight black leggings”;

Lieutenant Dave Sieve, March 10, 2016, said a woman he arrested was wearing a “pink + blue sweater hoodie”;  

PO Figaro said on August 25, 2015, he arrested a woman wearing “mini dress, bra strap showing”;

and PO Sieger, in another August 2015 arrest, said the woman was wearing “tight jeans and tight tank showing cleavage [sic].”
Tiffanie Grissom first saw jail for prostitution arrests more than a decade ago in the West Village. “That was the beginning stages of the cleanup,” she told the Voice in October. Her long dark hair was pulled back, her smooth leather purse on her lap. We were in the Lower Manhattan offices of Legal Aid, not far from where the piers on the city’s West Side once stood.

“It was still pretty rough out there. There was no Gansevoort there,” Grissom added dryly, referring to the luxury hotel that opened in 2004. As she was growing up in the Village as a young, transgender black woman, the neighborhood she hung out and worked in gentrified around her. “Half the stuff that was out there when I was out there is no longer there. The pizza shops are gone; the sex shops are gone. It is all gone. The bars are gone and going. If they are not gone yet, they are going.”

In those days in the Village, Grissom said, it was different: You would make enough money that sitting in jail for a night wasn’t the worst thing. “Initially, it was routine. It was kind of like paying your dues.” She would plead guilty to the prostitution or loitering charges, get time served or community service, go home, and be back out. “I was just like, ‘Oh, in jail again,’” she added with a sigh. “I had a girl who got arrested every single Friday. Every single Friday! It was literally like we knew them by name, they knew us by
Bronx would never be my ideal choice of places to move to. It was just convenient. Then I kind of got stuck in the Bronx.” Her boyfriend was there, she said, pausing before going on a highlight reel recollection of those times. “Living stuff started going up/down. All this ridiculousness.”

Her record from the Village remained with her. But between Fordham and Kingsbridge roads, for about a three- or four-block radius, she said, she could go out, maybe pick someone up, see what happened, make some money. “When you go to the area,” she said, “it is kind of like the Village outside of the Village.

“It is like you go out there and you don’t have to be closeted,” she continued. “The girls that are trans don’t have to live their closeted trans life. In those places, you can be free. ...You don’t have to bite your tongue.”

Grissom added, “The men that come there...they appreciate trans women. ...Sometimes they have money, sometimes they don’t have money.” She wouldn’t always go out to work; it could be just to hang out, and some of the people she was hanging out with could be working, too.

For a while, Grissom felt like police left her alone, or maybe they just didn’t know her arrest somebody.”

One night in October 2013, she was leaving the Twin Donut on Fordham Road, “where everybody goes...one of the only places you can just go in and sit down when you don’t have money.” She walked for a while, speaking with a man along the way. After about 30 or 45 minutes, they went their separate ways. It was then that an unmarked police car pulled up alongside her. Officers Bryan Pocalyko and Christopher Savarese demanded she stop and placed her under arrest.

Only after Grissom was arrested and loaded into a police van with another woman who had been arrested that night did she learn that she was charged with loitering for the purpose of prostitution, though she says that at no time had she tried to solicit money for sex.

According to the lawsuit, when Grissom was brought to the 52nd Precinct, Officer Pocalyko refused to believe she was a woman.

“[Officer] Pocalyko unlawfully ordered Ms. Grissom to be strip-searched by a female police officer even though she was not suspected of possessing any drugs or contraband,” the suit reads. “The female officer took Ms. Grissom into a bathroom and ordered her to lift her shirt, shake out her bra, and pull her shorts down. This search was for the purpose of confirming whether or not she was female, as her identification indicated.”

Later in court, the Legal Aid suit says, one of the officers “alleged that Ms. Grissom’s purpose was prostitution because she was observed at a location ‘frequented by people engaged in prostitution’ and was wearing ‘tight short shorts [and a] tight tank top.’ ”
If Tiffany Grissom had been doing the same thing, in the same outfit, but in, say, Times Square, would she have been arrested? It depends: In what decade?

New York's law criminalizing loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense only dates to 1976. Before the law was passed, the NYPD would use the existing, general anti-loitering laws to target women it wanted to keep off the streets. In one infamous six-month wave of sweeps in 1967 and 1968, police arrested more than three thousand women who either were or were profiled as sex workers, mostly centering on Times Square, driven by panic about street crime. Police said they would charge the women with loitering or disorderly conduct offenses because it was easier than trying to prove they were engaged in prostitution. The Legal Aid Society along with the New York Civil Liberties Union intervened to have some of the loitering cases dismissed.

This crackdown came as the NYPD began to pressure the state to add loitering for the purposes of prostitution to the penal code. “The actions of these individuals have always had a deleterious effect on the business and social life of the community,” wrote the department in a 1967 memo. But at the time, civil rights attorneys were testing loitering statutes in the courts. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a law prohibiting loitering, “vagrancy,” and “nightwalking” was unconstitutionally vague. It was after all this that loitering for the purpose of prostitution was added to the New York State penal code. To this day, the NYPD continues to make a few thousand prostitution arrests each year under a variety of statutes, with several hundred for loitering for prostitution.
Eight days after she was pulled off the bus in East New York, Sarah Marchando was arrested again. “I caught that case at five o’clock in the morning,” she said, “with overalls on and a pair of shoes. It doesn’t matter what I have on or how I am dressed.”

Marchando said she would have to plan ahead about when to go out just to try to avoid arrest. “You have to keep in the back of your mind that, ‘OK, what is the day?’ Because if it is that type of day, like on Friday nights or Saturday mornings, they are doing prostitution sweeps.”

According to Tiffaney Grissom, “The only thing that you can do to avoid it is just not go outside.”

But she would have to leave the house for court appearances, and a lot of them. At one
was like Tuesdays and Wednesdays it would be Brooklyn. Then, get up on Wednesdays and Thursdays and go to the Bronx. It would be excessive.”

“We were always in court,” longtime community advocate Lorena Borjas told me. She’s the founder of the Lorena Borjas Community Fund, a legal fund for transgender New Yorkers in immigrant communities, which has offered assistance to trans women in Queens targeted in loitering arrests. “I can say that four years ago we were having arrests about every fourteen days,” she recalled. “They were specifically focused on the trans community that crosses the Jackson Heights area. Especially with all of the trans girls that this was happening to who were undocumented, they were, of course, running the risk of being deported. When people had to appear in court, they would say, ‘Well, I saw you out here last Friday, so now this Friday I am going to arrest you.’”

Borjas explains that what makes Jackson Heights different from East New York or the Bronx is that there, the women most likely to be targeted in anti-loitering policing, members of the Latina trans community, were visible and organized. Borjas did street outreach, sharing “Know Your Rights” cards so they knew how to protect themselves during police encounters. Groups like Make the Road New York have documented the policing of Jackson Heights’ LGBTQ Latinx community, highlighting the use of anti-loitering laws to sweep trans Latinas off the street.

“The police were saying a while ago that they wanted to change the face of Jackson Heights,” Borjas said. “They wanted to stop drug sales, they wanted to stop people from selling tacos and food in public.” All this came at the same time as crackdowns on trans women. “They were saying, ‘The face of Jackson Heights is something we are going to change.’ According to them, the mentality was that they were going to do this by arresting the whole world.”

As in the West Village when Tiffaney Grissom worked and hung out there, police used anti-loitering laws to “change the face” of neighborhoods. “This kind of policing is very much tied into the gentrification and sort of economic shift in certain areas,” said Legal Aid’s Mogulescu. “The call for a kind of ‘cleanup’ of the streets that accompanies that — this is not the only law that’s used to do that, but it’s a pretty striking example. And because the law allows for such abuse — it’s part of the law itself — there’s no check on that. So it becomes a very useful tool for getting people off the street.” Mogulescu’s voice softened. “And we have to think about who those people are.”

After all her arrests, Sarah Marchando ended up leaving Brooklyn. She told me she’s still trying to keep a steady place to live, still trying to find work. “It wasn’t like I could just say, ‘Hey, let me go get a job,’ because I am not stable. I can’t get stable if every time I turn around I am in jail again.”

Tiffaney Grissom left the Bronx, too. She estimates that of all her arrests for loitering, about 80 percent of the time, she wasn’t even out doing sex work. “Whether you are ‘hoing or not ‘hoing,” she said, “even if you look like you might be trans, you are going to jail.”

What she remembers from all the arrests is, “They always give you this whole speech of ‘high prostitution-prone area.’” After a while, it was like police thought that was just anywhere she was. “It is a stigma that comes with being trans. You are automatically a
And on top of that, she said, "you don't want to go back and tell your mother or whoever you live with, 'Hey, just got arrested for loitering.'"

In Jackson Heights, the loitering crackdowns on the community, in some ways, made it all the more determined, said Borjas. "Two years ago we started to do protests and to become more visible so that we could tell the police and the neighborhood, 'We are here. We are not going anywhere. We are your neighbors and your friends. We are your clients. We are the ones that come to buy a cup of coffee in the morning. We go to the supermarket and we, too, need protection, just like you.'"

Tiffany Grissom didn't have that. After she got arrested twice in the same week, she said, police scolded her. "They were like, 'You are just not getting it through your head.' It is not that I am not getting it through my head; it is, regardless of however many times I get arrested, I still need to eat. This is my livelihood." So she kept working. As a result of one prostitution arrest, she ended up at Rikers. "It was the day before Thanksgiving that I got out. I had on a minidress. It was ridiculous. A minidress, no money... When I had gotten there, I had just shut down. I didn't pee; I didn't eat. I didn't do anything for four days."

After years of this, both women told me, they were done with pleading guilty. They were done with Rikers. They signed on to be plaintiffs in the case challenging the law itself.

"It took a lot to get here," Marchando told me. "A lot of cases." For one, she needed support to fight her charges. But now, as part of the legal challenge, if they are successful, this could mean the end of so many women ending up in the system in the first place. "I was just going to jail and there were no questions asked," Marchando said. "It needs to change. It is a targeting thing that has to stop, and if nobody says nothing, it is not going to be dealt with."
NEW YORK

Interactive Map: See Where the NYPD Arrests Women Who Are Black, Latina, Trans, and/or Wearing Jeans

by MELISSA GIRA GRANT

NOVEMBER 22, 2016
Check out the interactive map below.

Since 1976, it's been a crime to “loiter for the purposes of engaging in a prostitution offense” in New York City. That might sound like the kind of thing that went out of fashion along with XXX marquees in Times Square. But between 2012 and 2015, the NYPD arrested and charged 1,300 people with this misdemeanor.

The Voice obtained arrest data from Legal Aid and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services Arrest Statistics for the past three years. This data was then mapped by John Keefe.
The vast majority of those charged with this offense (81%) are women. Overall, according to New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services Arrest Statistics, 85% of those arrested for loitering for prostitution between 2012 and 2015 were black or Latina.
How exactly do police think they can tell when women are doing something “for the purposes of” prostitution? The law gives the NYPD very wide discretion. From the supporting depositions officers file with each arrest, police list as evidence such wholly innocent behaviors as waving at passers-by, having conversations with someone of a different gender, or wearing tights jeans or baring cleavage.

This September, eight women of color, including cisgender and transgender women, filed a civil rights suit with the support of The Legal Aid Society of New York, challenging the constitutionality of the loitering law. They describe a pattern of targeted and yet arbitrary policing, sweeping women of color from their neighborhoods into jails,
But loitering arrests don’t reveal the places sex work happens in the city, only the places where women are most likely to be policed based on their presence alone, whether they are engaged in sex work or not. Between 2012 and 2015, 68.5% of arrests for loitering for the purposes of prostitution were made in just five neighborhoods: Bushwick (83rd Precinct), Belmont/Fordham Heights (52nd Precinct), East New York (75th Precinct), Hunts Point (41st Precinct), and Brownsville (73rd Precinct), neighborhoods where residents are predominantly people of color.

Police say these neighborhoods are “prostitution prone,” but as Kate Mogulescu, a supervising attorney in the Legal Aid Society’s Criminal Defense Practice, points out, “this is based on a self-fulfilling cycle. They make an arrest in a place, therefore that place becomes ‘prostitution prone’ – and they can make more arrests in that place, because they have already identified it as prostitution prone.”

“It is easier to prove somebody is guilty when it is already on their record,” said Sarah Marchando, one of the women suing over the loitering law. “There is really no fight,” You can’t say, ‘Hey, I wasn’t doing this!’ if you are dressed a certain way.”

“The only thing that you can do to avoid it,” Tiffaney Grissom, another plaintiff on the suit told me, “is just not go outside.”
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

D.H., N.H., K.H. f/k/a J.H., Natasha Martin, Tiffaney Grissom, R.G., A.B. and Sarah Marchando, individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated;

Plaintiffs,

-against-

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SEAN KINANE, JOSEPH MCKENNA, KAYAN DAWKINS, THOMAS KEANE, MARIA IMBURGIA, KEVIN MALONEY, JOEL ALLEN, DAVE SIEV, BRYAN POCALYKO, CHRISTOPHER SAVARESE, THOMAS DIGGS, JOEL GOMEZ, KEITH BEDDOWS, CHRISTIAN SALAZAR, HENRY DAVERIN, JOSEPH NICOSIA, KELLY QUINN, ALEXIS YANEZ, MICHAEL DOYLE, JOHN/JANE DOE NYPD POLICE OFFICERS #1-14;

Defendants.

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Plaintiffs D.H., N.H., K.H. f/k/a J.H., 1 Natasha Martin, Tiffaney Grissom, R.G., A.B. and Sarah Marchando ("Named Plaintiffs") bring this civil rights action on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated women of color, some of whom are transgender, who have been and may in the future be subjected to surveillance, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained under New York Penal Law Section 240.37 ("Section 240.37") (the "Plaintiff Class," and together with Named Plaintiffs, "Plaintiffs"), and allege the following on information and belief:

2. This is a civil rights class action that challenges the constitutionality of Section 240.37, Loitering for the Purpose of Engaging in a Prostitution Offense, under which New York City Police Department ("NYPD") officers target and arrest women—primarily women of color, including transgender women—engaged in wholly innocent conduct based on their race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.

3. Since 1976, New York has criminalized loitering in a public place by persons whom the police selectively and subjectively determine are present for the purpose of prostitution.

4. New York enacted Section 240.37, along with several other anti-loitering laws, at a time when street crime was rampant, in order to provide police officers with a "tool to curtail the proliferation of prostitution" and other "maladies" throughout New York. 2

1 K.H. is in the process of legally changing her name from J.H.

5. Many of these loitering statutes have since been struck down as unconstitutional. Section 240.37 remains in force, and the pattern of unlawful arrests under this statute demonstrates that the fears and doubts expressed at the time of its passage about its unconstitutionality and potential for abuse were entirely warranted.³

6. Section 240.37 provides in relevant part:

Any person who remains or wanders about in a public place and repeatedly beckons to, or repeatedly stops, or repeatedly attempts to stop, or repeatedly attempts to engage passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles, or repeatedly interferes with the free passage of other persons, for the purpose of prostitution, or of patronizing a prostitute as those terms are defined in article two hundred thirty of the penal law, shall be guilty of a violation.

7. On its face, Section 240.37 is unconstitutionally overbroad. It criminalizes many forms of constitutionally protected expressive activity, such as attempting “to engage passers-by in conversation,” based solely on a police officer’s subjective determination that the activity was “for the purpose” of prostitution.

8. The statute is also void for vagueness because it lacks objective criteria and guidelines for determining what conduct is “for the purpose of prostitution.” It therefore fails to provide adequate notice of the conduct that will be deemed criminal and gives police officers unfettered discretion to arrest individuals based on subjective determinations of an individual’s “purpose,” leading to inconsistent and arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, a person of

³ See, e.g., Letter from Harold Baer, Jr. to Hon. Judah Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor (June 15, 1976) [hereinafter Letter from Harold Baer, Jr. to Hon. Judah Gribetz] (writing on behalf of the State Legislation Committee of the New York State Bar Association and the New York County Lawyers’ Association, and noting that although the “prostitution problem . . . has reached critical proportions,” Section 240.37 is “unconstitutional” and would invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Legislation Report, No. 84 (1976) [hereinafter N.Y. State Bar Legislation Report] (demonstrating that Section 240.37 has “deficiencies . . . so glaring as to require our disapproval without regard to questions of the efficacy and underlying policy,” and declaring that the law provides a “shortcut” for police, whereby the “standards of probable cause” are “dropp[ed]” and “[w]omen who are suspected of being prostitutes are arrested on sight, not because they are committing any unlawful act but because they are considered ‘undesirable’”).
ordinary intelligence cannot know if, for example, by speaking to acquaintances on the street or engaging in similarly innocent activity, she risks arrest under Section 240.37.

9. Further, the City of New York (or the “City,” and together with all other named individual and Doe defendants (“Individual Defendants”), “Defendants”), through the NYPD, enforces Section 240.37 in a way that impermissibly targets Plaintiffs because of their race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance. Specifically, the City has adopted numerous policies, widespread practices and/or customs that result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of Section 240.37 in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 8, 11 and 12 of the New York Constitution, including by:

- Deploying groups of NYPD officers to arrest multiple Plaintiffs under Section 240.37 in “sweeps” that target certain public areas where women of color, and in particular transgender women, are known to gather and socialize;

- Arresting Plaintiffs under Section 240.37 without probable cause, including based merely on the fact that a Plaintiff has been arrested in the past for a prostitution-related offense (even if the charge was dismissed) or that the Plaintiff was present in an area that the NYPD has designated as “prostitution-prone”;

- Arresting women of color under Section 240.37 at a higher rate than men or white women because of their race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance; and

- Failing to adequately train, monitor, supervise or discipline NYPD officers involved in the enforcement of Section 240.37 to prevent or mitigate these abuses and constitutional violations.

10. Defendants’ conduct results in a pattern and widespread practice of unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of women of color, including transgender women, engaged in wholly innocent conduct, such as walking in public spaces or speaking with other pedestrians.
11. The overwhelming majority of arrests under Section 240.37 are of women of color, including significant numbers of transgender women. In many instances, charges are eventually dismissed, but the injurious legal, financial, emotional and physical effects of the arrests on Plaintiffs’ lives remain.

12. Defendants implement the NYPD’s policies, widespread practices and/or customs in an intentionally discriminatory and race-based manner by focusing their enforcement efforts on communities of color. Defendants also discriminatorily acquiesce in, ratify and fail to monitor or rectify these unlawful practices because the victims are transgender and/or women of color.

13. The enforcement of Section 240.37 intimidates, threatens and interferes with Named Plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their homes and neighborhoods and their right to associate freely with others. The enforcement is so arbitrary and discriminatory that many Named Plaintiffs are afraid to leave their homes, particularly at night.

14. As examples, on June 6, 2015, Named Plaintiff D.H., an African-American woman who is transgender, was arrested walking in her neighborhood in the Bronx while trying to hail a cab to get home. D.H. is deaf and communicates primarily through typing and sign language. During her walk, she did not interact with anyone or engage in any behavior related to the solicitation of prostitution or other unlawful conduct. She was nevertheless stopped, harassed, arrested and detained by the police as part of a “sweep” of transgender women in the area, and eventually charged with loitering for the purpose of prostitution.

15. Similarly, on June 6, 2015, Named Plaintiff N.H., an African-American woman who is transgender, was arrested in her neighborhood on her way home from buying food and cigarettes at a nearby store. Like D.H., N.H. was arrested as part of a sweep of transgender
women, and one of the arresting officers told those women that if they saw “girls like them”—meaning transgender women—outside after midnight, they would arrest them.

16. On June 13, 2015, Named Plaintiff K.H., an African-American woman who is transgender, was walking home to her apartment when she met another transgender woman. As they walked together, NYPD officers jumped out of an unmarked police car and accosted them. The officers arrested both women on the spot without probable cause.

17. Section 240.37 is unconstitutional, and, as evidenced by the experience of these and the other Named Plaintiffs, including as set forth more fully below, Defendants’ policies, widespread practices and/or customs in enforcing it have violated and continue to violate Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the constitutions and laws of the United States and the State and City of New York.

18. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief striking Section 240.37 as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and declaring that the City’s policies, widespread practices and customs in enforcing Section 240.37 in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights under federal, state and local law. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief prohibiting future enforcement of Section 240.37. In addition, Named Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, an award of attorneys’ fees and costs and such other relief as this Court deems equitable and just.

JURISDICTION

19. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and 1343(a)(4), as this is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution.
20. Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

21. This Court has jurisdiction over the supplemental claims arising under the laws of the State and City of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), as they are so related to the claims within the original jurisdiction of this Court that they form part of the same case or controversy.

22. This case is brought to vindicate the public interest, and the resolution of this case will directly affect the rights of all New Yorkers, particularly women of color. Therefore, to the extent that the notice of claim requirement of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §§ 50-e and 50-i would otherwise apply to any of the claims stated below, no such notice is required because this case falls within the public interest exception to that requirement.

VENUE

23. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because a substantial part of the events that gave rise to the claims alleged in this complaint occurred in the Counties of Bronx and New York. In addition, Defendants conduct business and maintain their principal place of business in the Counties of Bronx and New York. The NYPD maintains its headquarters at 1 Police Plaza, New York, NY 10007, where many of its policies are created.

PARTIES

I. PLAINTIFFS

24. The Plaintiff Class comprises women of color, some of whom are transgender, who have been or will be subjected to surveillance, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained pursuant to Section 240.37, including based on their race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.
25. Named Plaintiff D.H. is a 26-year-old deaf African-American woman who is transgender and at all relevant times was a resident of Bronx, New York.

26. Named Plaintiff N.H. is a 36-year-old African-American woman who is transgender and at all relevant times was a resident of Bronx, New York.

27. Named Plaintiff K.H. is a 32-year-old African-American woman who is transgender and at all relevant times was a resident of Bronx, New York.

28. Named Plaintiff Natasha Martin is a 38-year-old African-American woman who is transgender and at all relevant times was a resident of Brooklyn, New York.

29. Named Plaintiff Tiffaney Grissom is a 30-year-old African-American woman who is transgender and at all relevant times was a resident of Bronx, New York.

30. Named Plaintiff R.G. is a 59-year-old Latina woman and at all relevant times was a resident of Bronx, New York.

31. Named Plaintiff A.B. is a 44-year-old African-American woman and at all relevant times was a resident of Brooklyn, New York.

32. Named Plaintiff Sarah Marchando is a 28-year-old Latina woman and at all relevant times was a resident of Queens, New York.

II. DEFENDANTS

33. The City is a municipal entity created and authorized under the laws of the State of New York to maintain, operate and govern a police department, the NYPD, which acts as its agent in the area of law enforcement and for which the City is ultimately responsible. The City assumes the risks incidental to the maintenance of a police force and the employment of police officers. The law enforcement activities of the NYPD are supported, in part, by federal funds.
34. At all relevant times, all Individual Defendants were members of the NYPD, acting in the capacity of agents, servants and employees of the City, and within the scope of their employment as such. At all relevant times, Defendants JOSEPH MCKENNA, KEVIN MALONEY, DAVE SIEV, BRYAN POCALYKO, HENRY DAVERIN, KEITH BEDDOWS, MICHAEL DOYLE and Doe NYPD Officer #13, and potentially one or more of Defendants Doe NYPD Officers #1-12, were sergeants, lieutenants, captains and other high-ranking officials of the NYPD with training, supervisory and policy-making roles.

35. Defendants JOSEPH MCKENNA, KEVIN MALONEY and DAVE SIEV (collectively, the “Sweep Supervisor Defendants”) participated in planning, ordering, staffing, supervising and/or approving the sweeps described below which resulted in the unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detentions of D.H., N.H, K.H. and/or Natasha Martin, and failed to monitor or reprimand officers involved in those sweeps. Defendants SEAN KINANE, KAYAN DAWKINS, THOMAS KEANE, MARIA IMBURGIA, JOEL ALLEN, DAVE SIEV and Doe NYPD Officers #1-7 (collectively, the “Sweep Officer Defendants”) were involved in the unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detentions of D.H., N.H, K.H. and/or Natasha Martin as part of a sanctioned sweep, as described in greater detail below. The Sweep Supervisor Defendants and Sweep Officer Defendants are sued in their individual, official and supervisory capacities.

36. Defendants BRYAN POCALYKO, HENRY DAVERIN, KEITH BEDDOWS, MICHAEL DOYLE and Doe NYPD Officer #13 (collectively, the “Non-Sweep Supervisor Defendants”) were involved in the unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detentions of D.H., N.H, K.H. and/or Natasha Martin as part of a sanctioned sweep, as described in greater detail below.

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4 Per the 2015 edition of the NYPD Patrol Guide, to approve an arrest, the arrest paperwork and supporting deposition must be reviewed for completeness and accuracy by the desk officer. **NYPD Patrol Guide, Arrests — General Processing, Desk Officer, PG 208-03, ¶¶ 26-34 (2015-A Ed.) [hereinafter NYPD Patrol Guide].**
Defendants”) participated in planning, ordering, staffing, supervising and/or approving the unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detentions of Tiffaney Grissom, R.G, A.B. and Sarah Marchando, and failed to monitor or reprimand the officers involved. Defendants CHRISTOPHER SAVARESE, THOMAS DIGGS, JOEL GOMEZ, BRYAN POCALYKO, CHRISTIAN SALAZAR, JOSEPH NICOSIA, KELLY QUINN, MICHAEL DOYLE, ALEXIS YANEZ, and Doe NYPD Officers #8-13 (collectively, the “Non-Sweep Officer Defendants”) were involved in the unlawful surveillance stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detentions of Tiffaney Grissom, R.G, A.B. and Sarah Marchando. The Non-Sweep Supervisor Defendants and Non-Sweep Officer Defendants are sued in their individual, official and supervisory capacities.

37. At all relevant times, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #14 was an officer in the 52nd precinct. Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #14 was involved in the refusal to provide D.H. with a sign language interpreter in violation of her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law.

38. At all relevant times, Individual Defendants were acting under color of state law, including under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, customs and/or usages of the City and State of New York.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

39. Named Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

41. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are satisfied, as shown below.

42. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. From 2012 through 2015, nearly 1,300 individuals were arrested in New York City under Section 240.37. During those same years, nearly 400 of those arrests did not lead to convictions. In some cases, charges were never filed; in others, charges were dismissed; and in others, the accused was acquitted.

43. Joinder is also impracticable because many members of the Plaintiff Class are not aware that their constitutional and statutory rights have been violated and that they have the right to seek redress in court. Further, many Plaintiff Class members cannot be joined individually because they have been unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched and/or seized by NYPD officers but ultimately were not arrested and detained, and are therefore unknown. There is no appropriate avenue for the protection of these Plaintiff Class members’ constitutional and statutory rights other than by means of a class action.

44. The claims alleged on behalf of Named Plaintiffs as Plaintiff Class representatives raise questions of law or fact common to all Plaintiffs, and these questions predominate over individual questions. These common questions include, but are not limited to:

- Whether Section 240.37 is void for vagueness as a result of its failure to provide adequate notice to individuals of objective conduct that would subject them to arrest under the statute and/or guidance to officers;

- Whether Section 240.37 is unconstitutionally overbroad, impermissibly infringing Plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, §§ 8, 11 and 12 of the New York Constitution;

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• Whether the City engages in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of Section 240.37 in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, §§ 8, 11 and 12 of the New York Constitution;

• Whether the City has violated Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech by consciously choosing to enforce Section 240.37 based in large part on protected conduct, including conversations in public and/or Plaintiffs’ expression of gender or gender identity;

• Whether the City has consciously chosen to enforce Section 240.37 in violation of Plaintiffs’ right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by unlawfully surveilling, stopping, questioning, frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting and detaining Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion or probable cause;

• Whether the City has consciously chosen to enforce Section 240.37 in a discriminatory manner based on the race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance of Plaintiffs in violation of the New York State Civil Rights Law, the New York State Human Rights Law (the “NYHRL”), the New York City Bias-Based Profiling Law and the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”);

• Whether the City knew or should have known that, as a direct and proximate result of such policies, widespread practices and/or customs, the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs would be violated; and

• Whether the City acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in failing to rectify such arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement policies, widespread practices and/or customs, including by failing to adequately train, monitor, supervise or discipline officers engaged in the enforcement of Section 240.37.

45. The claims of Named Plaintiffs are typical of the Plaintiff Class they seek to represent, as each Named Plaintiff alleges violations of her federal and state constitutional and statutory rights in connection with law enforcement actions undertaken by NYPD officers pursuant to Section 240.37.

46. The Named Plaintiffs are adequate Plaintiff Class representatives. The violations of law that Named Plaintiffs allege stem from the same course of conduct by Defendants that violated and continues to violate the rights of Plaintiff Class members, and the legal theories under which Named Plaintiffs seek relief are the same as or similar to those on which the
Plaintiff Class will rely. In addition, the harm suffered by Named Plaintiffs is typical of the harm suffered by absent Plaintiff Class members.

47. Named Plaintiffs have the requisite personal interest in the outcome of this action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of other Plaintiff Class members. Counsel for Named Plaintiffs includes attorneys from The Legal Aid Society and the law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP who are experienced in federal class action litigation, including constitutional and civil rights litigation, and have the resources necessary to pursue this litigation. Counsel for Named Plaintiffs knows of no conflicts among Plaintiff Class members.

48. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because prosecuting separate actions by individual Plaintiff Class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual Plaintiff Class members that (a) would be inconsistent or varying, and thus establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Plaintiff Class, and/or (b) as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of non-parties or would substantially impair or impede non-parties’ ability to protect their interests.

49. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Defendants have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Plaintiff Class, thereby rendering final declaratory relief and corresponding injunctive relief appropriate with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class as a whole. Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief to end Defendants’ policies, widespread practices and/or customs of surveilling, stopping, questioning, frisking, searching, seizing and/or arresting and detaining Plaintiffs for loitering for the purpose of prostitution under Section 240.37, including, and especially, based on impermissible and/or insufficient grounds.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

I. SECTION 240.37 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD, WHICH LEADS TO ARRESTS FOR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED BEHAVIOR

A. Section 240.37 Is Void for Vagueness

50. Section 240.37 is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is a criminal statute that fails to give citizens notice of the specific conduct it prohibits. Furthermore, Section 240.37 fails to provide law enforcement with clear guidelines or standards to prevent arbitrary policing.

51. Section 240.37 fails to provide any objective criteria to determine what conduct is for the “purpose” of prostitution. Absent objective criteria, such determinations are based entirely on a police officer’s subjective views, making it all but impossible for an individual to know when “beckon[ing] to” or “engag[ing] passersby in conversation,” or other commonplace, innocent conduct enumerated in the statute, may be deemed for the “purpose” of prostitution, and to conform her behavior accordingly.

52. Section 240.37 also gives police officers unfettered discretion in determining whether conduct—otherwise innocent and/or constitutionally protected—is carried out for the “purpose” of prostitution. “Purpose,” unlike “criminal intent,” is not defined in New York’s Penal Law, affording the NYPD immense discretion to assume an individual’s “purpose” without ever having to prove a mens rea element. Thus, Plaintiffs are subjected to the whims of police officers who may determine that their conduct is for the “purpose” of prostitution for any of a substantial number of reasons not enumerated in the statute and unascertainable by Plaintiffs.

53. By allowing officers’ subjective views to be determinative of whether a person’s actions demonstrate a specific intent to engage in prostitution, Section 240.37 fails to provide
individuals with the notice required under the Due Process Clause to tailor their conduct to the confines of the law and avoid arrest.

54. Furthermore, the purported guidance provided in the NYPD Patrol Guide is equally vague and otherwise flawed, thereby increasing arbitrary enforcement. For instance, the NYPD Patrol Guide instructs officers that an arrestee’s “clothing” is “pertinent” to the probable cause inquiry. At the same time, the NYPD Patrol Guide does not provide any objective criteria regarding what types of attire may or may not have probative value for purposes of establishing probable cause, thus encouraging officers to make arrests based on individual, subjective opinions regarding what clothing someone who might be “loitering for the purpose of prostitution” would wear. In pre-printed affidavits provided by prosecutors (also referred to as supporting depositions), which prompt the arresting officer to describe “revealing” or “provocative” clothing, officers often respond by citing a wide range of innocuous attire, such as “jeans,” a “black pea coat” or a pair of leggings.

1. Legislative History and Previous Legal Challenges to Section 240.37

55. The broad discretion afforded to police officers in effecting arrests under Section 240.37 has given rise to substantial constitutional concerns and controversy since the law’s adoption. Section 240.37 was enacted by the New York Legislature in 1976 as a means of eradicating what were then high rates of prostitution by making it easier for police to arrest potential prostitutes.6

56. At the time Section 240.37 was first proposed, numerous commentators, including politicians, bar and other legal associations and advocacy groups expressed grave concerns that

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6Letter from N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor to Hon. Hugh L. Carey, supra note 2; Schumach, supra note 2; Goldstein, supra note 2.
the statute would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Thomas Poster, Fears About Police Abuses
senators “have raised serious civil liberty questions” about a proposed draft of Section 240.37
and expressed concerns that the law “contains police powers that are too sweeping”); Schumach,
supra note 2 (quoting executive director of NYCLU’s concern that Section 240.37 would enable
police to “set up a dragnet of the streets”); N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, 1976 Legislative
Memorandum 20-A (arguing Section 240.37 is “far too vague and thus susceptible of arbitrary
and selective enforcement”); N.Y. State Bar Legislation Report, supra note 3 (“By giving the
police discretion to arrest anyone whom they think manifests such intent [to engage in
prostitution] the bill attempts to make it a crime to be ‘undesirable’ . . . . It thus oversteps several
constitutional bounds at once.”); Letter from Harold Baer, Jr. to Hon. Judah Gribetz, supra note 3
(writing on behalf of the State Legislation Committee of the New York State Bar Association
and the New York County Lawyers’ Association that Section 240.37 is “unconstitutional” and
would be “difficult to enforce”); see also Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Penal Law
§ 240.37 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (“Critics have argued that the proscribed conduct, such as
beckoning to, stopping or engaging passersby in conversation, is a trap into which unwary
innocent persons, particularly women, may fall.”); Letter from Michael R. Juviler, New York
Office of Court Administration, to Hon. Judah Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor (May 20, 1976)
(expressing concern that the term “for the purpose of” in Section 240.37 is “not a defined
culpable mental state”).

57. Shortly after Section 240.37 was enacted, its constitutionality was challenged on
the limited grounds that it “encourag[ed] police to use unfettered discretion in making arrests
based solely on circumstantial evidence [and] require[ed] them to infer criminality from wholly
innocent or ambiguous activity in which free citizens must necessarily engage to lead normal lives.” People v. Smith, 44 N.Y.2d 613, 619 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the New York Court of Appeals ultimately rejected that challenge, it made clear that it was not addressing a due process claim for lack of notice. Nor was it possible for the Court of Appeals to evaluate the subsequent four decades of evidence demonstrating arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute.

2. Constitutional Developments Since Section 240.37 Was Last Challenged

In the intervening four decades since Smith, several of New York’s “loitering-plus” statutes, even those purporting to “detail[ ] the prohibited conduct and limit[ ] [themselves] to one crime,” id. at 620, have been declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 421-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a public housing rule prohibiting loitering by residents in the lobby, roof, hallway or stairs because it “prohibits a vast swath of ‘conduct that is inherently innocent,’ it fails to give [public housing] residents notice of what precise conduct is prohibited, and it ‘places complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whom they will arrest’” (quoting People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 383 (1988))); Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that a statute that prohibited loitering, remaining or wandering in public for the purpose of begging impossibly chills a person’s First Amendment rights); Bright, 71 N.Y.2d at 382 (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a statute prohibiting

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7 In 1972, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a law prohibiting loitering, holding that the ordinance “makes criminal activities which by modern standards are normally innocent,” such as “[n]ightwalking,” “loafing,” or “wandering or strolling from place to place.” Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-64 (1972). Shortly thereafter, the New York State Legislature passed a series of “loitering-plus” laws, including Section 240.37, nicknamed as such because they included additional elements beyond simple loitering in order to avoid the constitutional deficiencies identified in Papachristou.
loitering “in any transportation facility, or . . . sleeping therein” for failure to provide notice or sufficient police enforcement guidelines).

59. Further, courts in six other states (Florida, Nevada, Alaska, Oklahoma, Missouri and Virginia) have held that statutes nearly identical to Section 240.37, proscribing loitering for the purpose of prostitution, are unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad. For example, in striking Alaska’s loitering-plus statute, the Supreme Court of Alaska wrote that, given the statute’s “excessive discretion, inviting by its inexactitude arbitrary enforcement and uneven application,” the court could “think of no construction which will save the statute from this infirmity.” Brown v. Municipality of Anchorage, 584 P.2d 35, 38 (Alaska 1978). See also Silvar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 129 P.3d 682, 684 (Nev. 2006); Wyche v. State, 619 So.2d 231, 234 (Fla. 1993); West Palm Beach v. Chatman, 112 So.3d 723, 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); Christian v. Kansas City, 710 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Profit v. City of Tulsa, 617 P.2d 250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).

3. New York Courts Have Been Unable to Remedy Violations of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights Attributable to Section 240.37’s Infirmities

60. When processing Section 240.37 arrests, officers and prosecutors rely on a pre-printed affidavit in which officers simply “check the boxes” that apply, indicating whether: the arrest location is known for prostitution; the defendant was on the street; the defendant was in close proximity to stores or restaurants (either open or closed); the defendant stopped motorists who were not livery, taxi or bus drivers; the defendant was standing somewhere other than a bus stop or taxi stand; the officer has previously seen the defendant in the same location engaged in the same conduct; and/or the officer has previously arrested the defendant for prostitution-related offenses.
61. The pre-printed affidavits filled out by arresting officers typically fail to articulate allegations sufficient to conclude that a female defendant was in fact loitering for the purpose of prostitution. None of the choices on the pre-printed affidavit from which an arresting officer can select reflects any criminal activity, much less activity that is indicative of prostitution. New York courts have expressed exasperation at the NYPD’s “slavish reliance” on this “pre-printed, check-off-type supporting deposition to expedite the processing” of a Section 240.37 accusatory instrument, which often “render[s] the accusatory instrument a legal nullity.” People v. Perry, Dkt. No. 2014CN003368, at *1 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2014) (quoting People v. McGinnis, 972 N.Y.S.2d 882 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2013)).

62. Courts have also emphasized that the government’s reliance on the fact that a defendant has previously been arrested for loitering for prostitution amounts to “emblazon[ing]” a “scarlet letter” on the defendant, thus violating core principles of a “free society.”

63. Despite these decisions by courts expressing concern about the NYPD’s arrests under Section 240.37, the NYPD has not reformed its policing practices with respect to Section 240.37, and the statute continues to give rise to improper and unconstitutional policing of women of color.

B. Section 240.37 Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad

64. The right to speak freely with others—whether the speaker be wealthy or poor, the listener a man or woman, and the conversation in a classroom or on a street corner—is a fundamental freedom in this country. So too is the freedom to express one’s gender identity.

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8 Additionally, check-box forms “[facilitate] post-hoc justifications for stops where none may have existed at the time of the stop . . . . ‘[T]he overwhelming belief of experts [is] that a narrative field in which the officers describe the circumstances for each stop would be the best way to gather information that will be used to analyze reasonable suspicion’ and, relatedly, ‘prevent[] racially biased policing.’” Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Susan Hutson, Independent Police Monitor, Review of the New Orleans Police Department’s Field Interview Policies, Practices and Data: Final Report 45 (Mar. 12, 2013)).
through her attire, without fear of police surveillance or arrest. Section 240.37 interferes with Plaintiffs' exercise of these fundamental freedoms through the statute's overbroad criminalization of constitutionally protected expression.

65. By its plain terms, Section 240.37 criminalizes protected expressive activity by prohibiting individuals from repeatedly "attempt[ing] to engage passers-by in conversation." While courts have interpreted the prohibitions on "conversation" to be limited to those conversations that are "for the purpose of prostitution," the vagueness of that phrase, see supra Section I.A., renders it meaningless and ineffective as a limiting construction. The lack of objective criteria as to what constitutes activity "for the purpose of prostitution" effectively sweeps all conversations that occur in a public place as falling within the ambit of the statute. Because an officer may determine that a conversation is "for the purpose of prostitution" for any one of countless reasons having nothing to do with the content of the conversation—such as the neighborhood in which it takes place or the speaker's attire or gender, among others—merely talking to others in public becomes an activity in which Plaintiffs no longer feel free to engage, fearing that doing so may put them at risk of being unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained.

66. A sampling of supporting depositions filled out by NYPD officers following arrests of Named Plaintiffs under Section 240.37 validates these concerns. As grounds justifying the arrests, many of the supporting depositions include allegations that the defendant engaged in conversation with male passersby—yet none lists any information regarding the content of those conversations. Plainly then, any conversation may be used to justify an arrest, making it all but certain that a substantial number of arrests involve conversations wholly unrelated to prostitution. Moreover, the simple fact that Plaintiffs can be arrested under Section 240.37 for
conversations unrelated to prostitution based on other attendant circumstances, including those over which Plaintiffs have no control (such as the neighborhood or time of day), serves to chill protected expressive activity by Plaintiffs.

67. The expression of Plaintiffs’ gender identity through their choice of dress and hair style is similarly chilled by Section 240.37. Plaintiffs have a liberty interest in their personal appearance, including in deciding what clothes to wear and how to style their hair, nails and other physical attributes. Yet, Plaintiffs’ clothing choices, and officers’ subjective interpretation of those choices, have been and continue to be the basis for arrests under Section 240.37. Transgender Plaintiffs in particular have a constitutionally protected interest in communicating their gender identity to the public, including through grooming and clothing decisions that send a message to the world that they are female regardless of the sex they were assigned at birth. By choosing to dress and present themselves in a manner that expresses their gender identity as women, transgender Plaintiffs are engaging in expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The NYPD’s decision to enforce Section 240.37 by arresting transgender Plaintiffs on the basis of these choices impermissibly infringes on and chills transgender Plaintiffs’ protected First Amendment conduct. As the New York Times succinctly put it: “If you are a 35-year-old biological woman wearing the $715 metallic platform peep-toe pumps you just bought at Barneys to lunch at Café Boulud, you are well-dressed; if you were born Joaquin, have changed your name to Marisol and put yourself together with a similar verve, you are a prostitute.”

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68. Further, Section 240.37 is overbroad for the additional reason that any legitimate application of the statute is merely duplicative of preexisting criminal prohibitions. New York separately prohibits prostitution and, under various provisions of New York Penal Law, officers may arrest individuals for solicitation of prostitution (P.L. § 230.00) and for attempted prostitution (P.L. § 110.00). Rather than addressing independent, additional criminal activity, Section 240.37 serves only to chill constitutionally protected expressive conduct.

II. THE CITY HAS POLICIES, WIDESPREAD PRACTICES, AND/OR CUSTOMS OF DISCRIMINATORY AND ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 240.37

69. The City consciously chooses to enforce Section 240.37 and to do so in an unconstitutional manner by using it to police expressions of gender identity and sexuality based on outdated and paternalistic notions of what clothing NYPD officers deem “revealing” or “provocative,” with a disproportionate impact on women of color. The City’s unconstitutional enforcement of Section 240.37 in this manner takes many forms. For example, the City uses unconstitutional sweeps to enforce Section 240.37; unlawfully surveils, stops, questions, frisks, searches, seizes and/or arrests and detains Plaintiffs for constitutionally protected conduct; routinely engages in unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and discriminates against protected classes in its enforcement of Section 240.37.

70. Furthermore, the City has failed to curtail policies, widespread practices and/or customs that contribute to the constitutional violations, such as maintaining performance goals and arrest quotas for officers and sanctioning arrest sweeps in minority neighborhoods. It has also failed to take corrective action in the hiring, retention or supervision of its officers despite notice of their routine violations of individuals’ constitutional rights. The City has also failed to
adequately train, audit, monitor, supervise and discipline police officers engaged in law enforcement actions pursuant to Section 240.37 to prevent constitutional violations and discriminatory enforcement.


71. Transgender individuals experience high levels of discrimination in places of public accommodation. Studies show that over half of transgender individuals nationwide report being verbally harassed and disrespected in public, with 22% of African-American respondents reporting having been a victim of physical assault. Transgender women of color are often unlawfully subjected to surveillance, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained pursuant to Section 240.37 under circumstances in which men, white women and cis-gender women are not subjected to such law enforcement actions.

72. As a result of this ongoing discrimination, many transgender individuals live, work and/or socialize near one another. The communities they create are safe spaces in which they can socialize with minimal harassment and discrimination. One such community exists in the catchment of the 52nd precinct in the Bronx, in the neighborhood surrounding the intersection of 192nd Street and Davidson Avenue, which borders Monroe College. The NYPD is aware that this area is inhabited and/or frequented by many transgender individuals.

73. The City has a policy, widespread practice and/or custom whereby its officers conduct “sweeps” in which a particular precinct deploys a group of officers to a particular

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10 Jaime M. Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey 5, 124 (2011).
location to arrest as many women as possible—in particular, women of color and transgender women—for Section 240.37 offenses.

74. Two such sweeps were conducted in the 52nd precinct on June 6-7 and 13-14, 2015. In a span of just over two hours on June 6, 2015, Defendants Keane, Dawkins, Kinane and Doe NYPD Officers #1-3 arrested at least eight transgender women, including D.H. and N.H. Defendant McKenna approved the arrests of D.H. and N.H. At the precinct, one of the arresting officers told the women that they had been conducting a sweep to let “girls like them” and their friends know that if the police saw them outside after midnight, they would arrest them.

75. One week later, in the same location, on the night of June 13, 2015, Defendants Imburgia, Doe NYPD Officer #4, Doe NYPD Officer #5 and non-party Officer Monge arrested at least six transgender women in a span of 25 minutes, including Plaintiff K.H. At least seven similar sweeps—and potentially many more—have been conducted by NYPD officers in the past three years in Brooklyn, the Bronx and Queens as a result of the City’s policies, widespread practices and/or customs.

76. The City further has a policy, widespread practice and/or custom of enforcing performance goals and arrest quotas that cause officers to arrest Plaintiffs under Section 240.37 without probable cause.

77. The use of performance goals and quotas pushes officers to aggressively, and often unlawfully, undertake law enforcement activity in order to be considered for promotions and other career incentives. Indeed, the City imposes requirements that officers issue, make or fill out a certain number of summons, arrests and stop forms within specified time periods.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} See\textsuperscript{\textit{Floyd}}, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600.
78. These policies lead to disproportionate enforcement of Section 240.37 against marginalized groups such as Plaintiffs. As described by a former NYPD officer, these policies impact “the most vulnerable . . . [members of the] LGBT community, . . . the black community, . . . those people that have no vote, that have no power.”12 As another officer explained, “when you put pressure on cops to come up with numbers . . . it’s the black, it’s the Hispanic, it’s the LGBT community. We go for the most vulnerable.”13

79. Officers are warned that failure to comply with numerical activity standards will result in adverse employment actions.14

80. Once arrested, transgender women of color endure further discriminatory and unlawful treatment at the hands of the NYPD, including verbal abuse by officers and other detainees. Moreover, once these women have been arrested under Section 240.37, they are subject to a higher risk of re-arrest, as shown below.

81. Plaintiffs have repeatedly been victims of this practice. They experience heightened police surveillance and activity, false arrests and discrimination. Many transgender Plaintiffs fear leaving their homes, particularly at night, due to the City’s policy, widespread practice and/or custom of targeting them for arrest under Section 240.37.

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14 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600.
B. The City Has a Policy, Widespread Practice and/or Custom of Unlawfully Arresting Plaintiffs Under Section 240.37 Without Probable Cause

82. In addition to targeting transgender Plaintiffs for arrest under Section 240.37 without probable cause in sweeps, the City has a policy, widespread practice and/or custom whereby its officers unlawfully arrest Plaintiffs without probable cause by, inter alia, (1) arresting individuals based on a prior arrest under Section 240.37 and P.L. § 230.00 (prostitution), regardless of the outcome of the prior charge; (2) arresting individuals for being present in areas the police arbitrarily designate as “prostitution-prone”; and (3) arresting Plaintiffs after observing them for short periods of time and while Plaintiffs are engaged in innocent conduct.

83. The NYPD Patrol Guide instructs officers effecting arrests under Section 240.37 to “[i]nform [the] assistant district attorney of actions or any additional pertinent information,” including whether the defendant is a “known prostitute” or “[c]onsorts with known prostitutes or pimps.” By including an arrestee’s status as a “known prostitute” among the categories of “pertinent information” showing an intent to engage in prostitution, the NYPD has unlawfully created a policy, widespread practice and/or custom of arresting individuals for loitering for the purpose of prostitution merely because they have previously been arrested for the same offense or another prostitution-related offense, even if charges were ultimately dismissed. As a result of this perverse practice, Plaintiffs who have been wrongfully arrested under Section 240.37 in the past are more vulnerable to additional unlawful arrests in the future, despite the fact that “all official records and papers . . . relating to the arrest” in connection with a dismissed charge are to

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be “sealed and not made available to any person or public or private agency” under Criminal Procedure Law § 160.50.

84. NYPD officers recognize Plaintiffs whom they have previously arrested for prostitution-related charges and arrest those women again without probable cause based merely on the prior arrest, in violation of Plaintiffs’ right to be free of unreasonable seizures.

85. Additionally, NYPD officers typically approach women, and in particular women of color, including transgender women, while they are lawfully present in public and request their identification. The officers then use the NYPD database to determine if a woman has previously been arrested for a prostitution-related offense. If she has, the officer will arrest the woman based on the arrest history alone, without any facts suggesting that she was loitering with the intent to engage in prostitution. This self-perpetuating cycle unlawfully prejudices any woman who has ever been arrested, even if the charges underlying her original arrest were dismissed.

86. NYPD officers also make unlawful arrests under Section 240.37 based on Plaintiffs’ appearance. For example, when filling out pre-printed affidavits after arrests, officers frequently check the box that the arrestee was “dressed in provocative or revealing clothing . . . .” But often, officers’ reliance on a woman’s clothing for probable cause is entirely pretextual. NYPD officers cite countless types of clothing in their supporting depositions to justify arrests, many of which are far from “provocative” or “revealing.” For instance, descriptions of such “provocative” or “revealing” clothing have included jeans, a black pea coat, a white jacket and a blue and white jump suit.

87. Moreover, in today’s cultural and legal landscape, which has changed significantly from that in which the New York Court of Appeals decided Smith, and in which
people freely and frequently express their identity through clothing and appearance, so-called “revealing” clothing has little, if any, probative value. The NYPD’s enforcement practices with respect to Section 240.37 highlight this fact: even if an arrestee’s clothing actually were “revealing,” this type of “dress code” is not policed against men or white women. Only women of color are systematically arrested for wearing clothing that emphasizes their femininity, making clear that “revealing” clothing is used simply as a pretextual justification for arrests without probable cause based on race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance. See infra Section II.C.

88. NYPD officers similarly make unlawful arrests under Section 240.37 on the basis of arbitrary designations that an area is “prostitution-prone,” even though that designation is based on the NYPD’s own dedication of resources to make high numbers of arrests in that area, not how much crime or prostitution actually occurs in that area as compared to another.

89. As a result, the areas where police have previously made prostitution arrests become the same areas that police then characterize as “prostitution-prone” to justify future arrests.

90. Finally, NYPD officers frequently make arrests after observing Plaintiffs engage in lawful conduct for very brief periods of time. For example, Defendant Keane observed N.H. for only five minutes before arresting her. During such brief observation periods, officers cannot establish probable cause to conclude that an individual is loitering, much less to determine whether that individual’s conduct is “for the purpose” of engaging in prostitution.
C. The City Has a Policy, Widespread Practice and/or Custom of Discriminating Against Women of Color

91. The City has a policy, widespread practice and/or custom whereby women of color are arrested under Section 240.37 at a much higher rate than men or white women. Women of color are commonly unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained under Section 240.37 under circumstances in which men and white women are not subjected to such law enforcement activity, such as for merely engaging in conversation with individuals of the opposite gender. Moreover, the unconstitutional policing practices described above occur almost exclusively in low income communities of color.

92. Defendants utilize Section 240.37 to unlawfully effect arrests based on gender. While Section 240.37 is gender- and race-neutral on its face, the discriminatory manner in which it is enforced leads to a significantly disproportionate impact on women of color. Even more telling, women of color are commonly arrested under Section 240.37 based on allegations that they were repeatedly beckoning to, stopping or attempting to stop or engaging in conversation with male passersby. Men engaged in similar behavior are not arrested under the statute. Men commonly attempt to speak to women passing by, attempt to engage those women in conversation and even make comments related to sexual conduct. However, NYPD officers discriminate based on gender by concluding that women engaged in such conduct are seeking to offer sex in exchange for money, and therefore are subject to arrest, while men doing so are merely paying a compliment.

93. Women’s liberty interest in making choices about their personal appearance is also disproportionately impacted by the NYPD’s enforcement of Section 240.37 as compared to

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16 NYPD identified 85% of the arrestees under Section 240.37 as Black or Latina. DCJS Arrest Statistics 2012-2013, supra note 5.
that of men. While the NYPD commonly arrests women under Section 240.37 for wearing clothing that highlights their femininity, no arrests are made of men for wearing clothing that highlights their masculinity, or based on any aspects of their personal appearance at all.

94. Women of color are disproportionately subject to arrests based on so-called “revealing” clothing as compared to white women who are similarly attired. Indeed, disproportionately arresting women of color for wearing “revealing” clothing is merely one of a number of discriminatory practices by the NYPD, along with labeling heavily minority neighborhoods as “prostitution-prone,” that causes Section 240.37 to be used to unlawfully effect arrests based on race.

95. The NYPD’s disproportionate targeting of people of color was thoroughly documented in the court’s findings in Floyd v. City of New York.17 In Floyd, the court made numerous findings demonstrating the NYPD’s practice of discriminating on the basis of race when implementing its stop-and-frisk policy. First, the court found that the NYPD carried out more stops in areas with a higher percentage of African-American and Hispanic residents.18 Second, even controlling for the racial composition of the area, African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped than whites.19 Third, African-Americans were more likely to be arrested after a stop for the same suspected crime.20 Fourth, African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely than whites to be subjected to the use of force.21

17 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540.
18 Id. at 589.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
96. In addition to these findings, the court in Floyd also found that the most common reason given for a stop was that it was in a “high crime area.”\textsuperscript{22} The court recognized that this was a weak indicator of criminal activity, noting that stops were more likely to result in arrest where “high crime area” was not given as a reason for the stop.\textsuperscript{23} As shown above, the City employs substantially the same tactic in designating areas as “prostitution-prone.” This practice contributes to the discriminatory enforcement of Section 240.37 in communities of color which have traditionally experienced higher concentrations of law enforcement than other communities.

97. Further illustrating this point, Section 240.37 arrests in New York City are clustered in several particular neighborhoods whose residents are largely people of color. For example, the five NYPD precincts with the most Section 240.37 arrests between 2012 and 2015, accounting for 68.5% of all Section 240.37 arrests during that period, are Bushwick, Brooklyn; Belmont/Fordham Heights, Bronx; East New York, Brooklyn; Hunts Point, Bronx; and Brownsville, Brooklyn, neighborhoods where residents are predominantly people of color.\textsuperscript{24}

98. The result of this unlawful enforcement of Section 240.37 is that women of color are subject to arrest for innocent conduct in a manner and with a frequency that others not belonging to this group are not. Specifically, men engaging in the same conduct are much less likely to face unlawful arrest and prosecution under Section 240.37, as are white women. This unequal and discriminatory enforcement violates Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.

\textsuperscript{22} Id. at 574-75.

\textsuperscript{23} Id. at 575.

\textsuperscript{24} The 41\textsuperscript{st}, 52\textsuperscript{nd}, 73\textsuperscript{rd}, 75\textsuperscript{th}, and 83\textsuperscript{rd} precincts largely encompass the above-mentioned neighborhoods. DCJS Arrest Statistics 2012-2015, supra note 5. Cf. Sharing NYC Police Precinct Data, johnkeefe.net (Apr. 29, 2011), http://johnkeefe.net/nyc-police-precinct-and-census-data.
D. The City Knew or Should Have Known of the Need for Corrective Action to Prevent Constitutional Violations of Plaintiffs’ Rights to Free Speech, Equal Protection of the Laws and Freedom from Unreasonable Seizures and False Arrests, and Failed to Take Corrective Action to Prevent Such Violations, Including by Failing to Adequately Train, Monitor, Supervise or Discipline Responsible Officers

99. The City has a policy, widespread practice and/or custom whereby it provides guidance that lacks any objective basis for determining whether conduct is “for the purpose” of prostitution. It affords officers extraordinary discretion in making such determinations that unconstitutionally infringe on Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights without sufficient training, guidelines, monitoring, supervision and accountability to ensure that officers do not abuse their discretion. Further, it is obvious that the failure to take such action will result in such violations of Plaintiffs’ rights, especially in light of the “performance goal” and quota policies encouraging aggressive law enforcement activities.

100. As to certain Individual Defendants, prior to the unlawful conduct alleged in the present action, the City had notice that many of these Individual Defendants had engaged in misconduct while carrying out surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of various individuals. For example, Defendants Imburgia, Diggs, Gomez, Nicosia and Yanez, allegedly abused their discretion while carrying out surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of other individuals, prior to the unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests and detention of Named Plaintiffs K.H., R.G. and Sarah Marchando in the present action.\(^{25}\)

101. Additionally, the City was aware through multiple lawsuits filed against it that NYPD officers falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted multiple persons for loitering for the purpose of prostitution with less than probable cause.26

102. The City nonetheless failed to adequately train, monitor and supervise NYPD officers making arrests under Section 240.37 or to discipline officers enforcing Section 240.37 in an arbitrary and/or discriminatory manner in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights. Instead, the City allowed, and continues to allow, officers to abuse their discretion, resulting in the unlawful and discriminatory targeting of Plaintiffs for law enforcement action on the basis of Plaintiffs’ speech or other protected conduct or Plaintiffs’ race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance, and unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion or probable cause under Section 240.37 in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights.

103. For instance, Defendant Imburgia’s paperwork regarding the arrests she made in connection with the sweeps conducted by the 52nd precinct on June 13-14, 2015 places her at

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26 See Jones v. City of New York, No.11-cv-05735-PGG (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2012) (transgender woman falsely arrested under Section 240.37 on November 4, 2010 by 52nd precinct officers after leaving a restaurant); Gonzalez v. City of New York, 08-CV 2699 (JBJ)(CLP) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2008) (woman falsely arrested under Section 240.37 on November 18, 2007 by 72nd precinct while walking to the hospital by officers who falsely stated plaintiff had previous loitering arrest); Gonney v. City of New York, No. 11-cv-00298-RRM-MDG (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011) (woman falsely arrested under Section 240.37 on August 29, 2010 while walking in the vicinity of her home in the 73rd precinct).
different locations at the same time. By her own accounts, Defendant Imburgia was arresting an individual at one location at a certain time while simultaneously observing K.H. in a wholly separate location. Nonetheless, Defendant Maloney approved K.H.’s arrest. Similarly, non-party Officer Monge’s sworn statement in one case from the same sweep indicates he observed an individual he believed to be loitering from 2:40 a.m. through 3:10 a.m., while arrest paperwork from another case shows that during that same time period, he effectuated the arrests of two other women. With appropriate monitoring and supervision, such abuses could be identified and discouraged by means of appropriate discipline for the officers responsible.

104. The City is also aware—because, among other reasons, it maintains law enforcement activity statistics and records—that transgender women of color are targeted for arrest under Section 240.37 and are systematically discriminated against and mistreated by NYPD officers.

105. Indeed, the City amended the NYPD Patrol Guide in June 2012 “follow[ing] years of complaints about police mistreatment [of transgender women].”27 However, these amendments have proven insufficient and, in the years since, widespread police abuse and mistreatment of transgender women has continued largely unabated. Plaintiffs have suffered, and continue to suffer, from the deprivation of rights that flows from being unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained under Section 240.37.

106. Despite its own knowledge of unlawful law enforcement actions under, and discriminatory enforcement of, Section 240.37, the City has failed to take sufficient corrective action to rectify these violations of Plaintiffs’ rights, including by: failing to sufficiently train

officers in enforcing Section 240.37 in a non-discriminatory manner and in making arrests under Section 240.37 only where there is probable cause; failing to monitor, supervise and, when appropriate, take disciplinary and/or remedial action against officers who make arrests under Section 240.37 without probable cause on the basis of past arrests or after insufficient periods of observation, or who disproportionately arrest women of color, including transgender women of color engaging in protected First Amendment activity under Section 240.37 or otherwise violate Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech, free association or equal protection of the laws; failing to audit arrests under Section 240.37 to determine whether they are made in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech, free association, equal protection of the laws or freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and failing to adequately monitor officers who are the subject of multiple civilian complaints.

107. The City’s deliberate indifference in failing to take such corrective action was and continues to be a direct and proximate cause of past and ongoing violations of Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech, free association and equal protection of the laws, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.

III. NAMED PLAINTIFFS HAVE BEEN TARGETED FOR UNLAWFUL SURVEILLANCE, STOPS, QUESTIONING, FRISKS, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND/OR ARREST AND DETENTION UNDER SECTION 240.37

A. Named Plaintiffs Arrested During Sweeps Targeting Transgender Women of Color

1. Named Plaintiff D.H.

108. D.H. is a 26-year-old African-American woman who currently resides in the Bronx. D.H. is deaf and communicates through sign language, writing or texting on her phone.

109. D.H. is a transgender woman. D.H. communicates and expresses her femininity through, among other means, her choices in hair, makeup, clothing and general appearance.
110. In the early morning on June 6, 2015, D.H. was walking near the corner of Fordham Road and Jerome Avenue and trying to hail a cab to get home. At the time, she was living with her sister in the neighborhood. She was walking with her phone in her hand when she saw an unmarked police car pull up next to her.

111. At no time on June 6, 2015 did D.H. solicit or attempt to solicit money in exchange for sex, trespass onto private property or otherwise engage in any unlawful or criminal conduct related to prostitution.

112. Defendants Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1 and Doe NYPD Officer #2 exited the vehicle and approached D.H. She pointed to her ear to indicate that she was deaf and tried to also tell the officers by typing in her phone that she was deaf. Without reading what D.H. had typed on her phone, the officers grabbed her bag and began searching its contents. D.H. could not understand what the officers were saying to her and did not consent to the search.

113. As they took her bag, the officers also took D.H.'s phone and cuffed her hands behind her back. In so doing, the officers made it impossible for D.H. to communicate with them. She did not understand why she was being arrested. D.H.'s arresting officers did not appear to care that D.H. was unable to communicate, and laughed at her.

114. D.H. was placed in the unmarked police car and driven a few blocks to a police van. There were three other transgender women in the van who had already been arrested. D.H. had seen the women in the community and recognized them as transgender women.

115. During this ordeal, D.H. began to experience very sharp pain in her shoulder due to the manner in which her hands were cuffed behind her back. D.H. was screaming in pain, but without any means of communication, she was unable to articulate what was wrong. The officers ignored her screams.
116. D.H. and the three other transgender women were taken to the 52nd precinct, where D.H. spent the remainder of the night in a holding cell with the other women. D.H. attempted to get the attention of numerous officers to obtain a sign language interpreter, but was repeatedly ignored. At one point, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #14 gave D.H. a pen and paper and she wrote that she needed a sign language interpreter. Despite receiving D.H.’s request for an interpreter in writing, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #14 and the other officers in the 52nd precinct failed to provide a sign language interpreter to communicate with D.H. as they processed her arrest.

117. In the morning, D.H. was transferred to central booking to await arraignment. D.H. was finally provided with a sign language interpreter and only then did she learn the reason for her arrest and the nature of the charges against her. She was arraigned in the evening on June 6, 2015, and then released.

118. D.H. was devastated by her arrest. After her arrest, she worried about being unlawfully arrested again so she stopped going out at night. D.H. moved out of her neighborhood in July 2015. Since she moved, D.H. has started going out again, but she avoids returning to the area of her arrest, which means she is rarely able to visit her sister or friends.

119. After her arrest, D.H. feels that she can no longer contact the police if she is in need of help because she will be unable to communicate with them and because she fears that they will be hostile toward her. D.H. was shocked by the acts of Defendants Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2, Doe NYPD Officer #14 and McKenna, and felt violated by their actions.

120. D.H. continued to experience pain in her shoulder for weeks after her arrest.
121. In the supporting deposition accompanying the criminal court complaint charging D.H. with violating Section 240.37, Defendant Kinane falsely alleged that on June 6, 2015, he observed D.H. for 15 minutes “during which time [D.H.] beckoned to passing traffic and stopped or attempted to stop 2 male passersby and 1 male motorist” from “the middle of the street.” He also alleged that D.H.’s purpose was prostitution based on her presence at a location “frequented by people engaged in prostitution” and because she was wearing a “short skirt.”

122. Defendant McKenna failed to properly review, monitor and supervise Defendant Kinane’s, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #1’s and Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #2’s unlawful stop, questioning, search and seizure of D.H., and approved D.H.’s arrest.

123. After her initial court appearance, D.H. was forced to return to court three additional times, under the threat of having the judge issue a bench warrant for her arrest. All criminal charges against D.H. were adjourned in contemplation of dismissal pursuant to C.P.L. § 170.55 on October 29, 2015. The charges were dismissed and sealed on April 28, 2016.

124. By the actions described above, Defendants Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and McKenna targeted and/or sanctioned the targeting of D.H. for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on her race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.

125. The actions of Defendants Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2, Doe NYPD Officer #14 and McKenna deprived D.H. of her liberty and caused her pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

2. **Named Plaintiff N.H.**

126. N.H. is a 36-year-old African-American woman who currently resides in the Bronx.
127. N.H. is a transgender woman. N.H. communicates and expresses her femininity through, among other means, her choices in hair, makeup, clothing and general appearance.

128. In the early morning of June 6, 2015, N.H. went to a store on Davidson Avenue near her apartment. After purchasing food and cigarettes, N.H. began to walk home. She had walked only a few blocks when Defendants Dawkins, Keane and Doe NYPD Officer #3 pulled up in a marked police patrol car, jumped out and approached her. They ordered N.H. to put her hands behind her back and then handcuffed her.

129. At no time on June 6, 2015 did N.H. solicit or attempt to solicit money in exchange for sex, trespass onto private property or otherwise engage in any unlawful or criminal conduct related to prostitution.

130. When N.H. asked why she was being arrested, the officers refused to explain and simply said, “you know.” Defendants Dawkins, Keane, and Doe NYPD Officer #3 placed her in the patrol car and drove around with her for over one hour, and then arrested a Latina woman who was also transgender and put her in the car with N.H. N.H. learned from this woman that she had been arrested for loitering for the purpose of prostitution.

131. At the 52nd precinct, Defendant Dawkins cut off the hood of N.H.’s sweatshirt and attempted to cut the laces out of her boots, permanently destroying both items of clothing and forcing her to remain in socks the entire time she was detained at the precinct. Defendant Dawkins also forcefully pulled N.H.’s earrings out of her ears and attempted to remove N.H.’s wig. Because the wig was attached to N.H.’s own hair, Defendant Dawkins pulled N.H.’s hair, causing her severe pain.

132. Throughout the booking process, Defendant Dawkins and other non-party officers referred to N.H. as a man. N.H. directed the officers to her identification, which identifies her as
female, but the officers, including Defendant Dawkins, persisted in referring to her as a boy or man.

133. N.H. was kept in handcuffs throughout the booking process—a period of approximately one hour—until she was placed in a holding cell with approximately ten other transgender women who had also been arrested for loitering for the purpose of prostitution. The officers continued to refer to N.H. and the other transgender women in the cell as “boys” and “men.”

134. One of N.H.’s arresting officers told the women that the police had been conducting a sweep and that if they saw “girls like them” outside after midnight, they would arrest them. When N.H. stated that she lives in the area, the officer told her that she should not go out on Jerome Avenue.

135. At the time of her arrest, N.H. had approximately $60 in her purse. Although the NYPD Patrol Guide requires arresting officers to return to arrestees all currency less than $100, N.H.’s arresting officers did not return these funds to her. Instead, she was forced to go through the arrest process without any money in violation of the arrest procedures established in the NYPD Patrol Guide.

136. N.H. was taken into custody at 2:15 a.m. on June 6, 2015. She was detained for approximately 40 hours before she was arraigned on the evening of June 7. The court set bail at $50, which N.H. would have been able to post immediately had her arresting officers not denied her the return of her funds. As a result, she was forced to spend over 24 hours in detention at the Vernon C. Bain Correctional Center, a New York City Department of Correction facility for adult men. She was finally released in the early morning of June 9, 2015, three days after her arrest.
137. Upon her release, N.H. went to the 52nd precinct to retrieve her personal property, including the keys to her apartment. At the precinct, she was told that the officer responsible for the property was not present and that she would need to return in the morning. Locked out of her own home, N.H. was forced to find another place to sleep that night. The next day, after returning to the precinct without her property, she learned that her keys had been there the whole time. Her jewelry and other personal possessions were never returned.

138. In the supporting deposition accompanying the criminal court complaint charging N.H. with violating Section 240.37, Defendant Keane falsely alleged that, on June 6, 2015, he observed N.H. for five minutes, “during which time [N.H.] beckoned to passing traffic and stopped or attempted to stop 3 male passersby.” He further alleged that N.H.’s purpose was prostitution because she was observed previously at a location “frequented by people engaged in prostitution” and was wearing a “blonde wig, tight pants and shirt.” Defendant Keane also alleged that he knew that “other officers have previously arrested [N.H.] for prostitution-related offense(s).”

139. Defendant McKenna failed to properly review, monitor and supervise Defendant Keane’s, Defendant Dawkins’s and Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #3’s unlawful stop and seizure of N.H., and approved N.H.’s arrest.

140. After her initial court appearance, N.H. was forced to return to court four additional times over nearly five months, under the threat of having the judge issue a bench warrant for her arrest. All criminal charges against N.H. were adjourned in contemplation of dismissal pursuant to C.P.L. § 170.55 on October 29, 2015. The charges were dismissed and sealed on April 28, 2016.
141. Since her arrest, N.H. has tried to avoid going out late at night because the officers told her explicitly that she would be arrested if she did so. She usually reserves for daylight hours even simple errands, such as going to a store, in order to reduce the risk that she will be improperly arrested. As such, the acts of Defendants Dawkins, Keane, Doe NYPD Officer #3 and McKenna intimidated and threatened N.H.

142. By the actions described above, Defendants Dawkins, Keane, Doe NYPD Officer #3 and McKenna targeted and/or sanctioned the targeting of N.H. for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on her race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.

143. The actions of Defendants Dawkins, Keane, Doe NYPD Officer #3 and McKenna deprived N.H. of her liberty and caused her pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

3. **Named Plaintiff K.H.**

144. K.H. is a 32-year-old African-American woman who currently resides in Florida. At the time of her unlawful arrest under Section 240.37, she resided in the Bronx.

145. K.H. is a transgender woman. K.H. communicates and expresses her femininity through, among other means, her choices in hair, makeup, clothing and general appearance.

146. In the early morning of June 13, 2015, K.H. was walking home to her apartment when she met another transgender woman and started a conversation. As they walked together, K.H. and her friend spoke to only one other person, a woman. As K.H. and her friend continued to walk, Defendants Imburgia, Doe NYPD Officer #4 and Doe NYPD Officer #5 jumped out of an unmarked police car and accosted them. The officers arrested both women on the spot.
147. At no time on June 13, 2015 did K.H. solicit or attempt to solicit money in exchange for sex, trespass onto private property or otherwise engage in any unlawful or criminal conduct related to prostitution.

148. K.H. and her friend were placed in a van with two other women. Over the course of the next five minutes, more women were arrested and loaded into the van. The officers then brought all of the detained women to the 52nd precinct. Throughout this ordeal, the handcuffs around K.H.'s wrists were pulled so tightly that they left indentation marks on her wrists and caused her pain. Defendants Imburgia, Doe NYPD Officer #4 and Doe NYPD Officer #5 ignored K.H.'s repeated requests to loosen the handcuffs.

149. At the precinct, K.H. was placed in a holding cell. Once inside the cell, she and the other women with whom she was held were not permitted to use the bathroom. Having no other choice, several women urinated on the floor or in bottles that had been left in the cell.

150. At approximately 7 a.m., K.H. was taken to central booking for her arraignment. She was released at approximately 3 p.m.

151. At the time of her arrest, K.H. had expensive make-up (primers, lipsticks and pencils) and other personal items in her purse. When she returned to the precinct to recover her belongings, her personal items, including the make-up, were no longer in her purse.

152. After her arrest, K.H. became estranged from her transgender friends, whom she believes are now afraid to associate with her because they perceive her to be under scrutiny by the police. Fearing another false arrest, she also avoided leaving her house alone and went outside only with her husband. K.H.'s false arrest was a motivating factor in her decision to move to Florida, as she worried about being unlawfully arrested again in another sweep if she
stayed in the Bronx and wished to end “living in fear.” Even after moving, she still believes that she cannot trust the police.

153. In the supporting deposition accompanying the criminal court complaint charging K.H. with violating Section 240.37, Defendant Imburgia falsely alleged that, on June 13, 2015, she observed K.H. for a half hour “during which time [K.H.] beckoned to passing traffic and stopped or attempted to stop three male passersby and two male motorists.” She further alleged that K.H.’s purpose was prostitution because she was at a location “frequented by people engaged in prostitution” and was wearing a “tight short black dress.”

154. Defendant Maloney failed to properly review, monitor and supervise Defendant Imburgia’s, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #4’s and Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #5’s unlawful stop and seizure of K.H., and approved K.H.’s arrest.

155. After her initial court appearance, K.H. was forced to return to court five additional times, under the threat of having the judge issue a bench warrant for her arrest. All criminal charges against K.H. were adjourned in contemplation of dismissal pursuant to C.P.L. § 170.55 on November 12, 2015 and dismissed and sealed on May 11, 2016.

156. By the actions described above, Defendants Imburgia, Doe NYPD Officer #4, Doe NYPD Officer #5 and Maloney targeted and/or sanctioned the targeting of K.H. for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on her race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.

157. The actions of Defendants Imburgia, Doe NYPD Officer #4, Doe NYPD Officer #5 and Maloney intimidated and threatened K.H., deprived her of her liberty and caused her pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.
4. Named Plaintiff Natasha Martin

158. Natasha Martin is a 38-year-old African-American woman who currently resides in Brooklyn.

159. Ms. Martin is a transgender woman. Ms. Martin communicates and expresses her femininity through, among other means, her choices in hair, makeup, clothing and general appearance.

160. The night of February 2, 2016, Ms. Martin had visited a friend who lives in Brooklyn. She stayed at her friend’s house that evening.

161. The next morning, February 3, 2016, Ms. Martin left her friend’s house at approximately 6:30 a.m. She left at the same time as her friend, who had to be at work by 7:00 or 7:30 a.m.

162. Ms. Martin said goodbye to her friend and then walked on the sidewalk for about two blocks before stopping at the corner of Bushwick Avenue and Woodbine Street to smoke a cigarette. She did not encounter or speak to anyone during that time.

163. At no time on February 3, 2016 did Ms. Martin solicit or attempt to solicit money in exchange for sex, trespass onto private property or otherwise engage in any unlawful or criminal conduct related to prostitution.

164. Ten minutes later, a marked police van pulled up next to her. Three officers jumped out: two male officers, Defendant Joel Allen and Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #6, both in plainclothes, and a female officer, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #7, who was wearing a blue uniform.

165. Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #6 asked Ms. Martin what she was doing, and she responded that she was “minding her own business.” After the officer told her that her answer
“wasn’t good enough,” Ms. Martin responded that she was coming from a friend’s house.

166. Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #6 then told Ms. Martin that his supervisor, Defendant Dave Siev, had instructed him to arrest her and that the area in which she was standing was a “hot” area for prostitution. Ms. Martin asked him how she was supposed to know that and further asked, “Is it a crime to be on the corner?” Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #6 then asked for her name. When Ms. Martin responded that her name is Natasha, he asked whether that was her “real name.” She responded “yes” and gave the officer her driver’s license, which says “Natasha Martin” and “female” on it.

167. The officers arrested Ms. Martin and placed her in handcuffs about five minutes after they had first pulled up to her. Ms. Martin’s arrest was one of several that were part of a sweep of the neighborhood.

168. As they drove her to the 83rd precinct, Defendant Allen made derogatory comments such as, “which one of you is going to process the he/she?”

169. When they arrived at the precinct, the officers put her in a cell with another woman. There was a third woman in the men’s cell nearby. Ms. Martin learned from these women that they had also been arrested in the same sweep for loitering for the purpose of prostitution.

170. Ms. Martin was kept at the precinct for about four hours. Along with the other two women, she was released from the precinct with a desk appearance ticket.

171. In the supporting deposition accompanying the criminal court complaint charging Ms. Martin with violating Section 240.37, Defendant Siev falsely alleged that on February 3, 2016, he “observed [Ms. Martin] . . . remain or wander about in a public place for a period of . . . 8 minutes, during which [Ms. Martin] repeatedly beckoned to passers-by and stopped 3
passers-by, engaging in conversation with those passers-by.” Ms. Martin did not in fact encounter or speak to anyone after saying goodbye to her friend until she was confronted by Defendants Allen, Doe NYPD Officer #6 and Doe NYPD Officer #7. Defendant Siev further alleged that Ms. Martin’s purpose was prostitution because she was at a location “frequented by people engaging in promoting prostitution, patronizing a prostitute, and/or loitering for the purpose of prostitution,” was wearing a “white jacket with blue and white jump suit, tight,” and because he recovered “8 condoms” from her person.

172. Defendant Siev also noted that his determination that Ms. Martin’s purpose was to engage in prostitution was based on the fact that he was “aware that [Ms. Martin] has previously been arrested for violating Penal Law Section 240.37, 230.00, and/or 230.03.” However, there are no public records of any previous arrests related to those charges.

173. Defendant Siev failed to properly review, monitor and supervise Defendant Allen’s, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #6’s and Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #7’s unlawful stop, questioning and seizure of Ms. Martin, and approved Ms. Martin’s arrest.

174. Since her arrest, Ms. Martin has been very nervous about going back to the location of her arrest and fears that the police could “jump out at her” at any time. She recalls that the whole experience felt like an “abduction.” As such, the acts of Defendants Siev, Allen, Doe NYPD Officer #6 and Doe NYPD Officer #7 intimidated and threatened Ms. Martin, and left her traumatized.

175. After her arrest, Ms. Martin was forced to return to court five additional times under the threat of having the judge issue a bench warrant for her arrest. All criminal charges against Ms. Martin were adjourned in contemplation of dismissal pursuant to C.P.L. § 170.55 on June 1, 2016. The charges are calendared to be dismissed and sealed on December 1, 2016.
176. By the actions described above, Defendants Siev, Allen, Doe NYPD Officer #6 and Doe NYPD Officer #7 targeted and/or sanctioned the targeting of Ms. Martin for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on her race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.

177. The actions of Defendants Siev, Allen, Doe NYPD Officer #6 and Doe NYPD Officer #7 deprived Ms. Martin of her liberty and caused her pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

B. Named Plaintiffs Targeted for Arrest Under Other Circumstances

178. Defendants have also wrongfully arrested Plaintiffs as part of a general pattern and practice of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of Section 240.37. These women were similarly engaging in constitutionally-protected activities or otherwise exercising their rights and not engaging in any prostitution-related activity at the time of their arrests.

5. Named Plaintiff Tiffaney Grissom

179. Tiffaney Grissom is a 30-year-old African-American woman who currently resides in New York City.

180. Ms. Grissom is a transgender woman. Ms. Grissom communicates and expresses her femininity through, among other means, her choices in hair, makeup, clothing and general appearance.

181. Ms. Grissom has been repeatedly followed, stopped, questioned, arrested and detained for loitering for the purpose of prostitution. The majority of her arrests have occurred in the West Village in Manhattan, primarily in the 6th precinct, and often by the same officers. Ms. Grissom has also been arrested in the 52nd precinct.

182. On the night of October 3, 2013, Ms. Grissom was walking from Twin Donut on Fordham Road. As she was walking, she spoke with a man for about 30 to 45 minutes, including
near the corner of West 192nd Street and Grand Avenue. Ms. Grissom and the man then walked in opposite directions. Shortly thereafter, an unmarked police car stopped beside her and Defendants Pocalyko and Savarese exited the car, ordered Ms. Grissom to stop and immediately placed her under arrest. Defendants Pocalyko and Savarese did not stop the man with whom Ms. Grissom had spoken and allowed him to leave the scene without questioning him.

183. At no time on October 3, 2013 did Ms. Grissom solicit or attempt to solicit money in exchange for sex, trespass onto private property or otherwise engage in any unlawful or criminal conduct related to prostitution.

184. Ms. Grissom was handcuffed and taken to a police van where she was detained for approximately 30 minutes to an hour until the police arrived with another woman who—as Ms. Grissom later learned—had also been arrested for loitering for the purpose of prostitution.

185. At the 52nd precinct, Defendant Pocalyko repeatedly probed Ms. Grissom with questions relating to her gender and her sex organs. When Ms. Grissom answered Defendant Pocalyko’s questions by maintaining that she was a woman, Defendant Pocalyko unlawfully ordered Ms. Grissom to be strip-searched by a female police officer even though she was not suspected of possessing any drugs or contraband. The female officer took Ms. Grissom into a bathroom and ordered her to lift her shirt, shake out her bra and pull her shorts down. This search was for the purpose of confirming whether or not she was female, as her identification indicated. She was then put in a holding cell with three other women, including the woman from the police van. She was detained at the precinct for an additional three to five hours.

186. Ms. Grissom provided her address to the officers processing her arrest, making them aware that she was a resident of the neighborhood and lived about 10 blocks from where she was arrested.
187. In the supporting deposition accompanying the criminal court complaint charging Ms. Grissom with violating Section 240.37, Defendant Pocalyko falsely alleged that, on October 3, 2013, he observed Ms. Grissom for twenty minutes “during which time [Ms. Grissom] beckoned to passing traffic and stopped or attempted to stop . . . 3 male motorists” from “the middle of the street.” Pocalyko further alleged that Ms. Grissom’s purpose was prostitution because she was observed at a location “frequented by people engaged in prostitution” and was wearing “tight short shorts [and a] tight tank top.” Additionally, the complaint corresponding to Ms. Grissom’s arrest indicated that Defendant Pocalyko believed Ms. Grissom’s purpose was prostitution because she had been convicted of loitering for the purpose of prostitution five years earlier, although nothing in the supporting deposition suggests that Defendant Pocalyko knew this at the time of the arrest.

188. Defendant Pocalyko failed to properly review, monitor and supervise Defendant Savarese’s unlawful stop and seizure of Ms. Grissom, and approved Ms. Grissom’s arrest.

189. Ms. Grissom believes that the police targeted her because she is a transgender woman. She believes the police have imposed a “dress code” for her to be out in public. In addition to her arrests, she is frequently followed and/or stopped and questioned by police when walking or sitting in public areas. As a result of this harassment and her arrests, Ms. Grissom believes she must constantly be on “high alert” for any police presence and avoid the police. As a result of her arrest and after learning of the sweeps conducted by the police in June 2015, she became scared about socializing in her neighborhood with friends—mostly other transgender women of color—and left her house less often. When she did leave her house, she came home early out of fear that she would be arrested again. Ms. Grissom ultimately moved out of the neighborhood; even after moving, however, Ms. Grissom remains anxious about engaging in
conversation in public for more than brief periods of time and avoids speaking to men in the area of the 52nd precinct and other neighborhoods where women of color and transgender women are targeted by the police for arrest under Section 240.37. As such, the acts of Defendants Pocalyko and Savarese caused Ms. Grissom to feel extremely anxious and powerless.

190. Ms. Grissom contested the Section 240.37 charge in Bronx Criminal Court and was forced to return to court at least six additional times under the threat of having the judge issue a bench warrant for her arrest. On August 13, 2015, the Section 240.37 charge against Ms. Grissom was dismissed on motion of the Bronx District Attorney’s Office and sealed.

191. By the actions described above, Defendants Pocalyko and Savarese targeted and/or sanctioned the targeting of Ms. Grissom for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on her race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.

192. The actions of Defendants Pocalyko and Savarese deprived Ms. Grissom of her liberty and caused her pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

6. **Named Plaintiff R.G.**

193. R.G. is a 59-year-old Puerto Rican-American woman who lives in the Bronx. R.G. lives with and cares for her 28-year-old daughter, who is disabled and unable to live or travel by herself. R.G. has previously been employed as a secretary in a variety of industries, including for a police department in Florida and most recently for a large insurance company in New York.

194. R.G. had never been arrested for any offense before she was unlawfully arrested for loitering for the purpose of prostitution on March 28, 2014.
195. During the afternoon of March 28, 2014, at approximately 2:00 p.m., R.G. was taking a walk less than one mile from her home, which is located in the 41st precinct. As she walked on the sidewalk, smoking a cigarette, an unmarked police car passed her, slowed down to make a U-turn, and pulled up alongside her. Defendants Diggs and Gomez asked her where she was going. They said that they knew what she was doing and that they had seen her stop five cars. R.G. explained to the officers that she was taking a walk and had not stopped any cars. Defendant Diggs told her that if she denied attempting prostitution, he would arrest her for lying. Defendants Diggs and Gomez then asked R.G. whether she had any drugs, and when she replied that she did not, they frisked her and searched her pockets. They then seized R.G.'s purse and began to search its contents without her consent. At the time of the search, R.G. had in her purse some condoms that she had recently obtained for free at her doctor's office. After seeing the condoms, Defendants Diggs and Gomez handcuffed R.G. and placed her under arrest.

196. At no time on March 28, 2014 did R.G. solicit or attempt to solicit money in exchange for sex, trespass onto private property or otherwise engage in any unlawful or criminal conduct related to prostitution.

197. Also during the arrest, and while still on the street, Defendants Diggs and Gomez asked R.G. for her address, which she provided. R.G.'s apartment building is known to the police as a location for illegal narcotics activity. As soon as Defendants Diggs and Gomez learned her address, they began pressuring her for information about drug sales in her building. When R.G. declined, the officers put her in the patrol car and drove to the 41st precinct. Defendants Diggs and Gomez continued to press R.G. to provide information about narcotics activity in her building while she was in the police car and later detained at the precinct. At one point, Defendants Diggs and Gomez even offered to release her and pay her for information
about crime in her building. R.G. declined and told the officers that she feared for her safety if she were to inform on anyone in her building.

198. At the 41st precinct, R.G. was put on a bench directly next to a men’s holding cell and handcuffed to the bench for approximately seven hours. During that time, five or six men inside the cell harassed and taunted R.G. with lewd comments. R.G. did not receive any food or water. She was allowed to use the bathroom only once—under the supervision of an officer who stood in the bathroom stall with her and watched her urinate. R.G. was humiliated and embarrassed by this experience.

199. While processing R.G., Defendants Diggs and Gomez again attempted to solicit information about drug activity in her building. She again refused. In response, Defendant Diggs made offensive comments about her appearance.

200. In the sworn criminal court complaint charging R.G. with violating Section 240.37, Defendant Gomez falsely alleged that, on March 28, 2014, he observed R.G. “beckon to passing motorists and attempt[ ] to stop five male motorists” and “approach a male motorist, lean her face into said motorist’s vehicle and begin speaking to said motorist.” Defendant Gomez also falsely alleged that R.G. was wearing “a tight low cut shirt and mini skirt.” She was in fact wearing long pants and a long-sleeve blouse. Defendant Gomez did not allege that he observed R.G. for any period of time before arresting her. He further alleged that R.G.’s purpose was prostitution because she was at a location “frequented by people engaged in prostitution.”

201. Defendant Beddows failed to properly review, monitor and supervise Defendant Diggs’s and Defendant Gomez’s unlawful stop, questioning, search and seizure of R.G., and approved R.G.’s arrest.
202. R.G. was eventually released from the precinct with a desk appearance ticket. Her period of unlawful detention left her demoralized, disoriented and worried about her disabled daughter. She could not believe what had happened and thought that it felt like a nightmare. R.G. was distraught and embarrassed by her experience. The arrest had a very harmful impact on her: she suffered depression, anxiety and humiliation that left her feeling helpless, with no energy to find work or even to leave her house much in the weeks after her arrest. Since she was arrested so close to her home, she has also been afraid to leave her home. Approximately one year after her arrest, after the Section 240.37 charge against her stemming from the arrest was dismissed, R.G. saw Defendant Gomez, who indicated that he recognized her and was watching her. R.G. no longer feels like she can trust the police or depend on them for help. As such, the acts of Defendants Beddows, Diggs and Gomez intimidated and threatened R.G.

203. As a result of her arrest, R.G. had to appear in Bronx Criminal Court five times over the course of six months. Each time she was required to be in court, her anxiety and depression around the incident were exacerbated. On November 6, 2014, over seven months after her arrest and after numerous court appearances, the accusatory instrument charging R.G. under Section 240.37 was finally dismissed as facially insufficient pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 100.15(3) and 100.40(1)(c), and R.G.'s case was sealed.

204. By the actions described above, Defendants Beddows, Diggs and Gomez targeted and/or sanctioned the targeting of R.G. for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on her race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.
205. The actions of Defendants Beddows, Diggs and Gomez deprived R.G. of her liberty and caused her pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

7. Named Plaintiff A.B.

206. A.B. is a 44-year-old African-American woman who currently resides in Brooklyn.

207. On August 13, 2015, an acquaintance of A.B.'s picked her up at around 1:30 a.m. to attend a dance party. The two drove to a local store to buy drinks to take to the party. Afterwards, they got back in the car and resumed driving. Shortly afterward, an unmarked police car pulled them over and three uniformed police officers, Defendants Salazar, Doe NYPD Officer #8 and Doe NYPD Officer #9, approached the car in which A.B. was a passenger.

208. The officers opened the passenger door to the car and forcefully removed A.B. from the vehicle by her arm. They asked A.B. how she knew the man with her, and she replied that the man was her acquaintance. The officers apparently did not believe A.B. and told her that he could arrest her for prostitution.

209. The officers asked A.B. if she had ever been arrested. When she replied that she had, the officers returned to their car, apparently to enter A.B.'s name into their computer. While the officers waited for the results, they began questioning A.B.'s acquaintance. He confirmed that A.B. was his acquaintance and that they were going to a party. The officers accused him of being A.B.'s pimp, but they did not arrest him. Instead, they removed A.B.'s belongings from his car without her consent and placed them on the trunk of the police car. A.B. asked the officers to look at the text messages in her phone, which would confirm that she and her acquaintance were planning to go to a party, but the officers ignored her.
210. While A.B. was detained, the officers verbally abused her by using racial slurs and calling her a “prostitute” and a “hooker.” A.B. felt emotionally battered, and she informed the officers of her intention to file an official complaint against them. They continued to taunt her.

211. At that point, A.B. asked for the names and shield numbers of Defendants Salazar, Doe NYPD Officer #8 and Doe NYPD Officer #9. They laughed at her. The officers then handcuffed her, put her in the unmarked police car, and took her to the 75th precinct for further processing.

212. At no time on August 13, 2015 did A.B. solicit or attempt to solicit money in exchange for sex, trespass onto private property or otherwise engage in any unlawful or criminal conduct related to prostitution.

213. In the supporting deposition accompanying the criminal court complaint charging A.B. with violating Section 240.37, Defendant Christian Salazar falsely alleged that, on August 13, 2015, he observed A.B. at the corner of Flatlands Avenue and Alabama Avenue “[stopping] only male passers-by.” He further alleged A.B.’s purpose was prostitution because she was at an “industrial location” and that he was “aware that the [NYPD] has made numerous arrests for violations of Penal Law Sections 240.37, 230.00 and/or 230.03 at [that] location.”

214. Defendant Daverin failed to properly review, monitor and supervise Defendant Salazar’s, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #8’s and Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #9’s unlawful arrest of A.B.

215. After her initial court appearance, A.B. was forced to return to court two additional times under the threat of having the judge issue a bench warrant for her arrest. All criminal charges against A.B. were dismissed and sealed on September 16, 2015.
216. Since her arrest, A.B. has stopped walking alone in East New York because she fears that she will be wrongfully arrested again. She becomes very anxious whenever she sees police and will often cross to the other side of the street to avoid any contact with them. As such, the acts of Defendants Daverin, Salazar, Doe NYPD Officer #8 and Doe NYPD Officer #9 intimidated and threatened A.B.

217. By the actions described above, Defendants Daverin, Salazar, Doe NYPD Officer #8 and Doe NYPD Officer #9 targeted and/or sanctioned the targeting of A.B. for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on her race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.

218. The actions of Defendants Daverin, Salazar, Doe NYPD Officer #8 and Doe NYPD Officer #9 deprived A.B. of her liberty and caused her pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

8. **Named Plaintiff Sarah Marchando**

219. Sarah Marchando is a 28-year-old Latina woman who currently resides in Queens, New York.

220. Ms. Marchando has a long history of prostitution-related arrests, primarily in the East New York neighborhood in Brooklyn. Because of her arrest record, police officers assigned to the 75th precinct, and the related satellite precinct of Police Service Area (“PSA”) 2, know Ms. Marchando by face and last name. Because of her criminal record and previous proximity to the precinct, the police target Ms. Marchando for arrest when they see her outside, and she is often arrested for loitering for the purpose of prostitution when engaged in wholly innocent conduct.
May 7, 2015 Arrest

221. For example, on the morning of May 7, 2015, Ms. Marchando met her boyfriend, who was coming home from work, at the BP car wash located on the corner of Flatlands Avenue between Pennsylvania Avenue and Sheffield Avenue. She was wearing a dress that stopped about an inch above her knee-high flat boots. Ms. Marchando and her boyfriend arrived at approximately 7:20 or 7:25 a.m. From there, Ms. Marchando’s boyfriend left to run some errands and Ms. Marchando planned to take the bus back to his apartment.

222. At around 7:30 a.m., Ms. Marchando boarded the B6 bus at the corner of Alabama Avenue and Cozine Avenue. Ms. Marchando remained on the bus for five or six stops until it arrived at Wortman Avenue and Ashford Street, approximately 11 blocks from where she had boarded. There, Defendants Nicosia and Doe NYPD Officer #10, dressed in plainclothes, rushed onto the bus. They ordered Ms. Marchando to put her hands behind her back and disembark. Ms. Marchando asked the officers what was happening. They did not answer. After a few seconds, Defendant Nicosia grabbed her by the arm and pulled her down the bus stairs. Ms. Marchando kept asking why she was being arrested but never got a response.

223. At no time on May 7, 2015 did Ms. Marchando solicit or attempt to solicit money in exchange for sex, trespass onto private property or otherwise engage in any unlawful or criminal conduct related to prostitution.

224. Once Defendant Nicosia dragged her off the bus, she tried to stop him from pulling on her arm. Defendants Nicosia and Doe NYPD Officer #10 restrained her. One of them put her in a chokehold, which exacerbated her asthma and caused her to vomit. Ms. Marchando repeatedly told the officers that she could not breathe, but they did not release her until two
bystanders who were watching the incident intervened. After she was finally released from the chokehold, her bra was ripped, and she was having trouble breathing and was in substantial pain.

225. Additional police officers arrived at the scene. In total, there were at least six officers involved in Ms. Marchando’s arrest, including Defendants Nicosia and Doe NYPD Officer #10 in plainclothes, Defendants Quinn, Doe NYPD Officer #11 and Doe NYPD Officer #12 in uniform, and their supervisor Defendant Doyle, who was dressed in plainclothes. Without telling Ms. Marchando why she was being arrested, the officers placed her in handcuffs and searched her purse. Ms. Marchando requested medical attention, but the officers refused to get her help. Instead Defendant Doyle remarked, “She’s back” and “We got her.”

226. The officers brought Ms. Marchando to the 75th precinct around 7:45 a.m. where an officer performed a pocket search of Ms. Marchando. She was kept in handcuffs and placed in a holding cell. Still having difficulty breathing, Ms. Marchando asked for her asthma inhaler, but the officers refused to give it to her. At approximately 2:45 or 3:00 p.m., an officer returned and told Ms. Marchando for the first time that she had been arrested for loitering for the purpose of prostitution. She was arraigned around midnight and was finally released after spending approximately 16 hours in custody.

227. After her arrest, Ms. Marchando suffered from ongoing breathing difficulties and pain and swelling in her arm and knee. In addition, the arrest caused Ms. Marchando emotional suffering in that she felt humiliated and unfairly treated. She worried that she would not be able to walk anywhere or utilize public transportation in that neighborhood without facing arrest. Her fears were and are justified, as officers from the 75th precinct arrested her again eight days after this incident, similarly without probable cause or justification.
228. In the sworn criminal court complaint charging Ms. Marchando with violating Section 240.37 on May 7, 2015, Defendant Quinn falsely alleged that he observed Ms. Marchando for 40 minutes, during which time she “beckon[ed] to multiple vehicles passing by with male drivers[,]... approach[ed] a vehicle and ... engage[d] in conversation with a male inside of said vehicle.”

229. Defendant Doyle failed to properly review, monitor and supervise Defendant Quinn’s, Defendant Nicosia’s, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #10’s, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #11’s and Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #12’s unlawful stop, seizure and assault of Ms. Marchando, and approved Ms. Marchando’s arrest.

May 15, 2015 Arrest

230. In the early morning of May 15, 2015, Ms. Marchando was on Flatlands Avenue between Pennsylvania Avenue and Sheffield Avenue. She had purchased juice from a nearby store and was listening to music, texting and playing a game on her phone. Defendants Yanez and supervising Doe NYPD Officer #13 approached her and immediately asked if she had ever been arrested for prostitution. When she responded affirmatively, they handcuffed and arrested her.

231. At no time on May 15, 2015 did Ms. Marchando solicit or attempt to solicit money in exchange for sex, trespass onto private property or otherwise engage in any unlawful or criminal conduct related to prostitution.

232. Defendants Yanez and Doe NYPD Officer #13 placed Ms. Marchando in a van with six male arrestees. Ms. Marchando was the only female arrestee in the van and remained handcuffed. She was kept in the van for over one hour.
233. At the 75th precinct, Ms. Marchando was searched by a male officer and put in a holding cell. She remained handcuffed in the cell for approximately two hours. During that time, Ms. Marchando asked three different male police officers to remove her handcuffs because she had lost feeling in her right arm. They told her that the handcuffs were necessary because there was no female officer available to search her, even though a male officer had already searched her when she arrived. Approximately one hour after Ms. Marchando’s request, a female officer came into the holding cell. She seemed surprised that Ms. Marchando was still handcuffed and performed a search. Ms. Marchando was finally arraigned and released around 11:30 p.m., after spending approximately 18 hours in custody.

234. In the supporting deposition accompanying the criminal court complaint charging Ms. Marchando with violating Section 240.37 on May 15, 2015, Defendant Yanez falsely alleged that he observed Ms. Marchando for 120 minutes “during which time [Ms. Marchando] repeatedly beckoned to passers-by and stopped five-passers-by, engaging in conversation with said passers-by” and that she was “standing in the middle of the road.” Yanez further alleged that Ms. Marchando’s purpose was prostitution because “the above area is an industrial location” “frequented by people engaging in promoting prostitution” and that he is “aware that [Ms. Marchando] has previously been arrested for violating Penal Law 240.37, 230.00 and/or 230.03” and because he recovered “10 unused condoms” from her person.

235. Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #13 failed to properly review, monitor and supervise Defendant Yanez’s unlawful stop and seizure of Ms. Marchando, and approved Ms. Marchando’s arrest.

236. After her arrest, Ms. Marchando continued to suffer pain and discomfort in her right arm and emotional harm. As a result of the May 7 and May 15, 2015 arrests,
Ms. Marchando was afraid to go outside in Brooklyn and when there, tried to stay inside her boyfriend’s apartment as much as possible to avoid arrest. Ms. Marchando suffers from an anxiety disorder, and her arrests exacerbated her condition. As a result of the harassment by Defendants Nicosia, Quinn, Doe NYPD Officer #10, Doe NYPD Officer #11, Doe NYPD Officer #12, Doyle, Yanez and Doe NYPD Officer #13 and other members of the 75th precinct, Ms. Marchando temporarily left New York City in September 2015. When she returned to New York in December 2015, she moved to Queens out of fear that she would be targeted for arrest by officers in the 75th precinct. As such, the acts of Defendants Nicosia, Quinn, Doe NYPD Officer #10, Doe NYPD Officer #11, Doe NYPD Officer #12, Doyle, Yanez and Doe NYPD Officer #13 intimidated and threatened Ms. Marchando.

237. After her arrests on May 7 and May 15, 2015, Ms. Marchando was forced to return to court two additional times, under the threat of having the judge issue a bench warrant for her arrest. All criminal charges against Ms. Marchando stemming from the two arrests were adjourned in contemplation of dismissal pursuant to C.P.L. § 170.55 on June 10, 2015. Both cases were dismissed and sealed on December 9, 2015.

238. By the actions described above, Defendants Nicosia, Quinn, Doe NYPD Officer #10, Doe NYPD Officer #11, Doe NYPD Officer #12, Doyle, Yanez and Doe NYPD Officer #13 targeted and/or sanctioned the targeting of Ms. Marchando for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on her race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.

239. The actions of Defendants Nicosia, Quinn, Doe NYPD Officer #10, Doe NYPD Officer #11, Doe NYPD Officer #12, Doyle, Yanez and Doe NYPD Officer #13 deprived
Ms. Marchando of her liberty and caused her pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

I. CLASS CLAIMS

First Claim for Relief

Section 240.37 Is Unconstitutionally Void for Vagueness in Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

240. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

241. Section 240.37 does not provide citizens with adequate notice as to what type of behavior they must avoid in order to avoid arrest under the statute.

242. Plaintiffs have been and continue to be unlawfully subjected to surveillance, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained for engaging in innocent activities such as walking down the street, sitting on a bench, riding on a public bus and speaking to other individuals on a public street.

243. Section 240.37 lacks adequate guidelines for police, leading to inconsistent and arbitrary enforcement. Neither New York State courts, the City, nor the NYPD have provided adequate guidance to officers as to what type of behavior is criminal under Section 240.37.

244. Section 240.37 is unconstitutionally void for vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to Plaintiffs because it provides insufficient notice to citizens of what constitutes illegal behavior under the statute and provides

28 A copy of this Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial has been served on the New York State Attorney General’s Office.
insufficient guidance to law enforcement, resulting in discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement of the statute at the discretion of individual officers.

**Second Claim for Relief**

Section 240.37 Is Unconstitutional Because It Is Overly Broad, Infringing on the Right to Freedom of Expression Under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution, the Right to Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution

245. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

246. A substantial number of law enforcement activities undertaken pursuant to Section 240.37, including surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and arrests and detention under Section 240.37 are unconstitutional.

247. Plaintiffs maintain a liberty interest in self-expression and bodily integrity and privacy.

248. Plaintiffs exercise free speech, including the expression of gender identity through choice of clothing, free movement and free association with other citizens.

249. As a result of the unconstitutionally overbroad provisions of Section 240.37 that implicate a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech and other protected activity, Plaintiffs are forced to live with a heightened risk of law enforcement encounters and experience a real and substantial deterrent to the exercise of these freedoms.

250. Plaintiffs have been deterred from exercising their rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by restricting their expression through clothing choices, restricting their movement through public spaces and restricting their associations with other people out of fear of future arrest.
251. The substantial unconstitutional applications of Section 240.37 in unlawfully surveilling, stopping, questioning, frisking, searching, seizing and/or arresting and detaining Plaintiffs who are engaged in constitutionally protected speech and other protected activity outweigh any public policy goals of Section 240.37, which are already met through other provisions of New York’s Penal Law.

**Third Claim for Relief**

Municipal Liability for Violations of Plaintiffs’ Due Process Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Against the City)

252. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

253. By consciously choosing to enforce Section 240.37, and adopting and implementing certain enforcement policies and widespread practices and/or customs, Defendants have chosen to enforce Section 240.37 in an unconstitutional manner in violation of Plaintiffs’ liberty interests in self-expression, bodily integrity and privacy. By unlawfully surveilling, stopping, questioning, frisking, searching, seizing and/or arresting and detaining Plaintiffs, including Named Plaintiffs, under Section 240.37 based in large part on Plaintiffs’ appearance and their presence in public areas, Defendants, who are state actors, infringed on Plaintiffs’ fundamental freedoms.

254. The City has acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in failing to adequately train, monitor, supervise or discipline NYPD officers, including Individual Defendants, involved in the enforcement of Section 240.37, leading to unlawful infringement of Plaintiffs’ liberty interests in self-expression, bodily integrity and privacy.
255. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s policies, widespread practices and/or customs, Plaintiffs continue to face an imminent threat of being unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained under Section 240.37 if they engage in constitutionally protected conduct in public areas, and their ability to self-determine their personal appearance in public continues to be chilled.

**Fourth Claim for Relief**

Municipal Liability for Violations of Plaintiffs’ Right to Freedom of Speech Under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution (Against the City)

256. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

257. Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected interest in the exercise of free speech, including the expression of gender identity through choice of clothing, conversations with individuals of any gender and gender identity, free movement and free association with other citizens.

258. By consciously choosing to enforce Section 240.37, and adopting and implementing certain enforcement policies and widespread practices and/or customs, Defendants have chosen to enforce Section 240.37 in an unconstitutional manner in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution by unlawfully surveilling, stopping, questioning, frisking, searching, seizing and/or arresting and detaining Plaintiffs for Section 240.37 violations based in large part on protected conduct, *i.e.* their clothing, presence in public areas, conversations with others and/or other First Amendment activity, causing constitutional injury and chilling their First Amendment speech, expressive conduct and ability to freely utilize public space.
259. The City has acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution in failing to adequately train, monitor, supervise or discipline NYPD officers, including Individual Defendants, involved in the enforcement of Section 240.37, leading to the unlawful infringement of Plaintiffs' right to engage in free speech and other protected First Amendment activity.

260. As a direct and proximate result of the City's policies, widespread practices and/or customs, Plaintiffs continue to face an imminent threat of being unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained under Section 240.37 if they engage in constitutionally protected speech in public areas, and their speech continues to be chilled.

Fifth Claim for Relief

Municipal Liability for Violations of Plaintiffs' Right to Equal Protection of the Laws Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 11 of the New York Constitution
(Against the City)

261. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

262. By consciously choosing to enforce Section 240.37, and adopting and implementing certain enforcement policies, widespread practices and/or customs, Defendants have chosen to enforce Section 240.37 in an unconstitutional manner against women of color, some of whom are transgender, based on the race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance of Plaintiffs under circumstances in which Section 240.37 is not enforced against men or white women, causing constitutional injury by depriving Plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 11
of the New York Constitution. The City has no legitimate interest in enforcing Section 240.37 in this manner.

263. The City has acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 11 of the New York Constitution in failing to adequately train, monitor, supervise or discipline NYPD officers, including Individual Defendants, involved in the enforcement of Section 240.37, causing constitutional injury to Plaintiffs in that they have been, and continue to be, unlawfully subjected to law enforcement activities, including surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention based on race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance, under circumstances in which men or white women are not subjected to such law enforcement activities, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 11 of the New York Constitution.

264. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s policies, widespread practices and/or customs, Plaintiffs continue to face an imminent threat of being unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained under Section 240.37 on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance.

**Sixth Claim for Relief**


265. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

266. Pursuant to certain enforcement policies, widespread practices and/or customs, the City has chosen to enforce Section 240.37 in a discriminatory manner, denying Plaintiffs the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons as is enjoyed by
white citizens of the United States, and subjecting them to disparate forms of punishment, pains, penalties and exactions as compared to white citizens, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

267. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s policies, widespread practices and/or customs, Plaintiffs have suffered constitutional injury.

Seventh Claim for Relief

Municipal Liability for Violation of Plaintiffs’ Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizures Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution
(Against the City)

268. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

269. By consciously choosing to enforce Section 240.37, and adopting and implementing certain enforcement policies, widespread practices and/or customs, Defendants have chosen to enforce Section 240.37 in an unconstitutional manner, seizing persons in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution. These actions have resulted in constitutional injury in that Plaintiffs have been unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained under Section 240.37 without the requisite reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.

270. The City has acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in failing to adequately train, monitor, supervise or discipline NYPD officers, including Individual Defendants, involved in the enforcement of Section 240.37, causing Plaintiffs to be unlawfully subjected to surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention under Section 240.37 without reasonable suspicion or
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution.

271. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s policies, widespread practices and/or customs, Plaintiffs continue to face an imminent threat of being unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained under Section 240.37 in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution.

**Eighth Claim for Relief**

Claims Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (Against the City)

272. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

273. The law enforcement services described in this complaint have been funded, in part, with federal funds.

274. Plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of these law enforcement services.

275. Discrimination based on race in the law enforcement services and conduct described in this complaint is prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. The acts and conduct complained of herein by the Defendants were motivated by racial animus and were intended to discriminate on the basis of race, particularly against Blacks and Latinos.

276. As a direct and proximate result of the above-mentioned acts, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries and damages and have been deprived of their rights under the civil rights laws. Without appropriate injunctive relief, these violations will continue to occur.
Ninth Claim for Relief
Respondeat Superior Claim Under New York Common Law
(Against the City)

277. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

278. The conduct of Individual Defendants occurred while they were on duty, acting under the color of law, in and during the course and scope of their duties and functions as NYPD officers and while they were acting as agents and employees of the City.

279. As a result, the City is liable to Plaintiffs for the claims against Individual Defendants under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Tenth Claim for Relief
Conspiracy to Violate Plaintiffs’ Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(Against All Defendants)

280. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

281. Defendants from the 52nd precinct agreed to violate certain Plaintiffs’ rights by planning and performing sweeps, see supra ¶ 73, during which they planned to arrest certain Plaintiffs for their status as transgender women and deprive them of equal protection under the law. Defendants planned to arrest these Plaintiffs without probable cause to believe they committed a crime, in violation of their First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Defendants from the 52nd precinct took action in furtherance of violating certain Plaintiffs’ rights by actually arresting multiple Named Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class members, as described above, on June 6, 2015 and June 13, 2015, under Section 240.37, and telling them that they were arrested because they were transgender women out in public at night. In taking these actions,
Defendants from the 52nd precinct were motivated by their discriminatory attitudes towards and unlawful bias against transgender women.

282. Unknown high-ranking officers in the NYPD and/or other supervising officers and police officers of other precincts have similar policies, widespread practices and/or customs motivated by discriminatory attitudes and unlawful bias against transgender women of planning and performing sweeps to effectuate Section 240.37 arrests pursuant to which they have agreed to violate transgender Plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments due to the fact that they are transgender women.

283. As a result of these arrests, Plaintiff Class Members and Named Plaintiffs suffered constitutional injury; were harmed and suffered emotional and psychological distress, deprivation of liberty, embarrassment and shame.

Eleventh Claim for Relief

Violation of the N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 40-c, 40-d and 79-n (Against All Defendants)

284. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

285. Defendants’ prior and continuing acts of discrimination against Plaintiffs, including Defendants’ unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of Plaintiffs under Section 240.37, and/or the sanctioning of those law enforcement acts, were carried out on the basis of Plaintiffs’ race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance, under circumstances in which men or white women are not subjected to such law enforcement activities, and therefore subjected Plaintiffs to discrimination in violation of their civil rights, including their right to equal protection of the laws, in violation of New York State Civil Rights Law §§ 40-c and 40-d.
286. Further, Defendants' prior and continuing acts of discrimination against Plaintiffs, including Defendants' unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of Plaintiffs under Section 240.37, and/or the sanctioning of those law enforcement acts, constituted the intentional selection of Plaintiffs for harm in whole or substantial part because of Defendants' beliefs or perceptions regarding Plaintiffs' gender, including their actual or perceived sex, gender identity or expression, race and color, in violation of New York State Civil Rights Law § 79-n. Further, Defendants' sanctioning or acts of unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of Plaintiffs under Section 240.37 constituted intimidation of Plaintiffs on the basis of their gender, including their actual or perceived sex, gender identity or expression, race and color.

287. In addition, Defendants have aided and incited others to unlawfully surveil, stop, question, frisk, search, seize and/or arrest and detain Plaintiffs under Section 240.37 on the basis of Plaintiffs' race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance, under circumstances in which men or white women are not subjected to such law enforcement activities, in violation of New York State Civil Rights Law §§ 40-c, 40-d and 79-n. Defendants' violations of Plaintiffs' civil rights under the New York State Civil Rights Law are the actual, direct and proximate cause of injuries suffered by Plaintiffs, as alleged herein, and Plaintiffs continue to be harmed by Defendants' violations of the New York State Civil Rights Law.

288. Plaintiffs have complied with the procedural requirements of New York State Civil Rights Law § 40-d by serving notice upon the state Attorney General at or before the commencement of the action.
Twelfth Claim for Relief


N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2), 296(6), 297(9)
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 9, § 466.13
N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(6), 8-107(17), 8-502(a)
(Against All Defendants)

289. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

290. The NYPD is a place or provider of public accommodation because it provides services, facilities, accommodations, advantages and privileges through acting in its investigative and custodial capacities, including the supervision and execution of surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention pursuant to Section 240.37. The New York City Commission on Human Rights has not granted the NYPD an exemption to § 8-107(4) based on bona fide considerations of public policy.

291. By sanctioning and/or engaging in sweeps and targeting Plaintiffs for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention pursuant to Section 240.37 on the basis of Plaintiffs’ actual and/or perceived race, color, ethnicity and/or gender, including their gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, expression and/or transgender status, and/or by aiding, abetting, inciting or compelling such conduct, Defendants have refused, denied and withheld from Plaintiffs the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of the NYPD’s investigative and custodial services. Therefore, the acts of Defendants, who are owners, proprietors, managers, superintendents, agents and/or employees of the NYPD and the City, violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the NYHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2) and
296(6), the N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 9, § 466.13 and the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a) and 8-107(6).

292. Defendants have also violated the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(17), because their actions, policies, practices or customs, or a group thereof, have a disparate impact on women of color, including transgender women of color, who are protected under the NYCHRL. By targeting Plaintiffs for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 on the basis of Plaintiffs’ actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, gender and/or gender identity, including self-image, appearance, behavior, expression and/or transgender status, Defendants’ actions, policies, practices or customs, or a group thereof, result in the refusal, denial and withholding from Plaintiffs of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of the NYPD’s investigative and custodial services on the same terms as non-transgender, male and/or white individuals. Therefore, women of color, including transgender women, are disparately impacted to their detriment by Defendants’ actions, policies, practices or customs, or a group thereof.

293. The disparate impact of Defendants’ actions, policies, practices or customs, or a group thereof, which bear no relationship to a significant business objective of the NYPD, exceeds the mere existence of a statistical imbalance between women of color and transgender women, and the general population.

294. Plaintiffs have not filed a complaint with the New York City Commission on Human Rights, the State Division on Human Rights, any other court of competent jurisdiction, or any other administrative agency based upon the unlawful discriminatory practices alleged herein.
295. Defendants’ violations of Plaintiffs’ rights under the NYHRL and NYCHRL are the actual, direct and proximate cause of injuries suffered by Plaintiffs, as alleged herein, and Plaintiffs continue to be harmed by Defendants’ violations of the NYHRL and NYCHRL.

296. Plaintiffs have served a copy of the complaint upon the authorized representatives of the New York City Commission on Human Rights and Corporation Counsel.

**Thirteenth Claim for Relief**

Violation of the New York City Bias-Based Profiling Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 14-151 (Against All Defendants)

297. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

298. The City and Individual Defendants who are members of the NYPD police force have engaged, are engaging and continue to engage in bias-based profiling by initiating law enforcement actions against Plaintiffs, including the sanctioning and/or execution of unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of Plaintiffs under Section 240.37, on the basis of and in reliance on Plaintiffs’ actual or perceived race, color, gender and/or gender identity as the determinative factor. Therefore, Defendants have engaged and continue to engage in the above-described intentional bias-based profiling of Plaintiffs, in violation of the New York City Bias-Based Profiling Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 14-151.

299. Defendants have intentionally engaged in the above-described bias-based profiling of Plaintiffs. Such bias-based profiling is not justified by factors unrelated to unlawful discrimination, and is instead based on Plaintiffs’ actual or perceived race, color, gender and/or gender identity. Defendants’ above-described bias-based profiling is neither necessary to
achieve a compelling governmental interest nor narrowly tailored to achieve any compelling governmental interest.

300. In addition, Defendants’ actions, policies, practices, or customs, or a group thereof, which result in the above-described bias-based profiling of Plaintiffs by Defendants, have a disparate impact on Plaintiffs, based on Plaintiffs’ actual or perceived race, color and/or gender.

301. Further, the disparate impact of Defendants’ actions, policies, practices or customs, or a group thereof, exceed the mere existence of a statistical imbalance between women of color and transgender women, and the general population. Defendants’ actions, policies, practices or customs, or a group thereof, bear no significant relationship to advancing a significant law enforcement objective.

302. Defendants’ violations of Plaintiffs’ rights under the New York City Bias-Based Profiling Law are the actual, direct and proximate cause of injuries suffered by Plaintiffs, as alleged herein, and Plaintiffs continue to be harmed by Defendants’ violations of the New York City Bias-Based Profiling Law.

II. CLAIMS BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS

303. With respect to each of the following claims, the conduct of Individual Defendants constituted outrageous and reckless conduct and demonstrated a callous indifference to and willful disregard of Named Plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional rights. Their conduct caused Named Plaintiffs pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.
Fourteenth Claim for Relief


304. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.


306. The conduct of Individual Defendants deprived Named Plaintiffs of their liberty and caused Named Plaintiffs pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

Fifteenth Claim for Relief


307. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

308. The Individual Defendants unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained Named Plaintiffs in violation of their rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Individual Defendants arrested Named Plaintiffs for engaging in constitutionally protected expressive conduct, including communicating with others
in public and/or expressing their gender identity in a public place through their choice of
clothing.

309. The conduct of Individual Defendants deprived Named Plaintiffs of their liberty
and caused Named Plaintiffs pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

Sixteenth Claim for Relief

Violation of Plaintiffs’ Right to Equal Protection of the Laws Under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 11 of the New York Constitution and
42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against Individual Defendants)

310. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein
the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

311. Acting under color of state law, Individual Defendants targeted and/or sanctioned
the targeting of Named Plaintiffs for unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches,
seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on their race, color, ethnicity,
gender, gender identity and/or appearance, under circumstances in which men or white women
are not subjected to such law enforcement activities. The Individual Defendants had no
legitimate interest in targeting Named Plaintiffs in this manner.

312. As a direct and proximate result of such Individual Defendants’ law enforcement
actions, such Named Plaintiffs have been deprived of their right to equal protection of the laws
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 11 of the

313. The conduct of Individual Defendants deprived Named Plaintiffs of their liberty
and caused Named Plaintiffs pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.
Seventeenth Claim for Relief


314. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

315. The Individual Defendants intentionally and under color of state law have unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained Named Plaintiffs under Section 240.37 without reasonable suspicion or probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution.

316. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Individual Defendants, Named Plaintiffs have been unlawfully surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or arrested and detained, and deprived of their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

317. The conduct of Individual Defendants deprived Named Plaintiffs of their liberty and caused Named Plaintiffs pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional harm.

Eighteenth Claim for Relief


318. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

319. By their above-described actions pertaining to the sanctioning and/or execution of unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention of
Plaintiffs under Section 240.37, Individual Defendants denied Named Plaintiffs the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons as is enjoyed by white citizens of the United States, and subjected them to disparate forms of punishment, pains, penalties and exactions as compared to white citizens, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

**Nineteenth Claim for Relief**


(D.H. Against Defendants Kinane, McKenna, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer # 2, Doe NYPD Officer #14 and the City)

320. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

321. As stated in paragraphs 290-291 above, the NYPD provides services, facilities, accommodations, advantages and privileges by acting in its investigative and custodial capacities. Defendants are managers, proprietors, superintendents, agents and/or employees of the City and the NYPD, a department of local government and a place and provider of public accommodation. As such, Defendants are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12132, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(а), 296(6), 297(9), and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(6), 8-107(15)(a) and 8-502(a).

322. The New York City Commission on Human Rights has not granted Defendants an exemption based on bona fide considerations of public policy.

323. Plaintiff D.H. has not filed a complaint with the New York City Commission on Human Rights, the State Division on Human Rights, any other court of competent jurisdiction, or any other administrative agency based upon the unlawful discriminatory practices alleged herein.
324. D.H., who is deaf and communicates by sign language, writing or text message on her phone, suffers from a physical and medical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, including her ability to hear, and therefore qualifies as a disability.

325. The City and Defendants McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14 were therefore required to make a reasonable accommodation to enable D.H. to enjoy the rights or privileges of access to the investigative and custodial services provided by the NYPD during D.H.’s arrest.

326. The City and Defendants McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1 and Doe NYPD Officer #2 knew or should have known that D.H. was deaf at the time of her arrest, based in part on the fact that D.H. gestured to indicate that she was deaf when Defendants Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1 and Doe NYPD Officer #2 approached her during her arrest. Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #14 knew or should have known that D.H. was deaf during her pre-arraignment detention based on the fact that D.H. stated in writing that she needed a sign language interpreter.

327. The City and Defendants McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14, at the time of D.H.’s arrest and throughout her pre-arraignment detention, intentionally and/or with deliberate indifference failed to provide D.H. with a reasonable accommodation, reasonable modification and/or auxiliary aid and service for communicating, insofar as the City and Defendants McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14 denied D.H. a sign language interpreter, denied D.H. the ability to communicate through a writing or texting instrument and prevented D.H. from communicating with her hands by cuffing them behind her back. As a result of her inability to communicate, D.H. was not able to learn of the reason for her arrest until the day after her arrest, when she was brought to central booking. By intentionally denying D.H. any
means of communication during her arrest and detention, the City and Defendants McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14 intentionally and/or with deliberate indifference, discriminated against D.H. on the basis of her disability and denied her the benefit of the services, programs or activities of the NYPD.

328. In addition, by denying D.H. a reasonable accommodation, reasonable modification and/or auxiliary aid and service for communicating with the police during her arrest, the City and Defendants McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14 denied, refused and withheld from D.H. access to the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of the NYPD’s investigative and custodial services on the same terms as individuals without disabilities.

329. By denying D.H. a reasonable accommodation, reasonable modification and/or auxiliary aid and service for communicating with the police during her arrest, the City and Defendants McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14 refused, denied and withheld from D.H. her right to the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of the NYPD’s investigative and custodial services under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a) and N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2), as well as D.H.’s right to a reasonable accommodation, reasonable modification and/or auxiliary aid and service under N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(15)(a) and N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2). The City and Defendants McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14 have also violated N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(6) and N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) by aiding, abetting and inciting others’ acts of denying D.H. a reasonable accommodation, reasonable modification and/or auxiliary aid for communicating with police during her arrest, and of
denying, refusing and withholding from D.H. access to the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of the NYPD’s investigative and custodial services.

330. By their above-described actions, the City and Defendants McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14 also violated D.H.’s right to the benefit of the services, programs or activities of the NYPD, as well as her right to be free from discrimination by Defendants on the basis of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

331. The City, as the employer of McKenna, Kinane, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14 is also liable for those Individual Defendants’ unlawful discriminatory practices under 42 U.S.C. § 12132, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2) and 296(6) and N.Y.C. Admin. Code. §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(6) and 8-107(15)(a), as alleged herein.

332. The City and Defendant McKenna’s, Defendant Kinane’s, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #1’s, Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #2’s and Defendant Doe NYPD Officer #14’s violations of D.H.’s rights under the NYHRL, NYCHRL and 42 U.S.C. § 12132 are the actual, direct and proximate cause of injuries suffered by D.H., as alleged herein.

333. Plaintiffs have served a copy of the complaint upon the authorized representatives of the New York City Commission on Human Rights and Corporation Counsel.

**Twentieth Claim for Relief**

Violation of the Right to Be Free from the Use of Excessive Force Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(N.H. against Defendant Dawkins)

334. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

335. By pulling N.H.’s earrings and jewelry off of her person, forcibly pulling on her wig and verbally abusing her, Defendant Dawkins used excessive force against Plaintiff N.H.
and deprived her of her rights, remedies, privileges and immunities guaranteed to every citizen of
the United States, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, including, but not limited to rights guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York
Constitution.

336. In so doing, Defendant Dawkins acted intentionally and under color of state law.

337. The conduct of Defendant Dawkins caused N.H. pain and suffering, as well as
psychological and emotional harm.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

338. Certify this action as a class action on behalf of the proposed Plaintiff Class
pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: all women of color
who have been and/or will be surveilled, stopped, questioned, frisked, searched, seized and/or
arrested and detained pursuant to Section 240.37 between September 30, 2013 and the present
and the date on which the City is enjoined from or otherwise ceases to enforce Section 240.37.

339. Declare that Defendants’ acts, practices, policies, customs and/or omissions have
deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; the Constitution of the State of New York; the New York State Civil
Rights Law; the New York State Human Rights Law; the New York City Bias-Based Profiling
Law and the New York City Human Rights Law.

340. Declare that Section 240.37 violates the United States Constitution and the New
York Constitution on its face and as applied;

341. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining the City and its
employees, agents and successors from enforcing Section 240.37;
342. Award compensatory damages for economic harm, pain and suffering and emotional and mental distress to D.H. in an amount to be determined at trial against the City and Defendants Kinane, McKenna, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14 jointly and severally, together with interest and costs;

343. Award compensatory damages for economic harm, pain and suffering and emotional and mental distress to N.H. in an amount to be determined at trial against the City and Defendants Dawkins, Keane, McKenna and Doe NYPD Officer #3, jointly and severally, together with interest and costs;

344. Award compensatory damages for economic harm, pain and suffering and emotional and mental distress to K.H. in an amount to be determined at trial against the City and Defendants Imburgia, Maloney, Doe NYPD Officer #4 and Doe NYPD Officer #5, jointly and severally, together with interest and costs;

345. Award compensatory damages for economic harm, pain and suffering and emotional and mental distress to Natasha Martin in an amount to be determined at trial against the City and Defendants Allen, Siev, Doe NYPD Officer #6 and Doe NYPD Officer #7, jointly and severally, together with interest and costs;

346. Award compensatory damages for economic harm, pain and suffering and emotional and mental distress to Tiffaney Grissom in an amount to be determined at trial against the City and Defendants Savarese and Pocalyko jointly and severally, together with interest and costs;

347. Award compensatory damages for economic harm, pain and suffering and emotional and mental distress to R.G. in an amount to be determined at trial against the City and Defendants Diggs, Gomez and Beddows, jointly and severally, together with interest and costs;
348. Award compensatory damages for economic harm, pain and suffering and emotional and mental distress to A.B. in an amount to be determined at trial against the City and Defendants Salazar, Daverin, Doe NYPD Officer #8 and Doe NYPD Officer #9, jointly and severally, together with interest and costs;

349. Award compensatory damages for economic harm, pain and suffering and emotional and mental distress to Sarah Marchando in an amount to be determined at trial against the City and Defendants Nicosia, Quinn, Doe NYPD Officer #10, Doe NYPD Officer #11, Doe NYPD Officer #12, Doyle, Yanez and Doe NYPD Officer #13, jointly and severally, together with interest and costs;

350. Award punitive damages to D.H. in an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants Kinane, McKenna, Doe NYPD Officer #1, Doe NYPD Officer #2 and Doe NYPD Officer #14, whose actions constituted outrageous conduct, were reckless and showed a callous indifference to and willful disregard of D.H.'s rights as set forth above;

351. Award punitive damages to N.H. in an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants Dawkins, Keane, McKenna and Doe NYPD Officer #3, whose actions constituted outrageous conduct, were reckless and showed a callous indifference to and willful disregard of N.H.'s rights as set forth above;

352. Award punitive damages to K.H. in an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants Imburgia, Maloney, Doe NYPD Officer #4 and Doe NYPD Officer #5, whose actions constituted outrageous conduct, were reckless and showed a callous indifference to and willful disregard of K.H.'s rights as set forth above;

353. Award punitive damages to Natasha Martin in an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants Allen, Siev, Doe NYPD Officer #6 and Doe NYPD Officer #7, whose
actions constituted outrageous conduct, were reckless and showed a callous indifference to and willful disregard of Ms. Martin’s rights as set forth above;

354. Award punitive damages to Tiffaney Grissom in an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants Savarese and Pocalyko, whose actions constituted outrageous conduct, were reckless and showed a callous indifference to and willful disregard of Ms. Grissom’s rights as set forth above;

355. Award punitive damages to R.G. in an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants Diggs, Gomez and Beddows, whose actions constituted outrageous conduct, were reckless and showed a callous indifference to and willful disregard of R.G.’s rights as set forth above;

356. Award punitive damages to A.B. in an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants Salazar, Daverin, Doe NYPD Officer #8 and Doe NYPD Officer #9, whose actions constituted outrageous conduct, were reckless and showed a callous indifference to and willful disregard of A.B.’s rights as set forth above;

357. Award punitive damages to Sarah Marchando in an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants Nicosia, Quinn, Doe NYPD Officer #10, Doe NYPD Officer #11, Doe NYPD Officer #12, Doyle, Yanez and Doe NYPD Officer #13, whose actions constituted outrageous conduct, were reckless and showed a callous indifference to and willful disregard of Ms. Marchando’s rights as set forth above;

Code § 14-151(d)(3) and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(g); and

359. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

D.H., N.H., K.H. f/k/a J.H., Natasha Martin, Tiffaney Grissom, Rosa Gonzalez, Adrienne Bankston, and Sarah Marchando, individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated;

Plaintiffs,

-against-

The City Of New York, Sean Kinane, Joseph Mckenna, Kayan Dawkins, Thomas Keane, Maria Imburgia, Kevin Maloney, Joel Allen, Dave Siev, Bryan Pocalyko, Christopher Savarese, Thomas Diggs, Joel Gomez, Keith Beddows, Christian Salazar, Henry Daverin, Joseph Nicosia, Kelly Quinn, Alexis Yanez, Michael Doyle, John/Jane Doe NYPD Police Officers #1-14,

Defendants.

16 Civ. 7698 (PKC)(KNF)

ORAL ARGUMENT
REQUESTED

DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1) AND 12(b)(6)

ZACHARY W. CARTER
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
Attorney for Defendants
100 Church Street
New York, New York 10007
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Eight named plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law alleging twenty claims for relief relating to the stopping, summoning, and arresting of individuals pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 240.37, loitering for the purposes of prostitution. Plaintiffs sue on behalf of themselves and “a class of similarly situated women of color, some of whom are transgender, who have been and may in the future be subjected to surveillance, stopped, frisked, searched, and/or arrested and detained under New York Penal Law Section 240.37.” Amended Complaint, Annexed to the Declaration of Suzanna Mettham dated March 3, 2017 (“Mettham Dec.”) as Exhibit A, at ¶1. Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint on September 30, 2016 and an Amended Complaint on January 19, 2017. The Amended Complaint identifies certain previously-anonymous plaintiffs by name; but in all other respects, the complaints are the same. Plaintiffs N.H., K.H., D.H., Adrienne Bankston, Rosa Gonzalez, and Tiffaney Grissom allege a single unconstitutional encounter each, which they claim occurred between October 3, 2013 and February 3, 2016, while plaintiff Sarah Marchando alleges two unconstitutional encounters that occurred between May 7th and May 15th, 2015. Plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as well as damages for the individually named class representatives.

As discussed more fully below, defendants City, Sean Kinane, Joseph McKenna, Kayan Dawkins, Thomas Keane, Maria Imburgia, Kevin Maloney, Joel Allen, Dave Siev, Bryan Pocalyko, Christopher Savarese, Thomas Diggs, Joel Gomez, Keith Beddows, Christian Salazar, Henry Daverin, Joseph Nicosia, Kelly Quinn, Alexis Yanez, Michael Doyle (collectively “defendants”) move for partial dismissal of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to plead factual allegations sufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and because plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief either on behalf of themselves or a class.
ARGUMENT

POINT I

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 IS NEITHER VOID FOR VAGUENESS NOR OVERBROAD

Plaintiffs bring vagueness and overbreadth challenges against N.Y. Penal Law § 240.37, arguing that: (i) the statute is void for vagueness because it fails to provide adequate notice to citizens as to what behavior is proscribed by the statute and provides officers with too much discretion in determining how to enforce the statute, Ex. A at ¶¶ 241-43; and (ii) the statute is overbroad because it “. . . implicate[s] a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech and other protected activity.” Ex. A at ¶ 249. As discussed infra at Point II, plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the statute. Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs did have standing, their arguments still fail as a matter of law because the statute proscribes limited, clearly defined conduct carried out with a specific criminal intent. Section 240.37 reads, in relevant part:

Any person who remains or wanders about in a public place and repeatedly beckons to, or repeatedly stops, or repeatedly attempts to stop, or repeatedly attempts to engage passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles, or repeatedly interferes with the free passage of other persons, for the purpose of prostitution as that term is defined in article two hundred thirty of this part, shall be guilty of a violation and is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if such person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or of section 230.00 of this part.

N.Y. Pen. Law § 240.37(2) (emphasis added). Importantly, the statutory scheme proscribes specific conduct only where it is engaged in with a specific criminal intent.

Where, as here, a statutory scheme bans conduct carried out with a specific intent to engage in certain criminal activity, courts have generally found that the statute is not vague. See, e.g., Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed”); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979)
(“the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea’’); United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 116-18 (2d Cir. 2009) (mens rea element provided adequate notice of the proscribed conduct and “the heightened scienter requirement . . . constrains prosecutorial discretion, and ameliorates concerns of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”).

Similarly, a specific intent element saves a statute from an overbreadth challenge, where, as here, it only prohibits conduct engaged in for the specific purpose of criminal activity. People v. Smith, 44 N.Y.2d 613, 620 (N.Y. 1978) (rejecting challenge to 240.37 because “the statute, by its terms, is limited to conduct ‘for the purpose of prostitution, or of patronizing a prostitute’—behavior which has never been a form of constitutionally protected free speech’’); see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection”).

While plaintiffs argue that the statute does not include a mens rea element, Ex. A at ¶ 52, the statute was upheld by the New York State Court of Appeals against vagueness and overbreadth challenges in large part because it “explicitly limits its reach to loitering . . . for the purpose of committing a specific offense.” Smith, 44 N.Y.2d at 620. The Court of Appeals explained, “[t]he section does not authorize an arrest or conviction based on simple loitering by a known prostitute or anyone else; rather, it requires loitering plus additional objective conduct evincing that the observed activities are for the purpose of prostitution.” Id. at 621 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also complain that the statute allows “the NYPD immense discretion to assume an individual’s ‘purpose.’” Ex. A at ¶ 52. Yet, the Court of Appeals in Smith rejected a nearly identical argument, explaining that an officer must still have probable cause to be believe that an individual was acting with the specific intent to commit a prostitution-related offense before he
or she could effect an arrest pursuant to the statute, nor could a person be convicted under the statute absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual acted for the purpose of committing one of the enumerated crimes. See Smith, 44 N.Y.2d at 621. The Court of Appeals explained that “[t]here is also a remote possibility that a person involved in innocent conversation, such as a pollster or one seeking directions, might be arrested, but that is not envisioned by the statute and the mere fact that an officer in a particular case did not have probable cause to arrest that defendant would not warrant the invalidation of the statute.” Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1957)).

Moreover, while plaintiffs argue that “for the purpose of” is impermissibly vague, they offer no alternative for what this could possibly mean other than proscribing conduct engaged in with the intent to commit one of the enumerated prostitution-related offenses. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 51-52. Indeed, the court in Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court noted that “most of the prostitution loitering ordinances that have been upheld clearly require a specific intent element. Those ordinances criminalized loitering . . . ‘for the purpose of engaging in, soliciting, or procuring sexual activity for hire’ . . . or variations thereof.” 129 P.3d 682, 689 (Nev. 2006).

Plaintiffs also fault the statute for failing to “provide any objective criteria to determine what conduct is for the ‘purpose’ of prostitution.” Ex. A at ¶ 51. Ironically, similar attempts to bootstrap a mens rea element by allowing an officer to per se infer intent through observation of certain enumerated objective criteria have led to invalidation of many of the statutes cited by plaintiff. For example, Anchorage Municipal Ordinance 8.14.110 promulgated that “[n]o person will loiter in or near a thoroughfare or place open to the public in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose of, inducing, enticing, soliciting or procuring another to participate in an act of prostitution.” Brown v. Anchorage, 584 P.2d 35, 36 (Alaska 1978).
The ordinance also provided that “[a]mong the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such purpose is manifested are that such person: is a known prostitute or panderer; repeatedly beckons to, stops, attempts to stop, or engages males passersby in conversation . . . .” Id. In striking down the statute, the court noted that “[a]pplying a dictionary definition of the word ‘loiter,’ one could conclude that the ordinance makes it a crime for a previously convicted prostitute to ‘spend time idly;’ to ‘linger in an aimless way,’ or ‘to walk or move slowly and indolently, with frequent stop and pauses.’” Id. at 36; see also Coleman v. Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 463-65 (1988) (“[T]he ordinance provides that among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether the person loitering manifests that intent are three specific circumstances. The role of these enumerated circumstances is central to our decision. . . . It is not clear, however, whether the inclusion of the three particular circumstances was intended to prove that the presence of one or more of those circumstances would sufficiently manifest the intent . . . .”).

The “similar” statutes cited by plaintiffs, Ex. A at ¶ 59, were struck down because they either allowed officers to per se infer specific intent from enumerated criteria such as being a known prostitute or waving at cars, see Brown, 584 P.2d 36-38; Coleman, 364 S.E.2d at 242-43; Christian v. Kan. City, 710 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Profit v. City of Tulsa, 617 P.2d 250, 251 (OK 1980), or because the statute was construed by the court to not include any actual specific intent requirement subject to the probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See City of W. Palm Beach v. Chatman, 112 So. 3d 723, 727 (Fla. Dist. Cit. App. 2013); Silvar, 129 P.3d at 688-89; Wych v. State, 619 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 1993). Section 240.37 does not suffer from these infirmities, and indeed, most closely resembles the ordinance at issue in Cleveland v. Howard, which “was patterned after guidelines found in the American Law
Institute’s Model Penal Code” and which withstood vagueness and overbreadth challenges. 532 N.E.2d 1325, 1326 (Ohio 1987) (“The ordinance sets forth clear and definite criteria whereby both the citizen and the arresting officer can judge whether the particular loitering involved is unlawful.”). Accordingly, Section 240.37 is neither void for vagueness nor unconstitutionally overbroad and, as a result, plaintiffs’ First and Second Claims for Relief must be dismissed.

**POINT II**

**PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO PURSUE INJUNCTIVE OR DECLARATORY RELIEF**

The named plaintiffs lack standing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) to pursue injunctive relief on behalf of themselves or the putative class they seek to represent because they failed to plead a sufficient likelihood of future harm from and the existence of an official policy or its equivalent regarding the NYPD’s enforcement of Sec. 240.37. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ “Class Claims” under their First through Fourteenth Causes of Action, and their individual claims seeking injunctive and/or declaratory relief must be dismissed.

2016) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)). Additionally, plaintiffs “must allege that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class.” MacNamara v. City of New York, 275 F.R.D. 125, 140 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996).

“In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must prove: (1) injury-in-fact, or a concrete and particularized harm to a legally protected interest; (2) causation, or a fairly traceable connection between the asserted injury-in-fact and the alleged actions of the defendant; and (3) redressability, or a non-speculative likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Williams, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 295 (citing W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2008); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). For the reasons cited infra, plaintiffs have not met their burden to prove a non-speculative threat of future injury, or redressability.

A. The Prospect Of Future Harm Is Merely Speculative

1. Past Injuries Do Not Confer Standing for Injunctive Relief

Although past injuries may provide a basis for standing to seek money damages, they do not confer standing to seek injunctive relief unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that she is likely to be harmed again in the future in a similar way. See, e.g., Marcavage v. The City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2012); Harty v. Simon Property Group, L.P., 428 Fed. App’x. 69, 71 (2d Cir. 2011). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495-96. “In other words, [a plaintiff] asserting an injunction . . . must allege the probability of a future encounter with the defendant which is likely to lead to a similar violation of some protected right.” Curry v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-5847

2. The Likelihood of Future Harm Is Too Speculative

“[I]n order to demonstrate that they have standing to pursue claims for injunctive relief, plaintiffs must show a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Henry v. Lucky Strike Entertainment, 10 CV 3682 (RRM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124939, at *42 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2013). This possibility of future injury must be particular and concrete. See O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-97. An “abstract injury is not enough.” Shain, 356 F.3d at 215.

The seminal case in this regard, City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), “occupies much of the territory” related to a citizen’s standing to seek an injunction against police practices surrounding arrests. Williams, 34 F. Supp.3d at 296 (citing Shain, 356 F.3d at 215). In Lyons, the plaintiff alleged that he feared again being subjected to an illegal chokehold, and given the extensive use of chokeholds by the Los Angeles police, that he should be afforded standing to seek injunctive relief. See generally Lyons, 461 U.S. 95. However, the United States Supreme Court held that the risk that plaintiff himself would come into contact with the police and suffer a subsequent unlawful chokehold was speculative in nature and insufficient to confer equitable standing. Id. at 109. Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly confirmed that the likelihood of future unconstitutional treatment by the police in the course of an arrest is too speculative to confer standing. See, e.g., MacIsaac v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 770 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (plaintiff’s claim that he would be stopped, arrested and subjected to a Taser gun again was speculative, and injunctive relief therefore denied); McLennon v. City of New York, 171 F. Supp. 3d 69, 74-76 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (plaintiffs alleging suspicionless searches and seizures at de
facto vehicle checkpoints denied standing for injunctive relief where likelihood of similar alleged constitutional harm by NYPD in future was too speculative); Williams, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 294 (plaintiff lacked standing for injunctive relief under the ADA requiring the NYPD to provide accommodations to hearing-impaired persons upon arrest and incarceration because likelihood of future arrest by NYPD too speculative); MacNamara, 275 F.R.D. at 140-141 (plaintiffs denied class certification, as they could make only a speculative showing of future harm from alleged NYPD mass protest arrest practices in question).

Notably, even where plaintiffs have expressed an intention to engage in future, similar activities to those which they allege caused them to be subjected to past harm, courts have denied standing for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), deeming allegations of future similar harm still too speculative to sustain class certification.¹ For example, in MacNamara, class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) was denied due to lack of standing on the grounds that plaintiffs, arrested during the 2004 RNC convention protests, and who sought to enjoin certain allegedly “unconstitutional” practices employed by the NYPD in effecting mass arrests during protests, could make only a speculative showing of future harm from the practices in question. MacNamara, 275 F.R.D. at 140-141. This was in spite of the fact that, “[t]o support their assertion of likely future harm, plaintiffs cite[d] the depositions of [putative class members] who have indeterminate future plans to participate in New York City protests,” which would presumably bring them into contact with the NYPD and the complained-of practices in the future. There, the court found that plaintiffs’ alleged future harm – that they faced potential arrest since several class representatives planned to attend demonstrations in New York in the future –

¹ Plaintiffs admit that plaintiff K.H. moved to Florida following her arrest, where she still resides. Ex. A at ¶152. K.H. has not alleged an intention to return to New York City, but even if she had, it would be insufficient to confer standing since she is not “necessarily or even likely have any contact with the police in the future.” Williams, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
was “too speculative and conjectural to supply a predicate for prospective injunctive relief.” Id. at 141 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Liu v. The New York City Campaign Finance Board, 14 Civ. 1687 (RJS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135687 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016) (plaintiff’s statement that he “may run for elective office in New York City in the future” deemed too speculative and lacking the requisite imminence of future harm to support standing to challenge campaign finance provision); Shain, 356 F.3d at 216 (denying claim for prospective relief predicated on “an accumulation of inferences” that were “simply too speculative and conjectural” to show “sufficient likelihood of future [injury]”).

The speculative future arrests theorized by plaintiffs fail to rise to the level of “certainly impending” and are the very essence of “conjectural or hypothetical.” See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 800 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)); Atik v. Welch Foods, Inc., No. 15-CB-5405 (MKB)(VMS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136056, at *19-20 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30. 2016).

3. **One to Two Prior Incidents Are Insufficient to Confer Standing**

Where a stop has occurred only once or twice in several years, a plaintiff lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief because it is unlikely that she will be stopped again. See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02 (one past incident involving a plaintiff and the police was insufficient to confer standing); Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (motorists stopped by Border Patrol once in ten years had no standing); Alvarez v. City of Chi., 649 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (no injunction for only two incidents of police misconduct in six years). The *D.H.* plaintiffs fall far short of the standard of showing “certainly impending” future injury,
particularly as seven named plaintiffs allege only one unconstitutional arrest pursuant to Sec. 240.37, and only one named plaintiff alleges two unconstitutional arrests in a five year period.

B. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged The Existence Of An Official Policy Or Its Equivalent

The Second Circuit in *Shain v. Ellison* established a two prong test by which a “plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate both a likelihood of future harm and the existence of an official policy or its equivalent.” *Shain*, 356 F.3d at 216 (emphasis added). For the reasons stated *supra*, plaintiffs cannot meet the first prong of the test; but even if they could, plaintiffs also cannot meet the second prong, and therefore lack standing to seek injunctive relief.

In *DeShawn E. ex rel. Charlotte E. v. Safir*, 156 F.3d 340, 344-45 (2d Cir. 1998), “the Second Circuit distinguished the facts of that case from *Lyons*, noting that in *Lyons*, there was no proof of a pattern of illegality because the police had discretion to decide if they were going to apply a choke hold, and there was no formal policy which sanctioned the application of the choke hold. In contrast, the challenged interrogation methods in *DeShawn* were officially endorsed policies; as a result, there was a likelihood of recurring injury because the police activities are authorized by a written memorandum of understanding between the Corporation Counsel and the Police Commissioner.” *Burns v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.*, 166 F. Supp. 2d 881, 888-889 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The facts in *D.H.* are more similar to those alleged in *Lyons*, as plaintiffs allege that officers’ discretion is improperly applied, and not that the officers are enforcing an unconstitutional official policy.

1. Plaintiffs Do Not Alleged an Official Policy

The Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiffs were arrested or that their rights were violated pursuant to an official policy. Instead, plaintiffs allege “a pattern and widespread practice.” Ex. A at ¶10. In fact, the thrust of plaintiffs’ claims are that “Section 240.37 fails to provide law enforcement with clear guidelines” and that “the Plaintiffs are subjected to the
whims of police officers who may determine that their conduct is for the ‘purpose’ of
prostitution.” Ex. A at ¶¶50, 52. The closest plaintiffs get to alleging an official policy is by
arguing that the “NYPD Patrol Guide is equally vague and otherwise flawed,” but do not allege
that the Patrol Guide orders officers to conduct unconstitutional acts. Ex. A at ¶54.

2. Plaintiffs Do Not Plead Deliberate Indifference

Unable to identify an official policy, plaintiffs instead point only to a few complaints in
other lawsuits for their conclusion that the NYPD has an actionable municipal “custom or
usage.”2 Ex. A, ¶ 101. This is insufficient to confer standing. Although courts can “take judicial
notice of documents filed in other courts, again not for the truth of the matters asserted in the
other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.” Kramer v.
Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); Walker v. City of New York, No. 14 Civ.
808 (ER), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91410 at *24-25 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2015) (“[it] is not within
this Court’s purview to assess the veracity of either the claims of outside plaintiffs, or the
defenses presented against them in cases that have settled or are pending before other judges.”)
(quot ing Kramer).

The fact that none of the three lawsuits cited by plaintiffs resulted in a finding that the
NYPD officers violated the plaintiffs’ rights is fatal to plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim.
See An v. City of New York, No. 16 Civ. 5381 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14857, *10-11
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); Tieman v. City of Newburgh, No. 13 Civ. 4178, 2015 WL 1379652, at *17
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015)). Simply put, plaintiffs’ allegation of an actionable municipal “custom
or usage” by citing to three other lawsuits filed in the last ten years cannot confer standing in this

2 For municipal liability to lie under such a theory, plaintiff must establish the existence of an unlawful practice by
subordinate officials so permanent and well settled to constitute a “custom or usage,” with proof that this practice
was so manifest as to imply the acquiescence of policy-making officials. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127-30.
In fact, of the three other lawsuits cited by plaintiffs, one voluntarily withdrew the case only two months after bringing it in the first place. See Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal, annexed to Mettham Dec. as Ex. B. The other two were settled without admissions of liability by any defendant. See Stipulations of Settlements, annexed to Mettham Dec. as Ex. C and Ex. D.

Further, the Amended Complaint has failed to allege sufficiently “that the City, once on notice, failed to take corrective action required to show deliberate indifference.” An, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14857 at *10-11. In fact, plaintiffs admit that the City amended the Patrol Guide in 2012, even though they claim that the amendments “proved insufficient.” Ex. A at ¶105. This is hardly sufficient to plead official acquiescence to unlawful behavior by subordinates, as required by City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127-30 (1985) (plurality opinion).

C. The Claimed Injuries Would Not Be Prevented By the Equitable Relief Sought

According to the Amended Complaint, the defendants lied about what they observed. As such, according to plaintiffs, it is not that the officers were unclear about what 240.37 permitted and unconstitutionally enforced the statue based on gender identity, race, or First Amendment factors, but rather simply manufactured allegations. Ex. A at ¶¶121, 138, 153, 171, 187, 200, 213, 228, 234 (defendants “falsely alleged” facts in each criminal complaint). Thus, it is unclear how equitable relief regarding the change in the prosecution of 240.37 would have prevented the injuries alleged. For example, plaintiff Gonzalez denies that she stopped and spoke to anyone on the date of incident; however, plaintiffs allege that defendant Gomez falsely swore in a criminal complaint that she stopped five male motorists. Ex. A at ¶¶ 195, 200. To the extent plaintiffs claim that officers lied under oath regarding their observations, the statutory construction of

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3 Nor can alleging a handful of lawsuits and a newspaper article satisfy the “plausibility” requirement of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2008). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. As seen, complaints from other lawsuits and newspaper articles are not evidence of municipal wrongdoing. Thus, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as well.
240.37 is irrelevant. Moreover, alleged deficient training regarding the correct constitutional interpretation of 240.37 would not remedy the “isolated misconduct” or “negligent or intentional disregard of their training” that is alleged by plaintiffs. See, e.g., *Stelling v. City of New York, et al.*, 15-CV-0035 (ILG), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3566 **5-8** (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2017) (citing *Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford*, 361 F.3d 113, 130 (2d Cir. 2004)). For this reason, plaintiffs have not pleaded that injury would be prevented by the equitable relief sought.

**POINT III**

**PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO PLEAD A VIABLE 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) CONSPIRACY CLAIM**

Plaintiffs’ attempt to plead a conspiracy claim against “[d]efendants from the 52nd Precinct” pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1985(3) in their Tenth Claim for Relief fails as a matter of law. Ex. A at ¶ 281. In order to plead a viable conspiracy claim pursuant to either § 1983 or § 1985(3), a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to plausibly establish that there was “a meeting of the minds, such as defendants entered into an agreement, express or tacit, to achieve [an] unlawful end.” *Romer v. Morgenthau*, 119 F. Supp. 2d 346, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Where plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege such a meeting of the minds, their conspiracy claim must be dismissed. See, e.g., *Ciambriello v. County of Nassau*, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002); *Leon v. Murphy*, 988 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1993); *Corsini v. Bloomberg*, 12 Civ. 8058 (LTS)(MHD), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67020, at *36-*37 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014).

Here, plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim relates specifically to alleged actions taken by the 52nd Precinct defendants during so-called “sweeps” on June 6, 2015 and June 13, 2015. Ex. A at ¶ 281. Plaintiffs’ only factual support for their conspiracy claim appears to be that “[o]ne of N.H.’s arresting officers told the women that the police had been conducting a sweep and that if they saw ‘girls like them’ outside after midnight, they would arrest them.” Ex. A at ¶ 134 (emphasis
added); see also, Ex. A at ¶ 74. As an initial matter, the factual allegations regarding a single exchange with one police officer fall far short of plausibly establishing a “meeting of the minds” sufficient to support a viable conspiracy claim. Moreover, it is clear that the allegation that the police were conducting a sweep for a specific purpose is nothing more than a conclusory inference drawn by plaintiffs from a single alleged exchange.

In addition, plaintiffs’ reference to the alleged statement “girls like you” fails to plausibly establish that sweeps were targeted at transgender women. Even assuming the statement was made, the more likely explanation is that the officer was referring to prostitutes—not transgender women. That inference is bolstered by the fact that other individuals arrested in the same location were also arrested for prostitution-related offenses and that officers allegedly responded to N.H.’s query about the charges by simply stating “you know.” See Ex. A at ¶ 130. Accordingly, this statement, standing alone, cannot plausibly establish that there was a meeting of the minds to “send a message” to transgender women because there is a more likely explanation for the meaning behind the statement (i.e., that the officers were cracking down on illegal street prostitution). See Iqbal, 556 at 681 (although defendants’ actions were not inconsistent with plaintiff’s alleged improper purpose, there was a more likely explanation for the conduct, and thus plaintiff failed to plausibly establish the improper purpose).

Finally, under the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, even if the Amended Complaint plausibly established elements of an otherwise viable conspiracy claim, the claim would still be barred because it alleges a conspiracy within the NYPD itself. See, e.g., Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 254 Fed. Appx. 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Herrman v. Moore, 57 F.2d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) conspiracy claim must be dismissed.4

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4 Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs had plausibly established a meeting of the minds between defendants and their conspiracy claim was not otherwise barred by the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, to state a viable claim
POINT IV

PLAINTIFFS’ EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburn Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “Proof that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Okin v. Village of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dept., 577 F.3d 415, 438 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)). To allege a denial of equal protection, plaintiffs must show “(1) that [they were] treated differently from other similarly situated individuals, and (2) that such differential treatment was based on impermissible considerations . . . .” De Santis v. City of New York, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99126, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2011) (citing Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001)). They also must show that the disparity in treatment cannot survive the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. See Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs’ Equal Protection causes of action under their Fifth and Sixteenth Claims for Relief must be dismissed.

A. Claims of Selective Enforcement/Treatment Must Plead the Existence of Similarly Situated Individuals

Selective enforcement or selective treatment claims “arise when plaintiffs claim that they were treated differently based on impermissible considerations.” Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Village of Wesley Hills, 815 F. Supp. 2d 679, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Tasadfor v. Ruggiero, 265 F. Supp. 2d 542, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). The Second Circuit has held that “a plaintiff alleging for § 1985(3) conspiracy “a plaintiff must plead ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Blount v. New York Unified Court Sys., 03-CV-0023 (JS)(ETB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. March 17, 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations omitted). As discussed infra at Point IV, plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege this element of the claim as well.
a claim of selective prosecution … must plead and establish the existence of similarly situated individuals who were not prosecuted.” *Pyke v. Cuomo*, 258 F.3d 107, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) (citing *United States v. Armstrong*, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)). Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims are premised on a theory of selective enforcement/treatment, in that “Defendants targeted and/or sanctioned the targeting of Named Plaintiffs for unlawful surveillance, stops, questions, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrest and detention under Section 240.37 based on their race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity and/or appearance, under the circumstances in which white men or white women are not subjected to such law enforcement activities.” Ex. A at ¶ 78.

**B. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Facts Sufficient to Establish Differential Treatment**

A selective enforcement claim requires, as a threshold matter, a showing that the plaintiff was treated differently compared to others similarly situated. *See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik*, 356 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2004); *Gagliardi v. Vill. of Pawling*, 18 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 1994) (“To establish such intentional or purposeful discrimination, it is axiomatic that a plaintiff must allege that similarly situated persons have been treated differently.”). To plead the existence of similarly-situated others, plaintiffs must “compare themselves to individuals [who] are similarly situated in all material respects . . . . [and] identify comparators whom a prudent person would think were roughly equivalent.” *Best v. New York City Dep’t of Corr.*, 14 F. Supp. 3d 341, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting *Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc.*). Accordingly, because plaintiffs have not set forth facts sufficient to show the existence of similarly situated individuals, their equal protection claims must be dismissed. *See, e.g., Kerik*, 356 F.3d at 211 (denial of a permit did not constitute differential treatment where plaintiff failed to allege any other group who was granted a permit under similar circumstances); *Gagliardi*, 18 F.3d at 193 (affirming dismissal where plaintiff failed to allege that the municipality would have
enforced the zoning code at the request of a resident similarly-situated to plaintiff); *Best*, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 352-54 (dismissing claim in absence of “facts that suggest [plaintiff] was treated differently than were any other similarly-situated individuals”).

C. **Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Intentional Discrimination**

Plaintiffs also fail to adequately plead discriminatory intent based on race, gender, and gender identity. *See Okin*, 577 F.3d at 437 (“Proof that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”); *Troy v. City of New York*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136339, at *23-*27 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2014) (granting dismissal where plaintiff did not allege that differential treatment by police was based on impermissible considerations), *aff’d*, 614 Fed. Appx. 32 (2d Cir. 2015).

First, plaintiffs conclusorily allege that defendants enforce Section 240.37 in a discriminatory manner based on race. Plaintiffs, however, do not allege any specific facts that defendants were motivated by racial animus. Of the eight named plaintiffs in this case, only plaintiff Bankston alleges that “officers abused her by using racial slurs.” Ex. A at ¶55. However, plaintiff Bankston does not state what “racial slurs” were said and which officer made such statement. This allegation is vague, speculative, and does not give rise to a plausible inference of purposeful discrimination. *Brodt v. City of New York*, 4 F. Supp. 3d 562, 568-569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“plaintiff's feelings and perceptions of being discriminated against are not evidence of discrimination,” even where the conduct alleged is “rude and derogatory”).

Second, plaintiffs make conclusory assertions that defendants enforce Section 240.37 in a discriminatory manner based on gender; however, they do not allege any facts or attribute any statements to defendants that plausibly imply that defendants were motivated by gender animus.

Third, plaintiffs made conclusory assertions that defendants have chosen to enforce Section 240.37 in a discriminatory manner based on gender identity. Plaintiff N.H. alleges that
after she was arrested, defendant Dawkins and other police officers continually referred to her as a boy or a man. Ex. A at ¶39. Plaintiff N.H, however, makes no allegations that police officers she encountered made such references in a mocking or dismissive manner. Plaintiff Martin alleges that Defendant Allen made derogatory comments such as, “which one of you is going to process the he/she?” Ex. A at ¶45. These post-hoc gender references, while rude, are not sufficient to nudge her claim of purposeful discrimination from conceivable to plausible and do not give rise to a plausible inference that the decision to arrest any plaintiff was motivated by discriminatory animus regarding that plaintiff’s transgender status. See Brodt v. City of New York, 4 F. Supp. 3d 562, 569-572 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Conduct that is merely “rude and derogatory” does give rise to discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause).

Plaintiff Grissom alleges that a female officer, upon defendant’s Pocalyko’s order, strip-search her “for the purpose of confirming whether or not she was a female, as her identification indicated.” Ex. A at ¶48. However, she merely alleges that defendant Pocalyko asked her questions relating to her gender and sex organs and then ordered a female police officer to strip search her. Id. While these comments certainly suggest some degree of confusion on the part of the officer, they are far too vague to give rise to a plausible inference that the search was conducted for the “sole” purpose of assigning plaintiff a gender based on anatomical features.5

For the abovementioned reasons, since the plaintiffs have not plausibly pled intentional discrimination, their equal protection claims thus fail as a matter of law.

5 While Plaintiff Grissom may sincerely believe that the search was conducted to assign her a gender, those beliefs standing alone are not sufficient to prove animus. See Williams v. Wellness Med. Care, P.C., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139626, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (“without sufficient facts, even the most sincerely held beliefs [of animus] do not comprise a sufficient basis for withstanding a 12(b)(6) attack.”).
D. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity saves public officials from the burden of civil discovery and trial unless they have violated “a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” *Reichle v. Howards*, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). Even assuming, *arguendo*, that plaintiffs could establish a constitutional violation on the facts alleged, the plaintiffs’ rights must be “clearly established” at the time of the alleged incident. *Saucier v. Katz*, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (June 18, 2001). The “clearly established” inquiry requires that “if the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.” *Id.* For purposes of qualified immunity, in order to be considered “clearly established” the “contours of the right” must be “sufficiently clear” at the time of the challenged conduct so that every reasonable official would have understood that he or she was violating the right. *Terebesi v. Torreso*, 764 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd*, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)). “To date, neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has held that transgender plaintiffs are members of a protected or suspect class whose equal protection claims are entitled to heightened scrutiny. . . . Nor has the Second Circuit held . . . that discrimination against transgender individuals constitutes sex-based discrimination.” *White v. City of New York*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123140, at *22-*23 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2016) (internal citation omitted).

Because at the time of the conduct at issue, neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit had held that transgender people were a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, the named defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on claims of constitutional violations based on the named plaintiffs’ identities as transwomen.
POINT V

N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 40-C, 40-D, 79-N
CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED

To establish claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000d, a plaintiff must plead, *inter alia*, “that the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of race, that the discrimination was intentional, and that the discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor for the defendant's actions.” *Tolbert v. Queens College*, 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted). New York Civil Rights Law provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person shall, because of race, creed color, national origin, sex, marital status, sexual orientation or disability… be subjected to any discrimination of his or her civil rights ….” N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c. New York Civil Rights Law also imposes liability on “[a]ny person who intentionally selects a person or property for harm … in whole or in substantial party because of a belief or perception regarding the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age disability or sexual orientation of a person.” N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-n. As discussed in Point IV, *supra*, plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege intentional discrimination or that defendants were motivated by discriminatory animus. Since plaintiffs have not plausibly pled intentional discrimination, these claims under their Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and Eighteenth Claims for Relief thus fail as a matter of law.

POINT VI

PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CLAIM PURSUANT TO
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 296(2), 296(6), 297(9) AND
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(4)(A), 8-107(6), 8-107(17), 8-502(A) SHOULD BE DISMISSED

Under New York State Executive Law and New York City Administrative Code, plaintiffs may only oppose a discriminatory practice by “a place or provider of public
accommodation.” See N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-107(4)(a), N.Y. Exec. Law §296(2). Plaintiffs’ Twelfth Claim for Relief alleges that “the NYPD is a place or provider of public accommodation because it provides services, facilities, accommodations, advantages and privileges through acting in its investigative and custodial capacities.” Ex. A ¶ 73. However, plaintiffs’ allegations incorrectly expand the definition of “place of public accommodation.”6 Plaintiffs specifically state that the NYPD is a place or provider of public accommodation during the “supervision and execution of surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention pursuant to Section 240.37.” Id. This allegation implies that the NYPD provides a public accommodation to individuals suspected of committing a crime pursuant to Section 240.37. With respect to the enforcement of Section 240.37, the NYPD certainly does not provide a public accommodation to those suspected individuals, as the term is defined in either the Executive Law or Administrative Code. Unlike victims who are reporting crimes, such suspected individuals are not being provided conveniences and services by the NYPD. See Cahill v. Rosa, 89 N.Y.2d 14, 21 (1996). Here, plaintiffs are not claiming that they were seeking public services or accommodations of any kind when they were targeted by the NYPD acting in its investigative capacity. Thus, public accommodation laws are inapplicable to plaintiffs’ allegations.

Because plaintiffs are improperly expanding the definition of “place or provider of public accommodation,” this class claim should be dismissed.

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6 N.Y.C. Admin. Code states that “[t]he term ‘place or provider of public accommodation’ shall include providers … of goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantages or privileges of any kind, and places … where goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantages or privileges of any kind are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-102(9); N.Y. Exec. Law §292(9).
POINT VII
PLAINTIFFS’ INDIVIDUAL STATE LAW CLAIMS FOR MONEY DAMAGES MUST BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW

Plaintiffs’ state law claims, seeking money damages on behalf of named plaintiffs, must be dismissed due to their failure to comply with New York State notice of claim requirements.


Here, plaintiffs tacitly acknowledge that they did not serve a notice of claim upon the City. See Ex. A at ¶22. Instead, plaintiffs claim that they should be excused from such a requirement, because, they allege, they are bringing this action to benefit “all New Yorkers,” “particularly women of color,” and thus they fall within the public interest exception. Id.
An exception to the requirement that a notice of claim be filed as a condition precedent to a suit against a municipal actor is made for cases seeking vindication of a public interest. See *Mills v. Monroe Cnty.*, 464 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (1983). To merit the exception, the action must be “brought to protect an important right” and “seek relief for a similarly situated class of the public” and the resolution must “directly affect the rights of that class or group.” See *id*. This exception is applicable where plaintiffs seek monetary relief, if at all, “only as an incident of prospective declaratory and injunctive relief.” *S.W. v. Warren*, 528 F. Supp.2d 282, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also *Brooklyn Sch. for Special Children v. Crew*, 96 Civ. 5014, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12974, at *1-2, 50-51 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1997). Conversely, where a plaintiff seeks money damages to redress her individual injuries, the vindication of public right exception does not apply, even where the lawsuit implicates an important right, with impact on a larger class. Thus, in *Atkins v. County of Orange*, 251 F. Supp.2d 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), a group of mentally disabled prisoners brought suit alleging serious problems with their provided psychiatric treatment. Plaintiffs, who did not file a notice of claim, argued that their state law cause of action should not be dismissed because they sought to vindicate a public interest, “namely, challenging the inhumane mental health treatment at the Jail.” *Id.* at 1234. The Court disagreed. While admitting that a victory for plaintiffs may result in changes in the mental health conditions in the prison, the Court found that the relief plaintiffs sought was for their individual injuries. *Id.* at 1235. Therefore, the public right exception did not apply, and, because plaintiffs had not filed a timely notice of claim, their state law claim was dismissed. *Id.* at 1234-35; see also *Mills*, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 711; *O’Connell*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194831.

Plaintiffs’ myriad state law claims seek money damages redounding to their benefit only, rather than as a source of “relief for a similarly situated class of the public,” as required if the
public interest exception applied. See Mills, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 711. Plaintiffs have not sought to certify a damages class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); the only injuries for which they seek monetary compensation are their own. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ state law claims do not vindicate a public interest, and the failure to file a notice of claim is thus fatal to their state law claims.

**POINT VIII**

**THE SUPERVISORY DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT**

Plaintiffs allege supervisory liability claims against “Supervisor Defendants” McKenna, Maloney, Daverin and Beddows. However, besides alleging that these individuals “failed to properly review, monitor and supervise” other defendants in the section involving the specific incidents, Ex. A at ¶¶ 139, 154, 201, 214, plaintiffs fail to articulate specific actions undertaken by any of them. Instead, plaintiffs assert in a conclusory manner that the supervisory defendants “participated in planning, ordering, staffing, supervising and/or approving the unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detentions.” Ex. A at ¶¶ 35-36. Without more than vague allegations that they should be responsible for their subordinates, plaintiffs cannot maintain an action against any of the supervisory defendants. *Wright v. Smith*, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”).
CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) together with such costs, fees and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York
       March 3, 2017

ZACHARY W. CARTER
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
 Attorney for Defendants
100 Church Street, Rm. 3-212
New York, New York 10007
(212) 356-2356

By: ________________________________

Suzanna Publicker Mettham
Anthony DiSenso
Joanne McLaren
Bilal Haider
August 11, 2015

POLICY ON STATE OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT, PROTECT, AND FULFIL THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEX WORKERS (INTERNATIONAL BOARD)

SHARE

The International Council

REQUESTS the International Board to adopt a policy that seeks attainment of the highest possible protection of the human rights of sex workers, through measures that include the decriminalization of sex work, taking into account:

1. The starting point of preventing and redressing human rights violations against sex workers, and in particular the need for states to not only review and repeal laws that make sex workers vulnerable to human rights violations, but also refrain from enacting such laws.

2. Amnesty International’s overarching commitment to advancing gender equality and women’s rights.

3. The obligation of states to protect every individual in their jurisdiction from discriminatory policies, laws and practices, given that the status and experience of being discriminated against are often key factors in what leads people to engage in sex work, as well as in increasing vulnerability to human rights violations while engaged in sex work and in limiting options for voluntarily ceasing involvement in sex work.

4. The harm reduction principle.

5. States have the obligation to prevent and combat trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and to protect the human rights of victims of trafficking.

6. States have an obligation to ensure that sex workers are protected from exploitation and can use criminal law to address acts of exploitation.

7. Any act related to the sexual exploitation of a child must be criminalized. Recognizing that a child involved in a commercial sex act is a victim of sexual exploitation, entitled to support, reparations, and remedies, in line with
international human rights law, and that states must take all appropriate measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse of children.

8. Evidence that sex workers often engage in sex work due to marginalization and limited choices, and that therefore Amnesty International will urge states to take appropriate measures to realize the economic, social and cultural rights of all people so that no person enters sex work against their will or is compelled to rely on it as their only means of survival, and to ensure that people are able to stop sex work if and when they choose.

9. Ensuring that the policy seeks to maximize protection of the full range of human rights – in addition to gender equality, women’s rights, and non-discrimination – related to sex work, in particular security of the person, the rights of children, access to justice, the right to health, the rights of Indigenous peoples and the right to a livelihood.

10. Recognizing and respecting the agency of sex workers to articulate their own experiences and define the most appropriate solutions to ensure their own welfare and safety, while also complying with broader, relevant international human rights principles regarding participation in decision-making, such as the principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent with respect to Indigenous peoples.

11. The evidence from Amnesty International’s and external research on the lived experiences of sex workers, and on the human rights impact of various criminal law and regulatory approaches to sex work.

12. The policy will be fully consistent with Amnesty International’s positions with respect to consent to sexual activity, including in contexts that involve abuse of power or positions of authority.

13. Amnesty international does not take a position on whether sex work should be formally recognized as work for the purposes of regulation. States can impose legitimate restrictions on the sale of sexual services, provided that such restrictions comply with international human rights law, in particular in that they must be for a legitimate purpose, provided by law, necessary for and proportionate to the legitimate aim sought to be achieved, and not discriminatory.

The policy will be capable of flexible and responsive application across and within different jurisdictions, recognizing that Amnesty entities may undertake work on different aspects of this policy and can take an incremental approach to this work (in accordance with and within the limits of this policy) based on assessments of specific legal and policy contexts.

The International Board will ensure that, following the release of the final research report, Sections and structures have an opportunity to review and give feedback on the final draft policy before it is adopted.
Today, several LGBT rights organizations across the country issued the following joint statement in support of Amnesty International’s August 11th resolution supporting sex worker human rights.

**Joint Statement in Support of Amnesty International Resolution:**

As LGBT rights organizations in the United States, we join to applaud and support Amnesty International’s recent resolution to protect the human rights of sex workers by calling for decriminalization of sex work, while simultaneously holding states accountable in preventing and combatting sex trafficking, ensuring that sex workers are protected from exploitation, and enforcing laws against the sexual exploitation of children.

For many LGBT people, participation in street economies is often critical to survival, particularly for LGBT youth and transgender women of color who face all-too-common family rejection and vastly disproportionate rates of violence, homelessness, and discrimination in employment, housing, and education.

Transgender people engage in sex work at a rate ten times that of cisgender women, and 13% of transgender people who experience family rejection have done sex work. Whether or not they participate in sex work, LGBT people are regularly profiled, harassed, and criminalized based on the presumption that they are sex workers, contributing to the high rates of incarceration and police brutality experienced by these communities. As Amnesty International has clearly set forth, its resolution takes into account the negative impact of criminalization on the safety of sex workers, and furthermore, states remain obligated to protect the human rights of victims of trafficking and can use criminal law to address exploitation.

When LGBT people are prosecuted for sex work, they face alarmingly high rates of harassment and physical and sexual abuse behind bars. One study found that 59% of transgender people in California men’s prisons report having experienced sexual assault while in custody. Alternative diversion program alternatives are frequently based on moral judgment, sending the message that there is something wrong with people who are just trying to survive, and do nothing to address the actual needs of sex workers, including those sex workers who might prefer to be doing other kinds of work.

Laws criminalizing sexual exchange—whether by the seller or the buyer—impede sex workers’ ability to negotiate condom use and other boundaries, and force many to work in hidden or remote places where they are more vulnerable to violence. Research and experience have shown that these laws serve only to drive the industry further underground, make workers less able to negotiate with customers on their own terms, and put those who engage in criminalized sex work at higher risk for abduction and sex trafficking. And as UNAIDS and the World Health Organization have recognized, criminalization also seriously hampers efforts to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS—efforts in which people involved in the sex trades are crucial partners.

We look forward to working together, with sex workers and sex workers’ rights advocates, and with Amnesty International, to replace laws that criminalize sex work with public policies that address sex workers’ real economic and safety needs.

In solidarity,

Transgender Law Center
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD)
Lambda Legal
National Center for Lesbian Rights
National Center for Transgender Equality
Buying Sex Should Not Be Legal

By RACHEL MORAN  AUG. 28, 2015

DUBLIN — HERE in my city, earlier this month, Amnesty International’s international council endorsed a new policy calling for the decriminalization of the global sex trade. Its proponents argue that decriminalizing prostitution is the best way of protecting “the human rights of sex workers,” though the policy would apply equally to pimps, brothel-keepers and johns.

Amnesty’s stated aim is to remove the stigma from prostituted women, so that they will be less vulnerable to abuse by criminals operating in the shadows. The group is also calling on governments “to ensure that sex workers enjoy full and equal legal protection from exploitation, trafficking and violence.”

The Amnesty vote comes in the context of a prolonged international debate about how to deal with prostitution and protect the interests of so-called sex workers. It is a debate in which I have a personal stake — and I believe Amnesty is making a historic mistake.

I entered the sex trade — as most do — before I was even a woman. At age 14, I was placed in the care of the state after my father committed suicide and because my mother suffered from mental illness.

Within a year, I was on the streets with no home, education or job skills. All I had was my body. At 15, I met a young man who thought it would be a good idea for me to prostitute myself. As “fresh meat,” I was a commodity in high demand.

For seven years, I was bought and sold. On the streets, that could be 10 times in a night. It’s hard to describe the full effect of the psychological coercion, and how deeply it eroded my confidence. By my late teens, I was using cocaine to dull the pain.

I cringe when I hear the words “sex work.” Selling my body wasn’t a livelihood. There was no resemblance to ordinary employment in the ritual degradation of strangers’ using my body to satiate their urges. I was doubly exploited — by those who pimped me and those who bought me.

I know there are some advocates who argue that women in prostitution sell sex as consenting adults. But those who do are a relatively privileged minority — primarily white, middle-class, Western women in escort agencies — not remotely representative of the global majority. Their right to sell doesn’t trump my right and others’ not to be sold in a trade that preys on women already marginalized by class and race.

The effort to decriminalize the sex trade worldwide is not a progressive movement. Implementing this policy will simply calcify into law men’s entitlement to buy sex, while decriminalizing pimping will protect no one but the pimps.

In the United States, prostitution is thought to be worth at least $14 billion a year. Most of that money doesn’t go to girls like my teenage self. Worldwide, human trafficking is the second largest enterprise of organized crime, behind drug cartels but on a par with gunrunning.

In countries that have decriminalized the sex trade, legal has attracted illegal. With popular support, the authorities in Amsterdam have closed down much of the city’s famous red light district — because it had become a magnet for criminal activity.

In Germany, where prostitution was legalized in 2002, the industry has exploded. It is estimated that one million men pay to use 450,000 girls and women every day. Sex tourists are pouring in, supporting “mega-brothels” up to 12 stories high.
for those who want to get out of it. These women are trapped.

There is an alternative: an approach, which originated in Sweden, that has now been adopted by other countries such as Norway, Iceland and Canada and is sometimes called the “Nordic model.”

The concept is simple: Make selling sex legal but buying it illegal — so that women can get help without being arrested, harassed or worse, and the criminal law is used to deter the buyers, because they fuel the market. There are numerous techniques, including hotel sting operations, placing fake ads to inhibit johns, and mailing court summonses to home addresses, where accused men’s spouses can see them.

Since Sweden passed its law, the number of men who say they have bought sex has plummeted. (At 7.5 percent, it’s roughly half the rate reported by American men.) In contrast, after neighboring Denmark decriminalized prostitution outright, the trade increased by 40 percent within a seven-year period.

Contrary to stereotype, the average john is not a loner or a loser. In America, a significant proportion of buyers who purchase sex frequently have an annual income above $120,000 and are married. Most have college degrees, and many have children. Why not let fines from these privileged men pay for young women’s counseling, education and housing? It is they who have credit cards and choices, not the prostituted women and girls.

Amnesty International proposes a sex trade free from “force, fraud or coercion,” but I know from what I’ve lived and witnessed that prostitution cannot be disentangled from coercion. I believe the majority of Amnesty delegates who voted in Dublin wished to help women and girls in prostitution and mistakenly allowed themselves to be sold the notion that decriminalizing pimps and johns would somehow achieve that aim. But in the name of human rights, what they voted for was to decriminalize violations of those rights, on a global scale.

The recommendation goes before the board for a final decision this autumn. Many of Amnesty’s leaders and members realize that their organization’s credibility and integrity are on the line. It’s not too late to stop this disastrous policy before it harms women and children worldwide.

Rachel Moran is the founder of Space International, which advocates the abolition of the sex trade, and the author of the memoir “Paid For: My Journey Through Prostitution.”

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A version of this op-ed appears in print on August 29, 2015, on Page A19 of the New York edition with the headline: Buying Sex Should Not Be Legal.
The difference between decriminalisation and legalisation of sex work

There is a crucial distinction between these two terms that is frequently blurred in the debate around the different models.

By Frankie Mullin

Sex work divides feminist opinion like few others issues. The ideological clash – prostitution as violence against women vs simply a job – may never be resolved but where debate coalesces, around proposed legal systems, ideas become concrete and can be logically hashed out.

Largely, both sides agree that criminal sanctions against sex workers themselves should be lifted. At present, while selling sex is legal in the UK, women who work together for safety can be prosecuted for brothel-keeping and thousands end up with criminal records for loitering and soliciting.
Some claim, however, that people (usually men) buying sex should be criminalised, as is the case in Sweden. Others argue that this endangers sex workers, forcing them to work in secluded, dangerous conditions so that clients can go undetected.

Tension is escalating as the English Collective of Prostitutes (ECP) prepares to hold an evidence-gathering symposium in Parliament on 3 November, heralding a campaign for full decriminalisation. The ECP campaign mirrors that of MSP Jean Urquhart who, backed by sex worker organisations and health charities, is calling for sex work to be decriminalised in Scotland. In the other corner will be the End Demand campaign, which wants the government to follow Sweden by implementing a Sex Buyer Law.

So let the battle commence, but let it do so on clearly-defined terms. The ECP and Urquhart are campaigning for decriminalisation. This is not – as has been suggested in countless media reports – legalisation.

Insisting on clarification isn’t petty quibbling. The models are so distinct that when York Union last week changed the title of its debate to “This House believes the legalisation of prostitution would be a disaster”, both sides thought they were arguing in favour of the motion. Sex worker and activist Laura Lee, who was up against outspoken abolitionist Julie Bindel at the debate, had to “tear up her notes” when it emerged that York Union actually meant “decriminalisation”, something Lee wholeheartedly supports.

The York mix-up wasn’t unique. Since Amnesty released its draft proposal for the decriminalisation of sex work, countless articles have conflated the terms, inaccurately holding up Germany and the Netherlands as examples of “decriminalisation gone wrong”.

Some clarification: under legalisation, sex work is controlled by the government and is legal only under certain state-specified conditions. Decriminalisation involves the removal of all prostitution-specific laws, although sex workers and sex work businesses must still operate within the laws of the land, as must any businesses.

Clear examples of a legalised system in Europe come from the Netherlands and Austria; a murkier example from Germany. In the Netherlands, brothels have been legal since 2000, but only if they comply with specific requirements and, in some cases, undergo regular visits from
The police. Street workers must operate in designated areas, outside which they will be committing a criminal offence.

In Austria, most regions require sex workers to register, either directly with the police or, via a brothel owner. A national agreement stipulates that every sex worker must undergo a weekly health check, evidence of which must be provided in a compulsory booklet. Both of these measures, says Amnesty International, are human rights violations.

The situation is more confusing in Germany as federal states implement wildly different approaches, ranging from de facto forced registration in Bavaria to Munich’s almost city-wide no-prostitution zones. Elsewhere, licensing requirements support the much-publicised “mega brothels” at the expense of smaller operations which don’t have the resources to comply. The German government is currently debating bringing in compulsory medical examinations.

For some sex workers, these models of legalisation have brought benefits, including access to the welfare state and better negotiating rights with bosses. For others – and, in particular, those who are already marginalised – life has got harder. State-imposed regulations have created a two-tier system, so that the undocumented or those who use drugs now work in clandestine, almost invariably less safe, conditions. These systems increase the power of managers, who know that women have few options for where they can work.

Accurate trafficking statistics are notoriously hard to come by and definitions can be slippery. In the Netherlands, coercion is more likely to take place outside the regulated spaces, although the Dutch government states: “It also happens that prostitutes who are exploited according to Dutch standards do not see themselves as a victim of exploitation.” In Germany, the most reliable figures come from by the Federal Criminal Police Office, which suggests that, since the Prostitution Act, the number of victims has declined. According to Eurostat’s latest report, the German per-capita rate of trafficking between 2010 and 2012 was lower than that of Sweden.

But here’s the thing: these are not the models that human rights and sex worker-led organisations across the world are advocating. The only country to have fully decriminalised sex work is New Zealand. According to research, both street-based and indoor sex workers there report better relationships with the police and say they feel safer. Indoor workers are protected by employment laws and can take employers to court. Contrary to fears, decriminalisation has not led to overall growth of the industry and trafficking has not increased.
The antiblackness of 'modern-day slavery' abolitionism

TRYON P. WOODS 10 October 2014

Antiblack racism underwrites the contemporary movement against “modern-day slavery.” The anti-slavery movement is haunted by the specter of racial slavery even while it feeds off it parasitically.

The contemporary movement against ‘modern-day slavery’ makes a grave analytical and political error that, unfortunately, is all too common in our antiblack world. By ‘antiblack world,’ I refer to how blackness continues to represent danger and sexual savagery. It is the mark of the least desirable, the position against which all other oppressed subjects calibrate their humanity—as in, as hard as my life may be, at least I am not black.

Black people collectively generate no respect, honor, or value, let alone ‘rights’ or power—not because they are poor, live under corrupt governments, or live during a time of population explosion (all leading explanations for the emergence of ‘modern-day slavery’), but rather simply because of their existence as such. As much as blackness is the mark of the non-human, it is also the negation of ‘womanhood’ and ‘manhood.’ Long after anti-colonial movements the world over have permanently discredited white supremacy, the principle of antiblackness remains stubbornly intact: it is best to be white; but if that proves beyond reach, at least do not be black.

Antiblackness is the product of racial slavery. The enduring effect of this is that the slave is both paradigmatically black and construed in terms of a bestial and openly vulnerable sexuality. This spectre of blackness, understood as sexual savagery, is present whenever the discourse of ‘slavery’ is evoked, even when the subjects are racialized as non-black or white. The essential failure of organizations fighting against ‘modern-day slavery’ to recognize even the basic features of the relationship between antiblackness and slavery produces a
First, the movement against ‘modern-day slavery’ deploys non-racial language to define the racialized realities that it addresses, an approach that solidifies the existing racial regime. If we situate our analysis within the archive of the black social movement, we learn that the best way to preserve the racial status quo is to simply represent it in non-racial terms. An abundance of empirical evidence reveals that twenty-first century American society is as racially hierarchical as it has ever been. Several recent books demonstrate this well, such as **Racism without racists: Colorblind racism and the persistence of inequality in the United States** by Bonilla-Silva or **The shame of the nation: The restoration of apartheid schooling in America** by Jonathan Kozol. Whites are the single most segregated racial group, and wealth, health, education, and employment disparities have increased rather than diminished in the post-civil rights era.

Yet this evidence remains unpersuasive in the face of the prevailing non-racial logic, which maintains any remaining inequities are due to something other than racism.

The non-racial language of the ‘modern-day slavery’ discourse is particularly deceptive when it comes to the power relations in which the violent carnality of ‘race’ is simultaneously the normative process by which ‘sex’ is conferred.

Given western civilization’s basis in the sexual plunder of slavery and colonialism, it is unsurprising that today’s anti-slavery movement is inordinately preoccupied with women’s sexual victimization. For instance, the focus on white women from eastern Europe working in commercial sex recalls the fight by British and US feminists against trafficking in prostitutes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and what they termed at the time the ‘white slave trade.’ In both the earlier period and the contemporary one, the name of ‘slave’ marks these women as socially dangerous because of the implied proximity to blackness. It also labels them as victims undeserving of their plight, all the better to broaden the scope of state surveillance of sexuality.

Second, the anti-slavery movement is ahistorical. Again, black history is a corrective. Abolitionism against racial slavery showed us how ‘rescue’ movements are always self-referential: they aim at the salvation of the rescuer, not the rescued. White abolitionists frequently argued that slavery was an abomination because it made whites lazy and morally weak. W.E.B. DuBois reminds us that the American Civil War began as a war to preserve slavery, to keep it in the Union, not to abolish it; and it only became a war to end slavery as a result of the self-activity of the enslaved Africans themselves who stole away their labors from the South and forced the issue of abolition on the North. Anti-slavery does not necessarily mean anti-racist, and ‘rescue’ missions must be politically suspect.

Third, the moral authority that anti-slavery mobilizes today partly stems from the memory of black liberation that it implicitly draws upon—all the while explicitly distancing itself from black historical struggle. The movement often contrasts the ‘facts’ of ‘modern-day slavery’ with those of the ‘old’ (racial) slavery in order to emphasize how much worse the situation is today. The moral imperative of abolitionism today, therefore, rests not simply in objections to human oppression. It is also tied to white people’s unconscious memories as the
perpetrators of racial slavery. Anti-slavery today seeks to exorcise this history. As such, it is anything but non-racial, despite its language.

Fourth, while slavery is evoked to cloak contemporary abolitionism with a political saliency and emotional urgency that only memory of the foundational institution of the modern world can sustain, there is a decided absence of solidarity with actual black suffering today.

Part of this problem lies with an incorrect understanding of slavery itself. Racial slavery was never simply supreme labor exploitation, or even being held captive. It was foremost about the accumulation and usefulness of black bodies for all manner of desire, whim, fantasy, or need of white society. Racial slavery was primarily a symbolic economy, an arrangement of meanings about who was human, which bodies had integrity, who could deploy violence with impunity, and the interdependence of ‘freedom’ and slavery.

As the political economy has changed with time, the symbolic economy of antiblackness persists. The ubiquitous spectacle today of the police killing unarmed black people in the street, in their homes, and in stores reiterates the ongoing power relations of slavery.

Where is the anti-slavery movement when black people are being gunned down today by both state and civil society? Where are the abolitionists now when the black community endures all manner of premature death? Where is agitation over ‘modern-day slavery’ when black schools are degraded and then closed altogether?

I suggest that the invisibility of black struggle today highlights how the current anti-slavery movement hinges on assertions of Africans’ culpability in both racial slavery and its ‘modern-day’ version. In this narrative, African agents foist slavery upon an unwilling west and Africa is construed, again, as the locus of criminality and barbarism. In short, the current abolitionists are prosecuting their cause using the original terms of racial slavery, many centuries later.

The primary corrective for the problems of the anti-slavery movement is the same as for the problem of the antiblack world generally: solidarity with black historical struggle. For instance, lessons from black history that are relevant to the ‘modern-day slavery’ question include: 1) law is not a viable avenue for social redress: reform ends up extending, rather than ameliorating, black suffering; 2) work will not set you free: black people’s hard labor had little bearing on black self-efficacy, to the point where now, given the rates of black unemployment and incarceration, black people are more valuable to the economy idled and quarantined in ghettos or prisons; 3) self-defense is a prerequisite for self-determination: the unrelenting public spectacles of black vulnerability at the hands of the law and the unceasing reiteration of black pathology are meant to disqualify any expression of black self-possession.

These lessons directly confront the anti-slavery movement’s priority on human rights as the privileged vector for justice; they address the movement’s arbitrary distinction between ‘slavery’ conditions and all other conditions of ‘work’ under capitalism, including labor that has been rendered surplus altogether from the global economy; and they call into question the implicit requirement that the legitimate subjects of ‘modern-day slavery’ are passive victims, rather than people engaged in various modes of self-authored activity, including armed resistance.

Ultimately, what is called into question is the very conception of justice on which this movement trades. As a result of racial slavery the very existence of the modern era is unjust. The search for justice within an unjust paradigm, therefore, is premature at best, since we have yet to adequately explain the paradigm. Before we can conceive of justice, then, we must focus on ethics, on accurately explaining relations of power, including those in which the movement to end ‘modern-day slavery’ arises.
Sherri WILLIAMS, B.J. Bailey, 
Plaintiffs–Appellees, 
Betty Faye Haggermaker, 
et al., Plaintiffs, 
Alice Jean Cope, Jane Doe, Deborah L. 
Cooper, Benny Cooper, Dan Bailey, 
Jane Poe, Jane Roe, Plaintiffs–Appellees, 

v. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
ALABAMA, Defendant– 
Appellant, 
Tim Morgan, in his official capacity as 
the District Attorney of the County 
of Madison, Alabama, Defendant. 
No. 02–16135. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eleventh Circuit. 

Background: Civil liberties group, on behalf of various individual users and vendors of sexual devices, brought action challenging constitutionality of Alabama statute prohibiting commercial distribution of any device primarily used for stimulation of human genitals. The District Court, 41 F.Supp.2d 1257, granted plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunctive relief, and state appealed. The Court of Appeals, 240 F.3d 944, reversed and remanded. On remand, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, No. 98-01938-CV-S-NE, 220 F.Supp.2d 1257, C. Lynwood Smith, Jr., J., held that the statute was unconstitutional, and appeal was taken.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Birch, Circuit Judge, held that: 
(1) there is no fundamental, substantive due process right of consenting adults to engage in private intimate sexual conduct, as would trigger a strict scrutiny review of all infringements of that right, and 
(2) new fundamental right would not be recognized. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Barkett, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion.

1. Constitutional Law ⊗274(5)
   There is no fundamental, substantive due process right of consenting adults to engage in private intimate sexual conduct, as would trigger a strict scrutiny review of all infringements of that right. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

2. Constitutional Law ⊗82(1)
   In analyzing a request for recognition of a new fundamental right, or extension of an existing one, a court must first begin with a careful description of the asserted right; second, and most critically, the court must determine whether this asserted right, carefully described, is one of those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.

3. Constitutional Law ⊗258(5)
   Obscenity ⊗2.5

4. Constitutional Law ⊗82(10)
   Obscenity ⊗5.1
   It was not appropriate to extend constitutional right to privacy to encompass right to use sexual devices in lawful, pri-
vate sexual activity; asserted right was not objectively, deeply rooted in history and tradition, and to extent sex toys historically attracted attention of the law, it had been in context of proscription, not protection. Ala.Code 1975, § 13A–12–200.2.

West Codenotes
Negative Treatment Reconsidered
Code 1975, § 13A–12–200.2

Charles Brinsfield Campbell, Rouse, Scott Lee, Montgomery, AL, for Troy King.
Michael L. Fees, Fees & Burgess, P.C., Huntsville, AL, for Sherri Williams.
Mark J. Lopez, American Civil Liberties Union, New York City, for B.J. Bailey.
Amy Louise Herring, Huntsville, AL, for Alice Jean Cope, Deborah L. Cooper, Benny Cooper, Dan Bailey.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before BIRCH, BARKETT and HILL, Circuit Judges.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

In this case, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) invites us to add a new right to the current catalogue of fundamental rights under the Constitution: a right to sexual privacy. It further asks us to declare Alabama’s statute prohibiting the sale of “sex toys” to be an impermissible burden on this right. Alabama responds that the statute exercises a time-honored use of state police power—restricting the sale of sex. We are compelled to agree with Alabama and must decline the ACLU’s invitation.

I. BACKGROUND

Alabama’s Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act prohibits, among other things, the commercial distribution of “any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value.” Ala. Code § 13A–12–200.2 (Supp.2003).

The Alabama statute proscribes a relatively narrow bandwidth of activity. It prohibits only the sale—but not the use, possession, or gratuitous distribution—of sexual devices (in fact, the users involved in this litigation acknowledge that they already possess multiple sex toys). The law does not affect the distribution of a number of other sexual products such as ribbed condoms or virility drugs. Nor does it prohibit Alabama residents from purchasing sexual devices out of state and bringing them back into Alabama. Moreover, the statute permits the sale of ordinary vibrators and body massagers that, although useful as sexual aids, are not “designed or marketed . . . primarily” for that particular purpose. Id. Finally, the statute exempts sales of sexual devices “for a bona fide medical, scientific, educational, legislative, judicial, or law enforcement purpose.” Id. § 13A–12–200.4.

This case, which is now before us on appeal for the second time, involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the Alabama statute. The ACLU, on behalf of various individual users and vendors of sexual devices, initially filed suit seeking to enjoin the statute on 29 July 1998, a month after the statute took effect. The ACLU argued that the statute burdens and violates sexual-device users’ right to privacy.

1. Because the various user appellees and vendor appellees are all represented by the ACLU, the driving force behind this litigation, “the ACLU” will be used to refer collectively to appellees.
and personal autonomy under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2

Following a bench trial, the district court concluded that there was no currently recognized fundamental right to use sexual devices and declined the ACLU’s invitation to create such a right. Williams v. Pryor, 41 F.Supp.2d. 1257, 1282–84 (N.D.Al 1999) (Williams I). The district court then proceeded to scrutinize the statute under rational basis review. Id. at 1284. Concluding that the statute lacked any rational basis, the district court permanently enjoined its enforcement. Id. at 1293.

On appeal, we reversed in part and affirmed in part. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir.2001) (Williams II). We reversed the district court’s conclusion that the statute lacked a rational basis and held that the promotion and preservation of public morality provided a rational basis. Id. at 952. However, we affirmed the district court’s rejection of the ACLU’s facial fundamental-rights challenge to the statute. Id. at 955. We then remanded the action to the district court for further consideration of the as-applied fundamental-rights challenge. Id. at 955.

On remand, the district court again struck down the statute. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F.Supp.2d 1257 (N.D.Al 2002) (Williams III). On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the statute unconstitutionally burdened the right to use sexual devices within private adult, consensual sexual relationships. Id. After a lengthy discussion of the history of sex in America, the district court announced a fundamental right to “sexual privacy,” which, although unrecognized under any existing Supreme Court precedent, the district court found to be deeply rooted in the history and traditions of our nation. Id. at 1296. The district court further found that this right “encompass[es] the right to use sexual devices like the vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas” marketed by the vendors involved in this case. Id. The district court accordingly applied strict scrutiny to the statute. Id. Finding that the statute failed strict scrutiny, the district court granted summary judgment to the ACLU and once again enjoined the statute’s enforcement. Id. at 1307.

Alabama now appeals that decision. The only question on this appeal is whether the statute, as applied to the involved users and vendors, violates any fundamental right protected under the Constitution.3 The proper analysis for evaluating this question turns on whether the right asserted by the ACLU falls within the parameters of any presently recognized fundamental right or whether it instead requires us to recognize a hitherto unarticulated fundamental right.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a summary judgment decision de novo and apply the same legal standard used by the district court. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir.2003). Our de novo review begins with a discussion of the asserted right. Here, we reaffirm our conclusion in Williams II, 240 F.3d at 954, that no Supreme Court precedents, includ-

2. The ACLU also invokes the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.

3. As a threshold matter, Alabama also argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the vendors and users do not have standing to sue. The district court properly concluded that vendors and users have shown a high probability of suffering a legally cognizable injury as result of the statute and thus have demonstrated standing, and we adopt its analysis in this regard. Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1267–73.
ing the recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), are decisive on the question of the existence of such a right. Because the ACLU is asking us to recognize a new fundamental right, we then apply the analysis required by Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). As we explain, we conclude that the asserted right does not clear the Glucksberg bar.

A. Asserted Right

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” The most familiar function of this Clause is to guarantee procedural fairness in the context of any deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the State. The users and vendors here do not claim to have been denied procedural due process. Instead, they rely on the Due Process Clause’s substantive component, which courts have long recognized as providing “heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (citation omitted).

The ACLU argues that the use of sexual devices is among those activities that, although not enumerated in the Constitution, are protected under the concept of substantive due process. According to the ACLU, the State of Alabama, through its prohibition on the commercial distribution of sex toys qua sex toys, has intruded into the most intimate of places—the bedrooms of its citizens—and the lawful sexual conduct that occurs therein. While the statute’s reach does not directly proscribe the sexual conduct in question, it places—without justification—a substantial and undue burden on the ability of the plaintiffs to obtain devices regulated by the statute. By restricting sales of these devices to plaintiffs, Alabama has acted in violation of the fundamental rights of privacy and personal autonomy that protect an individual’s lawful sexual practices guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

Williams III, at 1261 (quoting the ACLU’s amended complaint).

The ACLU invokes “privacy” and “personal autonomy” as if such phrases were constitutional talismans. In the abstract, however, there is no fundamental right to either. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725, 117 S.Ct. at 2270 (fundamental rights are “not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy”). Undoubtedly, many fundamental rights currently recognized under Supreme Court precedent touch on matters of personal autonomy and privacy. However, “[t]hat many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.” Id. at 727, 117 S.Ct. at 2271. Such rights have been denominated “fundamental” not simply because they implicate deeply personal and private considerations, but because they have been identified as “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Id. at 720–21, 117 S.Ct. at 2268 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Nor, contrary to the ACLU’s assertion, have the Supreme Court’s substantive-due-process precedents recognized a freestanding “right to sexual privacy.” The Court has been presented with repeated opportunities to identify a fundamental right to sexual privacy—and has invariably declined. See, e.g., Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2018 n. 5, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977) (noting that the Court "has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating private consensual sexual behavior among adults, and we do not purport to answer that question now") (internal citation and punctuation omitted). Although many of the Court’s "privacy" decisions have implicated sexual matters, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (abortion); Carey, 431 U.S. at 678, 97 S.Ct. at 2010 (contraceptives), the Court has never indicated that the mere fact that an activity is sexual and private entitles it to protection as a fundamental right.

The Supreme Court’s most recent opportunity to recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy came in Lawrence v. Texas, where petitioners and amici expressly invited the court to do so. That the Lawrence Court had declined the invitation was this court’s conclusion in our recent decision in Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–16 (11th Cir.2004). In Lofton, we addressed in some detail the "question of whether Lawrence identified a new fundamental right to private sexual intimacy," Id. at 815. We concluded that, although Lawrence clearly established the unconstitutionality of criminal prohibitions on consensual adult sodomy, "it is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental right"—whether to homosexual sodomy specifically or, more broadly, to all forms of sexual intimacy. Id. at 816–17. We noted in particular that the Lawrence opinion did not employ fundamental-rights analysis and that it ultimately applied rational-basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, to the challenged statute. Id. at 816–17.

[1] The dissent seizes on scattered dicta from Lawrence to argue that Lawrence recognized a substantive due process right of consenting adults to engage in private intimate sexual conduct, such that all in-

4. See Tr. of Oral Argument, No. 02–102, at *4; Br. of the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae, No. 02–102, at *11–25.


6. Lofton stated in relevant part:

We are particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty interest from an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent with standard fundamental-rights analysis. The Court has noted that it must "exercise the utmost care whenever [it is] asked to break new ground" in the field of fundamental rights, which is precisely what the Lawrence petitioners and their amici curiae had asked the Court to do. That the Court declined the invitation is apparent from the absence of the "two primary features" of fundamental-rights analysis in its opinion. First, the Lawrence opinion contains virtually no inquiry into the question of whether the petitioners’ asserted right is one of "those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Second, the opinion notably never provides the "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest that is to accompany fundamental-rights analysis. Rather, the constitutional liberty interests on which the Court relied were invoked, not with "careful description," but with sweeping generality. Most significant, however, is the fact that the Lawrence Court never applied strict scrutiny, the proper standard when fundamental rights are implicated, but instead invalidated the Texas statute on rational-basis grounds, holding that it "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." Id. at 816–17 (internal citations omitted).
fringements of this right must be subjected to strict scrutiny. As we noted in Lofton, we are not prepared to infer a new fundamental right from an opinion that never employed the usual Glucksberg analysis for identifying such rights. Id. at 816. Nor are we prepared to assume that Glucksberg—a precedent that Lawrence never once mentions—is overruled by implication.

The dissent in turn argues that the right recognized in Lawrence was a longstanding right that preexisted Lawrence, thus obviating the need for any Glucksberg-type fundamental rights analysis. But the dissent never identifies the source, textual or precedential, of such a preexisting right to sexual privacy. It does cite Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Carey. However, although these precedents recognize various substantive rights closely related to sexual intimacy, none of them recognize the overarching right to sexual privacy asserted here. Griswold (marital privacy and contraceptives); Eisenstadt (equal protection extension of Griswold); Roe (abortion); Carey (contraceptives). As we noted above, in the most recent of these decisions, Carey, the Court specifically observed that it had not answered the question of whether there is a constitutional right to private sexual conduct. 431 U.S.

7. The dissent argues that certain declarations of the Lawrence Court signal a fundamental right, for example: “the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person,” Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2477 (emphasis added); dissent at 1253; and that “liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex,” id. at 2480 (emphasis added); dissent at 1259. However, neither of these quoted excerpts from Lawrence support such a broad proposition when read in context. The first quotation comes from the Lawrence Court’s synopsis of Roe, which it mentioned in its survey of the privacy cases preceding Bowers. 123 S.Ct. at 2477 (“Roe recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.”). The second comes from the Court’s discussion of how Bowers overstated the legal and historical condemnation of homosexual conduct, failing to recognize the “emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” Id. at 2480 (“This emerging recognition should have been apparent when Bowers was decided.”).

It is telling that the best support for the fundamental-right-to-sexual-intimacy interpretation of Lawrence must be assembled from bits of dicta. It is equally telling the dissent cites no language from the opinion—much less language articulating a rule of law—that states with any precision the right that Lawrence purportedly held to exist, or the standard of review that it triggers. Instead, the dissent characterizes our analysis as “de-manning and dismissive” yet fares little better in its attempt to overstate the effect of the Alabama law on the day-to-day sexual activities of consenting adults in their homes.

8. Contrary to the dissent’s accusation that “[t]he majority refuses . . . to acknowledge why the Court in Lawrence held that criminal prohibitions on consensual sodomy are unconstitutional,” we have refused to do no such thing. What we have refused to do, as we suggest the dissent has done, is to create a rationale that was not articulated as to the “why” for the ruling. The operative legal conclusion that we come to as a basis for the decision in Lawrence is that Texas’s sodomy prohibition did not further a legitimate state interest. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2484, 156 L.Ed.2d 508; Lofton v. Sec. of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.2004) (Birch, J., specially concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).

We appreciate that the dissent does not agree with our analysis, but we have not “refused” to answer the dissent’s question—notably, nobody else in the litigation has posed the question.

The dissent also flatly states that the Lawrence Court rejected public morality as a legitimate state interest that can justify criminaliz-
at 688 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. at 2018 n. 5. Moreover, nearly two decades later, the Glucksberg Court, listing the current catalog of fundamental rights, did not include such a right. 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2267.

In short, we decline to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a right to sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny. To do so would be to impose a fundamental-rights interpretation on a decision that rested on rational-basis grounds, that never engaged in Glucksberg analysis, and that never invoked strict scrutiny. Moreover, it would be answering questions that the Lawrence Court appears to have left for another day. Of course, the Court may in due course expand Lawrence’s precedent in the direction anticipated by the dissent. But for us preemptively to take that step would exceed our mandate as a lower court.9

9. The dissent indicates that “even under the majority’s own constrained interpretation of Lawrence, we are, at a bare minimum, obliged to revisit [our] previous conclusion in Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The crafting and safeguarding of public morality has long been an established part of the States’ plenary police power to legislate and indisputably is a legitimate government interest under rational basis scrutiny.”); see also id. at 949 n. 3 (“In fact, the State’s interest in public morality is sufficiently substantial to satisfy the government’s burden under the more rigorous intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny applicable in some cases.”). One would expect the Supreme Court to be manifestly more specific and articulate than it was in Lawrence if now such a traditional and significant jurisprudential principal has been jettisoned wholesale (with all due respect to Justice Scalia’s ominous dissent notwithstanding).
B. Glucksberg Analysis

[2] Because the ACLU is seeking recognition of a right neither mentioned in the Constitution nor encompassed within the reach of the Supreme Court’s existing fundamental-right precedents, we must turn to the two-step analytical framework that the Court has established for evaluating new fundamental-rights claims. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21, 117 S.Ct. at 2268. First, in analyzing a request for recognition of a new fundamental right, or extension of an existing one, we “must begin with a careful description of the asserted right.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 117 S.Ct. at 2268. Second, and most critically, we must determine whether this asserted right, carefully described, is one of “those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21, 117 S.Ct. at 2268 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

This analysis, as the Supreme Court has stressed, must proceed with “utmost care” because of the dangers inherent in the process of elevating extra-textual rights to constitutional status, thereby removing them from the democratic field of play:

By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the members of this Court.

Id. at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2267–68 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The mandate to proceed carefully applies with added force when venturing into terrain where the Supreme Court itself has tread lightly, as it has here. As we explain, the district court failed to exercise this “utmost care” in conducting the two-pronged Glucksberg analysis.

1. Careful Description

As we noted in Williams II, the district court’s initial opinion “narrowly framed the analysis as the question whether the concept of a constitutionally protected right to privacy protects an individual’s liberty to use sexual devices when engaging in lawful, private, sexual activity.” 240 F.3d at 953 (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, we affirmed this formulation, stating that “the district court correctly framed the fundamental rights analysis in this case.” Id. However, on remand, the district court abandoned its initial, careful framing of the issue and instead characterized the asserted right more broadly as a generalized “right to sexual privacy.” Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1277 (emphasis omitted).

In searching for, and ultimately finding, this right to sexual privacy, the district court did little to define its scope and bounds. As formulated by the district court, the right potentially encompasses a great universe of sexual activities, including many that historically have been, and

10. Although our Williams II opinion indicated from the outset that the district court’s initial narrow framing of the right was the proper approach, 240 F.3d at 953, we note that it created a degree of ambiguity by making a subsequent shorthand reference to this right as “a fundamental right to sexual privacy,” id. at 955. It appears that this imprecision in our language was, at least in part, the source of the district court’s over-broad framing of the right on remand. Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1276.
continue to be, prohibited. At oral arguments, the ACLU contended that “no responsible counsel” would challenge prohibitions such as those against pederasty and adult incest under a “right to sexual privacy” theory. However, mere faith in the responsibility of the bar scarcely provides a legally cognizable, or constitutionally significant, limiting principle in applying the right in future cases.\textsuperscript{11}

The sole limitation provided by the district court’s ruling was that the right would extend only to \textit{consenting adults}. \textit{Id.} at 1294. The consenting-adult formula, of course, is a corollary to John Stuart Mill’s celebrated “harm principle,” which would allow the state to proscribe only conduct that causes identifiable harm to another. See \textit{generally} John Stuart Mill, \textit{On Liberty} (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1978) (1859). Regardless of its force as a policy argument, however, it does not translate \textit{ipse dixit} into a constitutionally cognizable standard. See \textit{Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton}, 413 U.S. 49, 68, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2641, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“[F]or us to say that our Constitution incorporates the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults only is always beyond state regulation, is a step we are unable to take.”). If we were to accept the invitation to recognize a right to sexual intimacy, this right would theoretically encompass such activities as prostitution, obscenity, and adult incest—even if we were to limit the right to consenting adults. See, e.g., id. at 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. at 2641 n. 15 (“The state statute books are replete with constitutionally unchallenged laws against prostitution, suicide, voluntary self-mutilation, brutalizing ‘bare fist’ prize fights, and duels, although these crimes may only directly involve ‘consenting adults.’”). This in turn would require us to subject all infringements on such activities to strict scrutiny. \textit{Glucksberg}, 521 U.S. at 721, 117 S.Ct. at 2268. In short, by framing our inquiry so broadly as to look for a general right to sexual intimacy, we would be answering many questions not before us on the present facts.

Indeed, the requirement of a “careful description” is designed to prevent the reviewing court from venturing into vaster constitutional vistas than are called for by the facts of the case at hand. See \textit{Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.}, 472 U.S. 491, 501, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2801, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985). One of “the cardinal rules” of constitutional jurisprudence is that the scope of the asserted right—and thus the parameters of the inquiry—must be dictated “by the precise facts” of the immediate case. \textit{Id.; see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health}, 497 U.S. 261, 277–78, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2851, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990) (“[I]n deciding a question of such magnitude and importance it is the better part of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject.”) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

\textit{Glucksberg} and \textit{Flores}, cases in which the Court was asked to expand certain substantive due process rights, are instructive examples. In \textit{Glucksberg}, the lower court and the petitioners had variously characterized the asserted right as “a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one’s death,” 521 U.S. at 722, 117 S.Ct. at 2269, “a liberty to choose how to die and a right to control one’s final

\textsuperscript{11} As Thomas Jefferson noted, “In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.” Thomas Jefferson, \textit{Draft Kentucky Resolutions}, 1798. Although usually invoked in slightly different contexts, this principle—that, in our republican system, we do not entrust constitutional limitations to human good will or self-restraint—has equal force here.
days,” id., and the “liberty of competent, terminally ill adults to make end-of-life decisions free of undue government interference,” id. at 724, 117 S.Ct. at 2269. The Court rejected these characterizations as overbroad, noting its “tradition of carefully formulating the interest at stake in substantive-due-process cases.” Id. at 722, 117 S.Ct. at 2269. Then, looking to the specific statute under challenge—a ban on assisted suicide—the Court recast the asserted right as “a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,” id., or as “a right to commit suicide with another's assistance,” id. at 724, 117 S.Ct. at 2269.

Under challenge in Flores was an immigration regulation that governed the detention and release of alien juveniles. 507 U.S. at 294–98, 113 S.Ct. at 1443–45. The respondents, a class of detained alien juveniles, argued that the regulation violated their “fundamental right to freedom from physical restraint.” Id. at 299, 113 S.Ct. at 1446 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court, emphasizing the importance of beginning substantive-due-process analysis with a “careful description,” rejected respondents’ broad formulation of the implicated liberty interests. 507 U.S. at 302, 113 S.Ct. at 1447. The Court then restated the putative right—by careful reference to the challenged regulation:

The “freedom from physical restraint” invoked by respondents is not at issue in this case. Nor is the right asserted the right of a child to be released from all other custody into the custody of its parents, legal guardian, or even close relatives: The challenged regulation requires such release when it is sought. Rather, the right at issue is the alleged right of a child who has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a government-operated or government-selected child-care institution.

12. The mere fact that a product is used within the privacy of the bedroom, or that it enhances intimate conduct, does not in itself bring the use of that article within the right to privacy. If it were otherwise, individuals whose sexual gratification requires other types of material or instrumentalities—perhaps hallucinogenic substances, depictions of child pornography or bestiality, or the services of a willing prostitute—likewise would have a colorable argument that prohibitions on such activities and materials interfere with their privacy in the bedchamber. Under this theory, all such sexual-enhancement paraphernalia (as long as it was used only in consensual encounters between adults) would also be encompassed within the right to privacy—and any burden thereon subject to strict scrutiny.

13. Advocating that public morality should no longer be a “rational basis to restrict private sexual activity,” the dissent seeks to ignore that the legislation at issue bans by its express terms only the unsavory advertising and sale of sexual devices that the majority of the people of Alabama may well find morally offensive. The fact remains that the complainants here continue to possess and use such devices, burdened only by inconvenient access.
right at issue is the right to sell and purchase sexual devices.

[4] It is more than that, however. For purposes of constitutional analysis, restrictions on the ability to purchase an item are tantamount to restrictions on the use of that item. Thus it was that the Glucksberg Court analyzed a ban on providing suicide assistance as a burden on the right to receive suicide assistance. 521 U.S. at 723, 117 S.Ct. at 2269. Similarly, prohibitions on the sale of contraceptives have been analyzed as burdens on the use of contraceptives. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688, 97 S.Ct. at 2018 ("[T]he same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's right . . . by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the decision entirely."). Because a prohibition on the distribution of sexual devices would burden an individual's ability to use the devices, our analysis must be framed not simply in terms of whether the Constitution protects a right to sell and buy sexual devices, but whether it protects a right to use such devices.

We find that the district court, in reaching this conclusion, erred on four levels. The first error relates back to the district court's over-broad framing of the asserted right in question. Having framed the relevant right as a generalized "right to sexual privacy," the district court's history and tradition analysis consisted largely of an irrelevant exploration of the history of sex in America. Second, we find that this analysis placed too much weight on contemporary practice and attitudes with respect to sexual conduct and sexual devices. Third, rather than look for a history and tradition of protection of the asserted right, the district court asked whether there was a history and tradition of state non-interference with the right. Finally, we find that the district court's uncritical reliance on certain expert declarations in interpreting the historical record was flawed and that its reliance on certain putative "concessions" was unfounded.

a. The Scope of the District Court's History and Tradition Analysis

The district court began its Glucksberg-mandated history and tradition inquiry by defining its task as one of determining whether to "recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy." Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1277. After an extensive survey of the history of sex in American culture and law—replete with cites to the Kinsey studies and Michel Foucault—the district court concluded that "there exists a constitutionally inherent right to sexual privacy that firmly encompasses state non-interference with private, adult, consensual sexual relationships." Id. at 1296. As examined above, the Supreme Court's own reticence in this area, and its admonition to carefully define the right at stake, convince us that the district court erred in undertaking to find a generalized "right to sexual privacy." Given this over-broad starting point, the district court's subse-
quent inquiry, predictably, was likewise broader than called for by the facts of the case. The inquiry should have been focused not broadly on the vast topic of sex in American cultural and legal history, but narrowly and more precisely on the treatment of sexual devices within that history and tradition.

b. The District Court’s Focus on “Contemporary Practice”

In reaching its holding, the district court relied heavily on “contemporary practice,” emphasizing the “contemporary trend of legislative and societal liberalization of attitudes toward consensual, adult sexual activity.” Id. at 1294; see generally id. at 1289–94; see also id. at 1296 (holding that “there is a ‘history, legal tradition, and practice’ in this country of deliberate state non-interference with private sexual relationships between married couples, and a contemporary practice of the same between unmarried persons”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Our first concern is the legal significance, or the lack thereof, of much of the district court’s source material for this contemporary practice. In addition to invoking a cluster of Supreme Court precedents touching on matters of procreation and familial integrity, the district court looked to social science data respecting premarital intercourse, marriage and divorce rates, and the like. Id. at 1290. It further noted the revolutionary impact of the Kinsey studies, the “imagery and implements of adult sexual relationships [that] pervade modern American society,” the availability of “pornography of the grossest sort,” and the “widespread marketing of Viagra [including by such notable personalities as former United States Senate Majority Leader and 1996 Republican presidential candidate Robert J. Dole and popular NASCAR driver Mark Martin].” Id. at 1294. While such evidence undoubtedly confirms the district court’s discovery of “the specter of a twentieth century sexual liberalism,” id. at 1291, its relevance under Glucksberg is scant.

The district court justified this emphasis by noting that the Glucksberg Court had relied on contemporary practice in reaching its determination that assisted suicide is not a constitutional right. See, e.g., id. at 1275 (Glucksberg “considered current statutes, legislative debates, voter initiatives, and the positions of contemporary task forces and commissions on the issue of assisted suicide”). This gloss, however, considerably overstates that Court’s reliance on contemporary attitudes. What the Glucksberg Court did was to note that democratic action in many states had recently reaffirmed assisted-suicide bans, thus buttressing the Court’s conclusion that assisted suicide is not deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the nation. 521 U.S. at 716–19, 117 S.Ct. at 2265–67. But the existence of this contemporary practice was never essential to that conclusion. That is, the Court never suggested that a lack of contemporary reinforcement of the prohibition on assisted suicide would have led it to a contrary conclusion.

The district court’s interpretation also overlooks the context of Glucksberg’s contemporary practice analysis. The Court began its examination of history and tradition by inquiring “whether this asserted right has any place in our Nation’s traditions.” Id. at 723, 117 S.Ct. at 2269 (emphasis added). Having found that it did not, the Court had no need to proceed to the further question of whether that right was deeply rooted in those traditions (nor whether it was “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”). Part of the reason the Court was able to dismiss the asserted right so summarily was because it found that the prohibition on assisted suicide “continues explicitly” to the present. Id. In short, the democratic action cited by Glucksberg was merely one factor among
many disproving the claim that assisted suicide is a "deeply rooted" right.\textsuperscript{14}

c. The District Court’s Faulty Equation of Historical Non–Interference with Historical Protection

The district court’s central holding—its discovery of a constitutional “right to use sexual devices like . . . vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas”—was not based on any evidence of a history and tradition of affirmative protection of this right. Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1296. The district court’s lengthy opinion cites no reference to such a right in the usual repositories of our freedoms, such as federal and state constitutional provisions, constitutional doctrines, statutory provisions, common-law doctrines, and the like. Instead, the critical evidence for the district court was the relative scarcity of statutes explicitly banning sexual devices and the rarity of reported cases of sexual-devices prosecutions—along with various factual assertions from declarations by the ACLU’s experts. From this, the district court inferred “that history and contemporary practice demonstrate a conscious avoidance of regulation of [sexual] devices by the states.” Id. at 1296.

This negative inference essentially inverted Glucksberg’s history and tradition inquiry. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 117 S.Ct. at 2268. The district court—rather than requiring a showing that the right to use sexual devices is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” id.—looked for a showing that proscriptions against sexual devices are deeply rooted in history and tradition. Under this approach, the freedom to smoke, to pollute, to engage in private discrimination, to commit marital rape—at one time or another—all could have been elevated to fundamental-rights status. Moreover, it would create the perverse incentive for legislatures to regulate every area within their plenary power for fear that their restraint in any area might give rise to a right of constitutional proportions.

Beyond these obvious objections, the most significant flaw in the district court’s analysis is its misreading of Glucksberg. Admittedly, the Glucksberg Court, in declining to extend constitutional protection to assisted suicide, cited the extensive history of laws forbidding or discouraging suicide. But the context of this inquiry was the Court’s attempt to determine whether a right to suicide, and particularly assisted suicide, was deeply rooted in American history and tradition. Naturally, prohibitions on suicide were particularly competent evidence of the absence of such a history and tradition. The Glucksberg Court, however, never suggested that the reviewing court must find a history of proscription of a given activity before declining to recognize a new constitutional right to engage in that activity. Id. at 710–16, 117 S.Ct. at 2262–65; see also id. at 725, 117 S.Ct. at 2270 (rejecting the analogy between the constitutionally-protected right to refuse unwanted medical treatment and the asserted right to assisted suicide, noting that the former right “has never enjoyed similar legal protection”).

In short, nothing in Glucksberg indicates that an absence of historical prohibition is

\textsuperscript{14} The focus on the trajectory of contemporary practice ultimately proves too much. The fact that there is an emerging consensus scarcely provides justification for the courts, who often serve as an antimajoritarian sea-wall, to be swept up with the tide of popular culture. If anything, it is added reason for us to permit the democratic process to take its course. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735, 117 S.Ct. at 2275 (“Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”).
tantamount, for purposes of fundamental-rights analysis, to an historical record of protection under the law. To the contrary, the Glucksberg standard expressly requires a showing that the asserted right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.” Id. at 721, 117 S.Ct. at 2268. Not only does the record before us fail to evidence such a deeply rooted right, but it suggests that, to the extent that sex toys historically have attracted the attention of the law, it has been in the context of proscription, not protection.

The chief example of this proscription is the “Comstock Laws,” federal and state legislation adopted in the late 1800s. The federal Comstock Act of 1873 was a criminal statute directed at “the suppression of Trade in and Circulation of obscene Literature and Articles of immoral Use.” See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 70, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2882, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (quoting Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 599 (1873)). The Act prohibited importation of and use of the mails for transporting, among other things, “every article or thing intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use.” United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 257, 10 S.Ct. 756, 756, 34 L.Ed. 117 (1890).


The district court, however, discounted the significance of the Comstock laws, describing them as “aberrant to the sexual privacy” generally afforded to consensual, adult sexual conduct. Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1286. The district court cited expert declarations offered by the ACLU to the effect that the Comstock laws were not motivated primarily by a desire to ban sexual devices. Id. The district court further noted that searches of the annotations to the Comstock Act and of Federal Cases found no references to cases involving dildos and vibrators. Id. at 1287.

Even if these prohibitions on sexual devices were not widespread or vigorously enforced, their mere existence significantly undermines the argument that sexual devices historically have been free from state interference. Moreover, the lack of statutory references to sexual devices is relatively meaningless without evidence that commerce in these devices was sufficiently widespread, or sufficiently in the public eye, to merit legislative attention, at least beyond general anti-obscenity laws. Likewise, the focus on searches of federal case reporters for references to “vibrators” or “dildos” assumes, unjustifiably, that reported cases are reliable proxies for actual prosecutions, the vast majority of which would have never appeared in the court reporters (it also overlooks the possibility of prosecutions under state law). It also overlooks the possibility that traditional sensibilities and mores restrained courts from explicitly mentioning particular sexual devices in the text of judicial opinions.

In light of these realities, the negative inference drawn by the district court—that the scarcity of explicit reference to sexual devices in statutory schemes and reported cases reflects a “deliberate non-interference,” id. at 1286—is too speculative a basis for constitutionalizing a hitherto unrecognized right. This is especially true given the lack of any indicia of affirmative protection under the law. In short, there is no competent evidence in the record before us indicating that the lack of explicit and aggressive proscription of sex toys was, as the district court surmised, “conscious avoidance of regulation of these devices by the states.” Id. at 1296.
d. The District Court’s Handling of the Record

i. The District Court’s Reliance on the ACLU’s Expert Declarations

Finally, we note our recognition of the district court’s uncritical acceptance of the bare assertions contained in the ACLU’s expert declarations—particularly in reaching conclusions outside, or even in apparent contradiction to, the documented historical record.

This perfunctory reliance was especially pronounced in the district court’s deconstruction of the Comstock laws. The mere existence of both federal and state Comstock laws—especially the federal Comstock Act, which expressly prohibited importation and mail transport of “every article . . . for . . . immoral use”—seriously undermines the ACLU’s fundamental-rights argument under Glucksberg. Instead, the district court’s review of the Comstock laws led it to the conclusion that “[t]he popularity, legality, and ease of access to sexual devices like vibrators and dildos further demonstrate that the firm legislative respect for sexual privacy in the marital relationship extended to deliberate non-interference with adults’ use of sexual devices within those relationships.” Id. at 1286.

The sole support for this rather cursory conclusion appears to have been the assertions of one Rachel Maines, an historian and author, who submitted two separate expert declarations on the ACLU’s behalf. R3–56, Ex. A: R4–84, Ex. 4. Her declarations offered criticism of the Alabama statute going well beyond her specific expertise and delving into the legal and policy dimensions of the case:

Laws like Alabama’s that target the appearance, packaging or marketing of [sexual] devices, rather than their functionality, thus do not prevent or mitigate the supposed “evil” of “commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism, for its own sake” (Brief of Alabama Attorney General, 21). Their effect is merely to benefit one set of retailers (drug stores, health food stores, and discount houses such as Walmart, GNC and Target) at the expense of another (marital aids vendors).


On the historical record, if devices “designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of the human genital organs” represent an evil and/or a moral threat to the citizens of Alabama, the state has been remarkably dilatory in making this discovery, having waited for something more than two and a half millennia from the invention of the dildo and more than a century from the invention of the electromechanical vibrator to legislate against them. Apparently unconcerned about the availability of vibrators to consumers beginning in 1899, and even about their use in the production of orgasm in women, for which there was ample evidence by 1930, the state did not act against these devices until a small percentage of them took on anatomical forms, and until they began to be associated with a new interest in orgasmic mutuality in heterosexual relationships. Significantly, Viagra, which enhances sexual experience for men but not necessarily for women, is legal by prescription in all states, including those with laws against vibrators and dildos.

As an historian and as a citizen, I fail to see what legitimate purpose is served by institutionalizing an hypocrisy in which the sale of a standard and traditional therapeutic device is rendered unlawful by sexual references in appearance, packaging or marketing.

Id. at 23–25.

Although Maines’s statements suggest an agenda inconsistent with an unbiased
and complete historical presentation, the district court nevertheless repeatedly relied on her factual assertions, usually without any independent verification. We note several typical examples:

• In downplaying the historical significance of the Comstock laws, the district court emphasized that “sexual devices were not the impetus for the so-called Comstock Acts.” Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1286. The only support for this statement was Maines’s declaration statement that “vibrators and dildoes [sic] were not significant motivations for the passage and enforcement of the Comstock Act.” R4–84, Ex. 4 at 2. However, we find in neither Maines’s declaration nor the record elsewhere any evidence—aside from Maines’s bare assertion—of the actual motivation behind passage and enforcement of the Act.

• The record before the district court contained evidence that, according to records maintained by the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, between 1871 and 1881, some 64,836 “Articles of immoral use, of rubber, etc.” were seized under the Comstock Act and other anti-vice laws. See Anthony Comstock, Traps for the Young 137 (Robert Bremner ed., Harvard University Press 1967) (1884). The district court, however, dismissed this evidence by quoting Maines’s claim that these “were almost all contraceptives.” Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1286; R4–84, Ex. 4 at 3. Although our own review of the record confirms that the articles “of rubber” likely represented many condoms, our concern is the district court’s casual dismissal of contemporaneous documentary evidence in favor of retrospective, and unsupported, characterizations of that evidence. Further, although Maines cited several authorities for her assertion, our review of her sources finds no support for the conclusion that the referenced articles “were almost all contraceptives.”

• The district court’s central holding—its discovery of a constitutional “right to use sexual devices like . . . vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas”—was based largely on unsupported statements from Maines’s declarations. Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1296. In divining this right, the district court concluded “that history and contemporary practice demonstrate a conscious avoidance of regulation of [sexual] devices by the states,” Id. This conclusion was based on the “emergence and widespread acceptance” of the electric vibrator, id. at 1283, and “[t]he popularity, legality, and ease of access to sexual devices like vibrators and dildos,” id. at 1286. These findings in turn relied on Maines’s declarations, particularly her assertion that “[v]ibrators remained legal throughout this period, and were mailable matter under the Comstock laws of 1873—1914.” Id. What both Maines’s declaration and the district court’s opinion omit is the fact that, according to Maines’s own writings elsewhere, the vibrators available on the market during this period were general purpose vibrators marketed for non-sexual

15. Heywood Broun & Margaret Leech, Anthony Comstock 92, 153 (1927); Charles G. Trumbull, Anthony Comstock, Fighter (1913); Anthony Comstock, Traps for the Young 137 (Robert Bremner ed., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (1884). Because Maines’s did not provide a pinpoint citation for the Trumbull book, we did not review every page of the book, but our review of the relevant portions of the book did not reveal any support for Maines’s assertion.
uses, such as massaging the hands, face, back, and neck. The fact that these general purpose vibrators were legal and mailable is hardly probative of the legality of sexual devices as sexual devices.

Because of our conclusion supra that the constitutionality of Alabama’s statute does not hinge on the enforcement, or lack thereof, of the Comstock laws, any error by the district court in its incorporation of Maines’s litigation-motivated and litigation-tailored assertions was harmless. Nevertheless, the district court’s truth-seeking duties should have compelled it to go behind Maines’s assertions and satisfy itself of their reliability before relying on those assertions in recognizing a new fundamental constitutional right.

Moreover, this uncritical reliance on Maines’s assertions appears to have been typical of a larger pattern. For example, the district court’s history and tradition discussion was largely a paraphrased version of the ACLU’s motion for summary judgment and its factual support appears to have consisted entirely of the ACLU’s pleadings and selective appendices of historical interpretations of sex throughout American history. Of the 104 supporting footnotes in the district court’s history and tradition analysis, 99 were citations to these pleadings and appendices.

ii. The District Court’s Reliance on Alabama’s “Concessions”

The district court’s rationale for its wholesale adoption of the ACLU’s evidence appears to have been its mistaken view that the Alabama Attorney General had conceded the ACLU’s evidence on the history and tradition question. The district court, as preface to its Glucksberg history and tradition analysis, stated that “the court notes that it is extremely significant, if not dispositive, that the Attorney General concedes that ‘there is little evidence to show that sexual devices, or consensual sexual activities in general, have historically been subject to governmental regulation.’” Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d. at 1277 (quoting Attorney General’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 16).

16. Maines, in her writing outside the context of this litigation, notes that the first evidence of the availability of mass-market vibrators appears in 1899. Rachel Maines, The Technology of Orgasm: “Hysteria,” the Vibrator, and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction 100 (1999). Significantly, she states that most of these early “home vibrators” were marketed as health and beauty aids, particularly for home massage. Id. at 19–20. Consistent with this theory are the turn-of-the-century vibrator advertisements included with Maines’s declaration, none of which suggest any sexual use for the devices. R3–56, Ex. A at 19–24. Even if, as Maines contends, there was some wink-and-nod encryption in these advertisements, this hardly supports the district court’s conclusion that sexual devices qua sexual devices were widely available and openly marketed during this period. Id.; see also Rachel Maines, Socially Camouflaged Technologies: The Case of the Electromagnetic Vibrator, Tech. and Soc’y Magazine, June 1989, at 3.

Indeed, Maines further asserts that “[t]he social camouflage of the vibrator as a home and professional medical instrument seems to have remained more or less intact until the end of the 1920s” and that it was not until the vibrator reemerged in 1960s and 70s that “it was openly marketed as a sex aid.” Maines, The Technology of Orgasm, at 20.

Thus, according to Maines’s own book, vibrators have been available to the general public for only slightly over a century and—contrary to the district court’s interpretation of Maines’s declarations—explicitly sexually-oriented vibrators have been widely available and accepted for only the past four decades, at most.

17. Moreover, in granting summary judgment to the ACLU, the district court was obligated to view all evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to Alabama. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir.2003).
This not only misquoted the Attorney General’s actual language, but mischaracterized it as a “concession.” In his memorandum supporting his motion for summary judgment, the Attorney General had devoted a section to describing Victorian-era proscriptions, and enforcement thereof, on sexual devices. R3–78 at 14–16. The following section began, “Although there is little additional evidence to show that sexual devices, or consensual sexual activities in general, have historically been subject to governmental regulation, there is also no evidence to show that these activities have been specially protected under the law.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). That section went on to mention some of that “additional evidence,” such as efforts by the states to restrict sexual devices. Id. The district court’s omission of the critical word “additional,” as well as its out-of-context quotation of a prefatory dependent clause, significantly altered the meaning of a statement that, in proper context, appears in no way to have been intended as a concession of one of the most significant and contested issues in the case.

Similarly, the district court elsewhere stated: “The Attorney General concedes that ‘there is no genuine dispute as to the historical chronology set forth by the plaintiffs’ experts,’ to the effect that there is a ‘history or tradition of state non-interference in persons sex lives.’” Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d. at 1276 (quoting Attorney General’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 16).

In fact, the Attorney General conceded only to the historical chronology set forth by the ACLU’s experts and the liberalization of attitudes towards sex that this chronology demonstrated. R3–78 at 12. However, the Attorney General never conceded a “history or tradition of state non-interference in persons sex lives.” Significantly, the Attorney General’s use of that phrase appeared four sentences prior to the “chronology” concession and itself was part of a sentence disputing the ACLU’s version of history and tradition: “In attempting to demonstrate a ‘history’ or ‘tradition’ of state non-interference in persons’ sex lives, [the ACLU’s] experts have professed a lengthy history of sexuality.” Id. The district court’s omission of the quotation marks surrounding “history” and “tradition” particularly distorted the Attorney General’s meaning.

The district court’s reliance on these “concessions” appears to have been substantial. In announcing its holding that the ACLU’s evidence demonstrated a fundamental right to sexual privacy, the district court stressed that “[t]he Attorney General has conceded plaintiffs’ evidence in this regard.” Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d. at 1294; see also id. at 1295 (“Given the breadth, depth, volume, and weight of that evidence, and the Attorney General’s concession, this court is compelled to agree [with plaintiffs-appellees].”); id. at 1295–96 (holding that, in light of the ACLU’s evidence “and the concession to this evidence by the Attorney General, this court concludes that plaintiffs have met their burden”).

To the contrary, the Attorney General’s pleadings, while not disputing much of the ACLU’s evidence about the liberalization of sexual norms, vigorously disputed both (a) the legal ramifications of that liberalization (e.g., that this liberalization, in itself, satisfied the fundamental-rights threshold) as well as (b) the contention that sexual devices had gone virtually unregulated throughout American history. R3–78 at 12–20. We conclude, however, that the district court’s reliance on these putative concessions was, at worst, harmless error. The issues that the district court treated as having been conceded per-
tained to the existence of a fundamental right to sexual privacy, which, as we explained supra, was an over-broad framing of the inquiry in the first place.

III. CONCLUSION

Hunting expeditions that seek trophy game in the fundamental-rights forest must heed the maxim "look before you shoot." Such excursions, if embarked upon recklessly, endanger the very ecosystem in which such liberties thrive—our republican democracy. Once elevated to constitutional status, a right is effectively removed from the hands of the people and placed into the guardianship of unelected judges. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2267–68. We are particularly mindful of this fact in the delicate area of morals legislation. One of the virtues of the democratic process is that, unlike the judicial process, it need not take matters to their logical conclusion. If the people of Alabama in time decide that a prohibition on sex toys is misguided, or ineffective, or just plain silly, they can repeal the law and be finished with the matter. On the other hand, if we today craft a new fundamental right by which to invalidate the law, we would be bound to give that right full force and effect in all future cases—including, for example, those involving adult incest, prostitution, obscenity, and the like.

The dissent eloquently quotes Justice Brandeis in its opening passages. We find merit in the wisdom of Justice Felix Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525, 71 S.Ct. 857, 875, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951), when he observed:

Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society... Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures.

For the reasons we have explained, we hold that the district court committed reversible error in concluding that the Due Process Clause "encompass[es] a right to use sexual devices like ... vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas." Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d. at 1296. Moreover, we reject the ACLU’s request that we redefine the constitutional right to privacy to cover the commercial distribution of sex toys. We REVERSE the district court’s grant of the ACLU’s motion for summary judgment and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BARKETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The majority’s decision rests on the erroneous foundation that there is no substantive due process right to adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home and erroneously assumes that the promotion of public morality provides a rational basis to criminally burden such private intimate activity. These premises directly conflict with the Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003).

This case is not, as the majority’s demeaning and dismissive analysis suggests, about sex or about sexual devices. It is about the tradition of American citizens from the inception of our democracy to value the constitutionally protected right to be left alone in the privacy of their bedrooms and personal relationships. As Justice Brandeis stated in the now famous words of his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), when “[t]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness...”
ment, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” 277 U.S. at 478, 48 S.Ct. 564 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) overruled by Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

The majority claims that Lawrence, like Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), failed to recognize the substantive due process right of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct. Conceding that Lawrence must have done something, the majority acknowledges that Lawrence “established the unconstitutionality of criminal prohibitions on consensual adult sodomy.” Majority Op. at 1236. The majority refuses, however, to acknowledge why the Court in Lawrence held that criminal prohibitions on consensual sodomy are unconstitutional. This failure underlies the majority’s flawed conclusion in this case.

As explained more fully below, Lawrence held that a state may not criminalize sodomy because of the existence of the very right to private sexual intimacy that the majority refuses to acknowledge. Lawrence reiterated that its prior fundamental rights cases protected individual choices “concerning the intimacies of [a] physical relationship.” Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because of this precedent, the Lawrence Court overruled Bowers, concluding that Bowers had “misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented” as involving a particular sexual act rather than the broader right of adult sexual privacy. Id. at 2478. Instead of heeding the Supreme Court’s instruction regarding Bowers’ error, the majority repeats it, ignoring Lawrence’s teachings about how to correctly frame a liberty interest affecting sexual privacy.

Compounding this error, the majority also ignores Lawrence’s holding that although history and tradition may be used as a “starting point,” they are not the “ending point” of a substantive due process inquiry. Id. at 2480 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In cases solely involving adult consensual sexual privacy, the Court has never required that there be a long-standing history of affirmative legal protection of specific conduct before a right can be recognized under the Due Process Clause. To the contrary, because of the fundamental nature of this liberty interest, this right has been protected by the Court despite historical, legislative restrictions on private sexual conduct.1 Applying the analytical framework of Lawrence compels the conclusion that the Due Process Clause protects a right to sexual privacy that encompasses the use of sexual devices.2

Finally, even under the majority’s own constrained and erroneous interpretation of Lawrence, we are, at a bare minimum, obliged to revisit this Court’s previous conclusion in Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Williams II”), that Ala-


2. As the majority acknowledges, there is no constitutional distinction between a ban on the private use of sex toys and a ban on the sale of sex toys. See Majority Op. at 1242 (“For purposes of constitutional analysis, restrictions on the ability to purchase an item are tantamount to restrictions on the use of that item.”). Accordingly, Alabama cannot be permitted to accomplish indirectly what it is not constitutionally permitted to do directly.
Alabama's law survives the most basic level of review, that of rational basis. See 240 F.3d at 949. That decision explicitly depended upon the finding in Bowers that the promotion of public morality provided a rational basis to restrict private sexual activity. Id. While the majority recognizes that Bowers has been overruled, it inexplicably fails to offer any explanation whatsoever for why public morality provides a rational basis to criminalize the private sexual activity in this case, when it was clearly not found to be a legitimate state interest in Lawrence.

For all of these reasons, which are amplified below, I dissent.

I. Lawrence Recognized a Substantive Due Process Right to Sexual Privacy.

There is no question that Lawrence was decided on substantive due process grounds. The doctrine of substantive due process requires, first, that every law must address in a relevant way only a legitimate governmental purpose. In other words, no law may be arbitrary and capricious but rather must address a permissible state interest in a way that is rationally related to that interest. As a consequence, any law challenged as violating a substantive due process right must survive rational-basis review.

However, the Supreme Court has found that some decisions are so fundamental and central to human liberty that they are protected as part of a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause, and the government may constitutionally restrict these decisions only if it has more than an ordinary run-of-the-mill governmental purpose. In such cases, the Court subjects these governmental restrictions to a heightened scrutiny, requiring that legislation be "narrowly drawn" to achieve a "compelling state interest." Included within this right to privacy is the ability to

3. I have also developed these arguments in my dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc in Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, (11th Cir.2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting).

4. The Supreme Court has explained that this right includes the ability of adults to make decisions relating to the right to abortion, Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147; contraception, Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 and Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510; marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).

5. The majority acknowledges that at issue in this case is "the Due Process Clause’s substantive component, which courts have long addressed in a relevant way only a legitimate governmental purpose. In other words, no law may be arbitrary and capricious but rather must address a permissible state interest in a way that is rationally related to that interest. As a consequence, any law challenged as violating a substantive due process right must survive rational-basis review.

However, the Supreme Court has found that some decisions are so fundamental and central to human liberty that they are protected as part of a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause, and the government may constitutionally restrict these decisions only if it has more than an ordinary run-of-the-mill governmental purpose. In such cases, the Court subjects these governmental restrictions to a heightened scrutiny, requiring that legislation be "narrowly drawn" to achieve a "compelling state interest." Included within this right to privacy is the ability to

6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 93 S.Ct. 705 ("Where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest" and that such legislation "must be narrowly drawn") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The only sexual privacy case where the Court did not use this language was in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), where it analyzed civil burdens on a woman's right to abortion, not an outright criminal ban. The Court found that a state regulation that had "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus" would place an "undue burden" on the right to abortion and therefore be unconstitutional. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791.
make decisions about intimate sexual matters. 7

In invalidating the sodomy statute at issue in Lawrence, the Court reaffirmed this right to sexual privacy, finding that private homosexual conduct is likewise encompassed within it. From its opening paragraph, the Court explained the importance of the liberty at issue here:

Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence . . . The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.

Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2475. The Lawrence Court noted in its opinion that it had granted certiorari specifically to consider "[w]hether Petitioners’ criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?" Id. at 2476 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). While the Court also granted certiorari to address whether Texas’s sodomy statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, 8 the Court explicitly decided to rest its holding on a substantive due process analysis because it found that if a sodomy law "remain[ed] unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons." 9 Id. at 2482. The Court stated that the "case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private [sexual] conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 2476.

In resolving this issue of whether the petitioners were "free as adults" to engage in "private [sexual] conduct," the Court retraced its substantive due process jurisprudence by discussing the fundamental rights cases of Griswold, Eisenstadt, 10 Roe, and Carey and emphasized the breadth of their holdings as involving private decisions regarding intimate physical relationships. Id. at 2476–77, 2483. Beginning with Griswold, the Lawrence

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7. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 685, 97 S.Ct. 2010 and Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486, 85 S.Ct. 1678 (right to use contraception); Casey, 505 U.S. at 869, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (right to seek out an abortion).

8. Unlike the sodomy statute at issue in Lawrence, which only applied to homosexual sexual conduct, the Georgia statute in Bowers criminalized acts of sodomy engaged in by both heterosexuals and homosexuals. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2841. The Lawrence Court indicated that the sodomy statute could have been invalidated using an equal protection analysis. 123 S.Ct. at 2482. Indeed, this was the conclusion of Justice O’Connor in her concurrence. Id. at 2484–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

9. The Lawrence majority went on to state that "[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres." 123 S.Ct. at 2482.

10. Although Eisenstadt was decided on equal protection grounds, the Court in Lawrence noted that Eisenstadt "went on to state the fundamental proposition that the law impaired the exercise of . . . personal rights." 123 S.Ct. at 2477. Further, while Lawrence cited Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996), as an example of how Bowers had been cast into doubt, the Court immediately declined to decide the case under Romer’s equal protection rationale, instead insisting that the decision be resolved on substantive due process grounds. Id. at 2482.
Court found that its prior decisions confirmed “that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person” and “that the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.” Id. at 2477 (summarizing Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Carey).

Because of the existence of this right to make private decisions regarding sexual conduct, the Lawrence Court was compelled to overrule the anomaly of Bowers, which had failed to acknowledge this right in permitting Georgia to criminalize sodomy. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194–96, 106 S.Ct. 2841. Lawrence found that at the time of the Bowers decision the Court’s prior holdings had already made “abundantly clear” that individuals have a substantive due process right to make decisions “concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship[s], even when not intended to produce offspring.” 123 S.Ct. at 2483 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The Lawrence Court therefore concluded that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided.” Id. at 2484 (emphasis added).

Given these statements in Lawrence, I fail to understand the majority’s reliance on a footnote from the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Carey, where the Court indicated in dicta that it had not “definitively answered” the extent to which the Due Process Clause protects the private sexual conduct of consenting adults. Majority Op. at 1236, 1237 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 2010).11 Obviously, Carey does not resolve in any way the meaning of a case that comes twenty-six years later. Nor does it prevent Lawrence from answering the very question posed in Carey’s footnote. Lawrence does precisely this in affirming the right of consenting adults to make private sexual decisions. Moreover, this could not have been a new right. Carey’s footnote notwithstanding, the Lawrence Court determined that its pre-Bowers decisions had already recognized a right to sexual privacy. This is the only way to make sense of the Lawrence Court’s statements that Bowers was “not correct when it was decided,” and that its decisions before Bowers had already made “abundantly clear” that adults have a right to make decisions “concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship[s].” Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483–84 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In light of the Court’s conclusion that its prior decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Carey, and Roe had already made “abundantly clear” that adults have a right to make intimate decisions about their sexual relationships, the majority cannot seriously maintain that this dissent “never identifies” a precedential source of the right to sexual privacy. Majority Op. at 1237. The majority’s argument that this dissent fails to identify a textual source of the right to sexual privacy is equally untenable. Id. As noted below, the Lawrence Court held that the petitioners’ “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their [private sexual] conduct without intervention of the government.” 123 S.Ct. at 2484 (emphasis added). The Court could not have been more clear that the petitioners’ right to engage in private sexual conduct has its textual locus in the Due Process Clause.

Bowers erred because it “misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented” consensual sexual) behavior among adults.” 431 U.S. at 688 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 2010 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
when it framed the issue before it as whether the Constitution protects "a fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy":

To say that the issue in *Bowers* was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. *The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.* *Lawrence,* 123 S.Ct. at 2478 (emphasis added). In other words, *Bowers* departed from the proper inquiry by focusing on a particular sexual act instead of upon the right to sexual privacy, which encompasses acts of adult consensual sexual intimacy.

As I explain in the next section, the majority repeats the very mistake made in *Bowers* by focusing on whether there is a right to engage in a particular sexual act—here the use of sexual devices—rather than asking whether the conduct burdened by Alabama's statute involves private consensual sexual intimacy. As *Lawrence* demonstrates, sexual intimacy is inevitably demeaned, and its importance to the private life of the individual trivialized, when it is reduced to a particular sexual or physical act.

As the *Lawrence* Court explained, the proper inquiry is simply whether adults have a right to engage in "private [sexual] conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." *Id.* at 2476. In answering this question, *Lawrence* expressly adopted the reasoning of Justice Stevens' dissent in *Bowers*:

12. The majority argues that acknowledging a right of adult sexual privacy would lead to the invalidation of laws banning, among other things, prostitution, incest, the use of hallucinogenic substances, child pornography, and bestiality. *See* Majority Op. at 1239, 1240 n. 12. Here again, the majority fails to credit *Lawrence,* which clearly stated, for purposes of guiding future courts, what the right of consensual adult sexual privacy is and is not about:

> The present case does not involve minors.
> It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does not deal with two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.

123 S.Ct. at 2484 (emphasis added). As the Court explained, as a "general rule," the state or a court should not attempt "to define the meaning of [a] relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects." *Id.* at 2478 (emphasis added). For example, in the case of prostitution, there may be a threat that
The Lawrence Court's answer to its question of whether adults have a right to engage in private sexual conduct is clearly a binding holding. I know of no principle of interpretation that supports, in any way, the majority's characterization as "scattered dicta" the Supreme Court's direct response to the question it granted certiorari to answer and that it found was necessary to resolve before disposing of the case. See id. at 2476 ("We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private [sexual] conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").

Like both Bowers and Lawrence, this case involves "the most private human conduct, sexual behavior," occurring "in the most private of places, the home." Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2478. Alabama's statute, by prohibiting the sale of sexual devices, thus affects the same "vital" liberty interest in adult consensual sexual intimacy threatened by the sodomy statutes in Bowers and Lawrence and should likewise be invalidated.14 I believe the majority errs in its strained effort to avoid the fair import of a Supreme Court precedent.

II. The Majority Ignores Lawrence's Teaching Regarding the Proper Framing of a Liberty Interest and the Appropriate Use of History.

Because the majority erroneously concludes that Lawrence did not reaffirm a substantive due process right to sexual privacy, it attempts to conduct a Glucksberg analysis with respect to whether to recognize a "hitherto unarticulated fundamental right." Majority Op. at 1234, 1240. In doing so, the majority not only errs by proceeding as if Lawrence and its prescriptions for conducting a fundamental rights analysis do not exist, but also errs by inventing new criteria that are not supported by Glucksberg, Flores, or any other case law.15

Regardless of the majority's belief that Lawrence did not recognize a substantive due process right, it cannot then simply conduct an analysis that ignores Lawrence's clear statements about the erroneous analytical framework of Bowers and repeat that methodology here. Even if Lawrence were not itself a fundamental rights decision, it remains the case that Bowers conducted a fundamental rights analysis that Lawrence found to be deeply flawed. Lawrence's repudiation of Bowers' substantive due process approach cannot be dismissed as dicta, since overruling Bowers was necessary to the disposition of the decision in Lawrence. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2476 ("We deem it necessary to reconsider the Court's holding in Bowers"). Therefore, Lawrence, coming after Glucksberg, must be read as providing binding guidance about how to properly analyze a liberty interest affecting sexual privacy.

individuals will be harmed, while adult incest poses a threat to the institution of the family and involves a "relationship[] where consent might not easily be refused." Id. at 2484.


14. As the majority acknowledges, the Supreme Court has held that the "same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's right . . . by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the decision entirely." Majority Op. at 1242 (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 688, 97 S.Ct. 2010).

A. The Proper Framing of a Liberty Interest

Just as the Bowers Court framed the question before it as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy,” Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, 106 S.Ct. 2841, the majority also mistakenly reduces the asserted liberty interest here to a particular sexual act, asking not whether consenting adults have a right to sexual privacy, but whether an Alabama citizen has the right to use sex toys. See, e.g., Majority Op. at 1241. The Lawrence Court explained that the narrow framing of the question in Bowers “demean[ed] the claim” set forth and “disclose[d] the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake” in that case. 123 S.Ct. at 2478 (Bowers “misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented to it”). The Lawrence Court further explained that “[t]he laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.” Id. at 2478 (emphasis added). In exactly the same manner, the majority’s characterization of the right at issue here as involving the right to use certain sexual devices severely discounts the extent of the liberty at stake in this case. Alabama’s law not only restricts the sale of certain sexual devices, but, like the statute in Lawrence, burdens private adult sexual activity within the home.17

B. The Use of History and Tradition

In addition to repeating the analytical mistake of Bowers in narrowly framing the right at issue, the majority also errs in its use of history. The majority claims that under Glucksberg, the district court was wrong to rely on a history and tradition of state non-interference with the private sexual lives of adults as a basis to recognize a right to sexual privacy.18 According to the majority, Glucksberg requires that there be a long-standing history of affirmative legal protection of specific conduct before a right can be recognized under the Due Process Clause.19

16. The majority erroneously insists that “the scope of the liberty interest at stake here must be defined in reference to the scope of the Alabama statute.” Majority Op. at 1241, even though Lawrence recognized that the liberty interest threatened by sodomy statutes could not be defined by the particular conduct those statutes prohibited. Selectively quoting from the district court’s opinion, the majority repeatedly insists that the right at issue here is the “right to use sexual devices like . . . vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas.” Majority Op. at 1244, 1247, 1250. In contrast to the majority, the district court properly framed the question in terms of the broader right to sexual privacy. The district court framed the inquiry as follows: “Does th[e] fundamental right of sexual privacy between married and unmarried adults in private, consensual, sexual relationships encompass a right to use sexual devices like the vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas distributed by the vendor plaintiffs in this action?” Williams v. Pryor, 220 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1296 (N.D.Ala.2002) (“Williams III”).

17. See Majority Op. at 1242 (“For purposes of constitutional analysis, restrictions on the ability to purchase an item are tantamount to restrictions on the use of that item.”).

18. The district court found that “history and contemporary practice demonstrate a conscious avoidance of regulation of [sexual] devices by the states.” Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1296. The majority dismisses this analysis. See Majority Op. at 1242 (“[R]ather than look for a history and tradition of protection of the asserted right, the district court asked whether there was a history and tradition of state non-interference with the right.”).

19. Majority Op. at 1244 (noting that the district court’s analysis was “not based on any
Contrary to the majority’s claim, neither Glucksberg nor any other relevant Supreme Court precedent supports the requirement that there must be a history of affirmative legislative protection before a right can be judicially protected. The majority simply invents this requirement, effectively redefining the doctrine of substantive due process to protect only those rights that are already explicitly protected by law. Such a requirement ignores not only Lawrence but also a complete body of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Had the Supreme Court required affirmative governmental protection of an asserted liberty interest, all of the Court’s privacy cases would have been decided differently. For instance, there was no lengthy tradition of protecting abortion and the use of contraceptives, yet both were found to be protected by a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause.20

Moreover, while history and tradition can be important factors, they are not the only relevant considerations in a substantive due process inquiry related to sexual privacy. See id. at 2480–81. As the Lawrence Court emphasized, “[t]he history and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” Id. at 2480 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, like the district court in this case, Lawrence looked to modern trends and practices. The Lawrence Court wrote:

[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.

Id. (emphasis added). Given this unequivocal statement, the majority cannot legitimately criticize the district court for its attention to “contemporary practice and attitudes with respect to sexual conduct and sexual devices.” Majority Op. at 1242. In light of all relevant Supreme Court precedents, the trial court—not the majority—strikes the proper balance between a

20. In Roe, for instance, the Court’s historical analysis of Anglo–American statutory and common law served to provide evidence of the relatively recent (late nineteenth-century) vintage of state restrictions on abortion, not to demonstrate a tradition of affirmative protection of the right to an abortion. 410 U.S. at 132–41, 93 S.Ct. 705. Despite the lack of a history of protecting the right to abortion, the Roe Court nevertheless held that the “right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. at 152–56, 93 S.Ct. 705.

21. The majority also claims that the district court should have limited its historical analysis to legislation involving the use of sexual devices. The proposal for such an unjustifiably narrow inquiry flows from the majority’s error in framing the right at issue too narrowly.
III. Under Lawrence, “Public Morality” Cannot Be Deemed a Legitimate Governmental Purpose for Criminalizing Private Sexual Activity.

The majority states that Lawrence held that sodomy laws fail rational-basis review. However, the majority neglects to address whether Alabama’s statute has a rational basis even though Alabama relies upon the same justification for criminalizing private sexual activity rejected by Lawrence—public morality. In Lawrence, Texas had explicitly relied upon public morality as a rational basis for its sodomy law. Lawrence summarily rejected Texas’s argument, holding that the sodomy law “further[ed] no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”

22. Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1259, 1296 (“[P]laintiffs’ evidence establishes that there exists a constitutionally inherent right to sexual privacy that firmly encompasses state non-interference with private, adult, consensual sexual relationships” and that this right, “even in its narrowest form, protects plaintiffs’ use of sexual devices like those targeted” by Alabama’s law).

23. Majority Op. at 1236 (noting that Lawrence “ultimately applied rational-basis review” to strike down Texas’s sodomy statute).

24. Respondent’s Brief in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 WL 470184 at *48 (U.S. Feb. 7, 2003) (“The prohibition of homosexual conduct in [Texas’ sodomy statute] represents the reasoned judgment of the Texas Legislature that such conduct is immoral and should be deterred.... [L]ong-established principles of federalism dictate that the Court defer to the Texas Legislature’s judgment and to the collective good sense of the people of the State of Texas, in their effort to enforce public morality and promote family values through the promulgation of penal statutes such as [the sodomy statute].”) (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Transcript of Oral Argument in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 WL 1702534 at *38 (U.S. March 26, 2003) (state’s counsel arguing that sodomy law was justified because “Texas has the right to set moral standards and can set bright line moral standards for its people.”).

25. The majority states that “[t]he only question on this appeal is whether the [Alabama] statute, as applied to the involved users and vendors, violates any fundamental right protected under the Constitution.” Majority Op. at 1234. Appellants, however, claim that Alabama’s statute violates the Due Process Clause, which necessarily includes a claim that the statute fails rational-basis review. On remand, the district court must consider whether our holding in Williams II that Alabama’s law has a rational basis remains good law now that Bowers has been overruled. See, e.g., Venn v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1058, 1063 (11th Cir.1996) (noting that the “law of the case ... does not apply to bar reconsideration of an issue when ... controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to that issue”).
the principles we relied upon in our decision in Williams II have been “discarded” by Lawrence:

It seems to me that the “societal reliance” on the principles confirmed in Bowers and discarded today has been overwhelming. Countless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is “immoral and unacceptable” constitutes a rational basis for regulation. See, e.g., Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (C.A.11 2001) (citing Bowers in upholding Alabama’s prohibition on the sale of sex toys on the ground that “[t]he crafting and safeguarding of public morality . . . indisputably is a legitimate government interest under rational basis scrutiny”).

123 S.Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

Whether Alabama’s legislature believes that the use of sex toys may be improper or immoral, the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]hese considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.” Id. at 2480 (discussing traditional moral views disapproving of homosexuality) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

IV. Conclusion

For all the reasons explicated above, Alabama’s statute should be invalidated because it violates a substantive due process right of adults to engage in private consensual sexual activity and because the state’s reliance on public morality fails to provide even a rational basis for its law. Ignoring Lawrence, the majority turns a reluctance to expand substantive due process into a stubborn unwillingness to consider relevant Supreme Court authority. I dissent.

Joana Claudia SEPULVEDA, Mauricio Sepulveda, Petitioners,

v.

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.

No. 03–14932
Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.


Background: Alien who was Colombian national petitioned for review of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of her requests for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Agency Docket No. A79–346–908.

Holding: The Court of Appeals held that alien failed to establish past persecution or well-founded fear of persecution based on her political opinion and activity, as would render her eligible for asylum.

Petition denied.

1. Federal Courts ☞915

When an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned.

2. Aliens ☞54.3(1, 4)

When the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) summarily affirms an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) decision without an
jury may have relied on this evidence to convict Howard for Count 5 under a conspiracy theory, that a coconspirator not under Howard's control actually made the false entries in the books and records.

The government next argues that since Howard only challenges his conviction under Count 5 because of the Pinkerton instruction that links Count 1 to Count 5, and because Howard failed to object to the Pinkerton instruction at trial, we should review under the plain error standard. We disagree. The Pinkerton instruction is a correct statement of the law and had factual support from the record. Thus, there was no basis for objection at the time the charge was given, considering the conspiracy evidence produced by the government. Additionally, Howard did object to the "honest services" instruction, which at bottom is the legal impediment to his conviction.

The government argues, finally, that even if the jury relied on the conspiracy avenue from Count 1 to convict Howard on Count 5, it was harmless error. The government argues, here, that a conviction for conspiracy to commit the falsification of books and records in Count 5 necessarily would also require the conclusion that Howard directly participated in those acts. The government relies on two cases—United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir.1992), and United States v. Holley, 23 F.3d 902 (5th Cir.1994)—for the proposition that this Court has found legally erroneous jury instructions harmless in fraud cases when the inevitable result of the fraudulent activity proved at trial established that the defendants participated in the scheme that justified their convictions on legally correct instructions. In both Saks and Holley, defendants were charged with bank fraud. The district courts gave the correct jury instruction that the jury could find the defendants guilty if they concluded that defendants' actions deprived the banks of money or property. The courts also gave the erroneous instruction that the jury could find the defendants guilty of bank fraud if the defendants' actions deprived the banks of the right to honest services. This Court found harmless error in both cases because the inevitable result of the scheme proved at trial was defrauding the banks of property interests, a valid theory of conviction. See Saks, 964 F.2d at 1521; Holley, 23 F.3d at 910.

For reasons discussed above, the record in this case persuades us that a reasonable jury could have based its conviction on the tainted conspiracy charge plus evidence that the false entries were made not by or at the direction of Howard but by a coconspirator. It necessarily follows that unlike in Saks and Holley, Howard's conviction on Count 5 predicated on a legally valid theory was not inevitable.

III.

For the reasons stated above, the district court order to vacate Count 5 is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.
PHE, Inc., doing business as Adam and Eve, Inc., Intervenor–Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

Ronnie EARLE, in his official capacity only, Travis County District Attorney, Defendant–Appellee,

State of Texas, Intervenor–Defendant–Appellee.

No. 06–51067.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.


Background: Businesses that sold sexual devices for profit filed suit challenging, on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, a Texas statute that, in essence, criminalized the selling, advertising, giving or lending of any device designed or marketed for sexual stimulation, unless defendant could prove that device was sold, advertised, given or lent for statutorily-approved purpose. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Lee Yeakel, J., entered order dismissing complaint as failing to state claim for relief, and businesses appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Reavley, Circuit Judge, held that:

1. Federal Courts ⇐776, 794
   Court of Appeals reviews district court's dismissal of complaint as failing to state a claim de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, and viewing them in light most favorable to plaintiff.

2. Federal Civil Procedure ⇐1772
   In order for complaint to survive motion to dismiss for failure to state claim, plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.A.

3. Constitutional Law ⇐889
   Businesses that sold sexual devices for profit had standing to raise constitutional rights of their customers in challenging, as violative of customers' substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of their choosing, a Texas statute which, in essence, criminalized the selling, advertising, giving or lending of any device designed or marketed for sexual stimulation, unless defendant could prove that device was sold, advertised, given or lent for statutorily-approved purpose. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; V.T.C.A., Penal Code §§ 43.21, 43.23.

4. Constitutional Law ⇐4509(20)
   Obscenity ⇐2.5
   Texas statute which, in essence, criminalized the selling, advertising, giving or lending of any device designed or marketed for sexual stimulation, unless defendant could prove that device was sold, advertised, given or lent for statutorily-approved purpose, impermissibly burdened the substantive due process rights of customers of businesses that sold such devices to engage in private intimate conduct of their choosing; neither state's interest in discouraging prurient interests in autonomous sex and the pursuit of sexual gratification unrelated to procreation, nor its interest in protecting children from im-
proper sexual expression or desire to protect "unwilling adults" from exposure to sexual devices, was sufficient to justify its heavy-handed restriction, not only on sale and advertisement, but upon giving or lending of such devices. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; V.T.C.A., Penal Code §§ 43.21, 43.23.

5. Constitutional Law \(\approx\) 4450

Individual decisions, by either married or unmarried persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

6. Constitutional Law \(\approx\) 4450, 4509(23)

Public morality cannot justify a law that regulates private sexual conduct protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that does not relate to prostitution, potential for injury or coercion, or public conduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

West Codenotes

Held Unconstitutional

V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 43.21
V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 43.23

H. Louis Sirkin (argued), Jennifer Marie Kinsley, Sirkin, Pinales & Schwartz, LLP, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Elaine Agnes Casas, Jennifer Kraber, Austin, TX, for Earle.

Bill L. Davis (argued), Austin, TX, for State of Texas.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

This case assesses the constitutionality of a Texas statute making it a crime to promote or sell sexual devices. The district court upheld the statute's constitutionality and granted the State's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We reverse the judgment and hold that the statute has provisions that violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

I. The Statute

The forerunner of Texas's obscenity statute was enacted in 1973 and had the modest goal of prohibiting "obscene material."¹ Six years later, the legislature redefined "obscene material" so that it would track the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity detailed in *Miller v. California.*² That same year, the legislature also expanded the scope of the statute so that it would prohibit the "promotion" and "wholesale promotion" of "obscene devices," which includes selling, giving, lending, distributing, or advertising for them.³ The legislature chose to broadly define "obscene device," not using the *Miller* test, but as any device "designed or marketed

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³. Id. §§ 43.21(a)(5), (6).
as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.’’ In 1985, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the statute did not violate an individual’s right to privacy, concluding that there was no constitutional right to “stimulate . . . another’s genitals with an object designed or marketed as useful primarily for that purpose.” Later, in 1993, a narrow affirmative defense was added to protect those who promoted “obscene devices” for “a bona fide medical, psychiatric, judicial, legislative, or law enforcement purpose.” Violating the statute can result in punishment of up to two years in jail.

In essence, the statute criminalizes the selling, advertising, giving, or lending of a device designed or marketed for sexual stimulation unless the defendant can prove that the device was sold, advertised, given, or lent for a statutorily-approved purpose. The statute, however, does not prohibit the use or possession of sexual devices for any purpose.

Besides Texas, only three states have a similar obscene-devices statute: Mississippi, Alabama, and Virginia. The Mississippi supreme court has upheld its state’s statute against First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Neither the Alabama nor Virginia supreme court has entertained a challenge to its state’s statute, but the Eleventh Circuit has rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Alabama’s statute. On the other hand, while the legislatures of Louisiana, Kansas, and Colorado had enacted obscene-devices statutes, each of their respective state supreme courts struck down its law on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Likewise, while the Georgia legislature had passed an obscene-device statute, the Eleventh Circuit recently struck it down.

II. This Proceeding

Reliable Consultants, Inc. d/b/a Dreamer’s and Le Rouge Boutique operates four retail stores in Texas that carry a stock of sexual devices. The sexual devices are for off-premise, private use. PHE, Inc. d/b/a Adam & Eve, Inc. is also engaged in the retail distribution of sexual devices. It

4. Id. § 43.21(a)(7).
7. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.35(a), 43.23(a)(d). The full text of the statute is provided in the appendix. All subsequent citations to the statute are to the current version.
12. Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.2007), cert. denied, Williams v. King, ___ U.S. ____, 128 S.Ct. 77, 169 L.Ed.2d 18 (2007). The Williams case had previously been before the Eleventh Circuit, where the court held that the obscene-device ban did not burden a fundamental right. See Williams v. Attorney General, 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir.2004) (remanding the case to the district court).
14. This That and the Other Gift and Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, 439 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2006).
operates no public facilities in Texas, but rather sells sexual devices by internet and mail, and it distributes sexual devices ordered in Texas by mail and common carrier. Reliable and PHE desire to increase their sale of, and advertising for, sexual devices in Texas, and they fear prosecution under the statute if they do so.

Reliable filed this declaratory action to challenge the constitutionality and enjoin the enforcement of the statutory provisions criminalizing the promotion of sexual devices. The complaint alleged that these provisions violate the substantive liberty rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the commercial speech rights protected by the First Amendment. Later, PHE intervened as a plaintiff and sought similar relief.

Reliable and PHE contend that many people in Texas, both married and unmarried, use sexual devices as an aspect of their sexual experiences. For some couples in which one partner may be physically unable to engage in intercourse, or in which a contagious disease, such as HIV, precludes intercourse, these devices may be one of the only ways to engage in a safe, sexual relationship. Others use sexual devices to treat a variety of therapeutic needs, such as erectile dysfunction. Courts scrutinizing sexual-device bans in other states have explained that an “extensive review of the medical necessity for sexual devices” shows that “it is common for trained experts in the field of human sexual behavior to use sexual aids in the treatment of their male and female patients' sexual problems.”

15. Brenan, 772 So.2d at 75. Similarly, in Hughes, the Kansas supreme court noted that recommending the use of sexual devices is “common in the treatment of anorgasmic women,” “who may be particularly susceptible to pelvic inflammatory diseases, psychological problems, and difficulty in marital relationships.” 792 P.2d at 1025.

16. A recent commentator points out that sexual devices, such as vibrators, were originally designed for medical purposes and they continue to be prescribed as such. Danielle J. Lindemann, Pathology Full Circle: A History of Anti–Vibrator Legislation in the United States, 15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 326, 327-30, 336-41 (2006). In the early to mid-twentieth century their use for sexual pleasure became well known, and in the 1960s advertising for such devices began to emphasize their sexual benefits. Id. at 329-30, 792 P.2d 1023.

17. Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir.2006).


Amendment to engage in private intimate conduct in the home without government intrusion. Because the asserted governmental interests for the law do not meet the applicable constitutional standard announced in Lawrence v. Texas,\(^{20}\) the statute cannot be constitutionally enforced.

[3] The State argues that Plaintiffs, who distribute sexual devices for profit, cannot assert the individual rights of their customers. This argument fails under the Supreme Court precedent holding that (1) bans on commercial transactions involving a product can unconstitutionally burden individual substantive due process rights and (2) lawsuits making this claim may be brought by providers of the product. In the landmark 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, which invalidated a ban on the use of contraceptives, the Court recognized that the plaintiff pharmacists “have standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a professional relationship.”\(^{21}\) Other Supreme Court cases hold that businesses can assert the rights of their customers and that restricting the ability to purchase an item is tantamount to restricting that item’s use.\(^{22}\) In line with these cases, the statute must be scrutinized for impermissible burdens on the constitutional rights of those who wish to use sexual devices.

[4] To determine the constitutional standard applicable to this claim, we must address what right is at stake. Plaintiffs claim that the right at stake is the individual’s substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct free from government intrusion. The State proposes a different right for the Plaintiffs: “the right to stimulate one’s genitals for non-medical purposes unrelated to procreation or outside of an interpersonal relationship.”\(^{23}\) The Court in Lawrence—where it overruled its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick\(^{24}\) and struck down Texas’s sodomy ban—guides our decision:

To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.\(^{25}\)

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\(^{21}\) 381 U.S. 479, 481, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1679, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965).


\(^{23}\) The State narrowly describes the right as the court did in Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). Id. at 1235–38 (describing the right as the right to use sex toys). But this would concoct a right contrary to the holding in Lawrence and evade the Court’s ruling. See id. at 1257 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s narrow framing of the right as inconsistent with Lawrence).

\(^{24}\) 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986).

\(^{25}\) Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 123 S.Ct. at 2478.
The right the Court recognized was not simply a right to engage in the sexual act itself, but instead a right to be free from governmental intrusion regarding "the most private human contact, sexual behavior." That Lawrence recognized this as a constitutional right is the only way to make sense of the fact that the Court explicitly chose to answer the following question in the affirmative: "We granted certiorari . . . [to resolve whether] petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."26

The State also argues that Lawrence does not apply because the Court there was concerned with how the statute targeted a specific class of people. Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority's decision in Lawrence because she would have struck down the law on equal protection, not substantive due process, grounds.27 But the Court explicitly rested its holding on substantive due process, not equal protection.28 As discussed, the Court concluded that the sodomy law violated the substantive due process right to engage in consensual intimate conduct in the home free from government intrusion. Once Lawrence is properly understood to explain the contours of the substantive due process right to sexual intimacy, the case plainly applies.

Because of Lawrence, the issue before us is whether the Texas statute impermissibly burdens the individual's substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, we hold that the Texas law burdens this constitutional right. An individual who wants to legally use a safe sexual device during private intimate moments alone or with another is unable to legally purchase a device in Texas, which heavily burdens a constitutional right. This conclusion is consistent with the decisions in Carey and Griswold, where the Court held that restricting commercial transactions unconstitutionally burdened the exercise of individual rights. Indeed, under this statute it is even illegal to "lend" or "give" a sexual device to another person.29 This further restricts the exercise of the constitutional right to engage in private intimate conduct in the home free from government intrusion. It also undercuts any argument that the statute only affects public conduct.

The dissent relegates the burden on this right to rational basis review. The State says we have two alternatives: (1) strict scrutiny if Lawrence established this right as a fundamental right or (2) rational basis review if Lawrence did not. There has been debate about this and the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Lawrence did not establish a fundamental right.30

[5] The Supreme Court did not address the classification, nor do we need to do so, because the Court expressly held that "individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to inti-

26. Id. at 564, 123 S.Ct. at 2476 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 579–85, 123 S.Ct. at 2484–88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 574–75, 123 S.Ct. at 2481–82.
29. Texas Penal Code Section 43.21(a)(5) defines "promote" to include to "give" or "lend." And the statute at Section 43.23(c) makes it a crime to "promote" sexual devices.
30. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1234–39.
mate choices by unmarried as well as married persons." The Court also carefully delineated the types of governmental interests that are constitutionally insufficient to sustain a law that infringes on this substantive due process right. Therefore, our responsibility as an inferior federal court is mandatory and straightforward. We must apply Lawrence to the Texas statute.

The State’s primary justifications for the statute are “morality based.” The asserted interests include “discouraging prurient interests in autonomous sex and the pursuit of sexual gratification unrelated to procreation and prohibiting the commercial sale of sex.”

[6] These interests in “public morality” cannot constitutionally sustain the statute after Lawrence. To uphold the statute would be to ignore the holding in Lawrence and allow the government to burden consensual private intimate conduct simply by deeming it morally offensive. In Lawrence, Texas’s only argument was that the anti-sodomy law reflected the moral judgment of the legislature. The Court expressly rejected the State’s rationale by adopting Justice Stevens’ view in Bowers as “controlling” and quoting Justice Stevens’ statement that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”

Thus, if in Lawrence public morality was an insufficient justification for a law that restricted “adult consensual intimacy in the home,” then public morality also cannot serve as a rational basis for Texas’s statute, which also regulates private sexual intimacy.

Perhaps recognizing that public morality is an insufficient justification for the statu-

31. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. at 2483 (quoting with approval Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2857, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).

32. Lawrence did not categorize the right to sexual privacy as a fundamental right, and we do not purport to do so here. Instead, we simply follow the precise instructions from Lawrence and hold that the statute violates the right to sexual privacy, however it is otherwise described.

33. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed in Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.2007), cert. denied, Williams v. King, — U.S. ——, 128 S.Ct. 77, 169 L.Ed.2d 18 (2007). There, the court held that Alabama’s interest in “public morality” was a constitutional justification for the state’s obscene devices statute. Id. at 1321–24. That fails to recognize the Lawrence holding that public morality cannot justify a law that regulates an individual’s private sexual conduct and does not relate to prostitution, the potential for injury or coercion, or public conduct.

34. See Respondent’s Brief, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (No. 02–102), 2003 WL 470184, at *48 (internal footnote omitted) (“The prohibition of homosexual conduct in [the anti-sodomy statute] represents the reasoned judgment of the Texas Legislature that such conduct is immoral and should be deterred .... Long-established principles of federalism dictate that the Court defer to the Texas Legislature’s judgment and to the collective good sense of the people of the State of Texas, in their effort to enforce public morality and promote family values through the promulgation of penal statutes such as [the anti-sodomy statute].”).

35. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78, 123 S.Ct. at 2483–84 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).

36. See id. at 564, 123 S.Ct. at 2476. The State offers cases for the general proposition that protecting morality is a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2637, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973). Our holding in no way overtly expresses or implies that public morality can never be a constitutional justification for a law. We merely hold that after Lawrence it is not a constitutional justification for this statute.
ute after Lawrence, the State asserts that an interest the statute serves is the “protection of minors and unwilling adults from exposure to sexual devices and their advertisement.” It is undeniable that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from improper sexual expression. However, the State’s generalized concern for children does not justify such a heavy-handed restriction on the exercise of a constitutionally protected individual right. Ultimately, because we can divine no rational connection between the statute and the protection of children, and because the State offers none, we cannot sustain the law under this justification.

The alleged governmental interest in protecting “unwilling adults” from exposure to sexual devices is even less convincing. The Court has consistently refused to burden individual rights out of concern for the protection of “unwilling recipients.” Furthermore, this asserted interest bears no rational relation to the restriction on sales of sexual devices because an adult cannot buy a sexual device without making the affirmative decision to visit a store and make the purchase.

The State argues that if this statute, which proscribes the distribution of sexual devices, is struck down, it is equivalent to extending substantive due process protection to the “commercial sale of sex.” Not so. The sale of a device that an individual may choose to use during intimate conduct with a partner in the home is not the “sale of sex” (prostitution). Following the State’s logic, the sale of contraceptives would be equivalent to the sale of sex because contraceptives are intended to be used for the pursuit of sexual gratification unrelated to procreation. This argument cannot be accepted as a justification to limit the sale of contraceptives. The comparison highlights why the focus of our analysis is on the burden the statute puts on the individual’s right to make private decisions about consensual intimate conduct. Furthermore, there are justifications for criminalizing prostitution other than public morality, including promoting public safety and preventing injury and coercion.

Just as in Lawrence, the State here wants to use its laws to enforce a public moral code by restricting private intimate conduct. The case is not about public sex. It is not about controlling commerce in sex. It is about controlling what people do in the privacy of their own homes because the State is morally opposed to a certain type of consensual private intimate conduct. This is an insufficient justification for the statute after Lawrence.


38. See Denver Area Educ. Telecommns. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2393, 135 L.Ed.2d 888 (1996) (holding, in the First Amendment context, that “[n]o provision, we concede, short of an absolute ban, can offer certain protection against assault by a determined child[;] generally, [however,] this fact alone [does not] justify reduct[ing] the adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).


40. To guide future courts, the Court in Lawrence delineated what the right is not about: “The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.” 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. at 2484. Instead, the right at issue in Lawrence dealt with two adults engaging in consensual sexual conduct. Id.
It follows that the Texas statute cannot define sexual devices themselves as obscene and prohibit their sale.\footnote{See State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 74 (La. 2000) (holding that “[t]he legislature cannot make a device automatically obscene merely through the use of labels”); State v. Hughes, 246 Kan. 607, 792 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Kan. 1990) (“The legislature may not declare a device obscene merely because it relates to human sexual activity.”).} Nothing here said or held protects the public display of material that is obscene as defined by the Supreme Court—i.e., the language in Section 43.21(a)(1) of this statute, excluding the words in the provision defining as obscene any device designed or marketed for sexual stimulation. Whatever one might think or believe about the use of these devices, government interference with their personal and private use violates the Constitution.

Appellants urge us to sustain their First Amendment claim to protect the advertisement of these devices. We decline to explore this claim because if it is necessary, it may be premature. Advertisements of the devices could be prohibited if they are obscene—meaning obscene as defined by the Supreme Court or by the bulk of Section 43.21(a)(1). But the State may not prohibit the promotion or sale of a bed, even one specially designed or marketed for sexual purposes, by merely defining it as obscene. We have held here that the State may not burden the use of these devices by prohibiting their sale. If other issues need to be pursued, the parties are free to do so on remand in proceedings consistent with this decision.

Judgment REVERSED and the case REMANDED.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE,
Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Concerning federalism and comity, few federal-court actions are more friction-producing than holding a state statute unconstitutional. To make matters worse, it is indeed rare to do so while, as here, reviewing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of challenges to the statute. Notwithstanding the best of intentions, the esteemed majority goes astray in both regards for the Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claim.

For the Texas statute at issue, I concur in vacating the dismissal of the First Amendment commercial-speech claim (advertising) and remanding it for further proceedings, if any. On the other hand, the invalidation of the statute is legally incorrect for the Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claim (sale). The dismissal of that claim should be affirmed. Accordingly, regarding that claim, I must respectfully dissent.

I.

The statute prohibits, \it{inter alia}, the sale or other promotion, such as advertising, of “obscene devices”: those “designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs”.\footnote{See Penal Code Ann. § 43.21(a)(7); id. § 43.23; see also id. § 43.21(a)(1)(B)(ii).} Such devices include, but are not limited to, “a dildo or artificial vagina”. Id. at § 43.21(a)(7). The statute provides an affirmative defense for persons who “possess[ ] or promote[ ] [obscene devices] . . . for a bona fide medical, psychiatric, judicial, legislative, or law enforcement purpose”. Id. at § 43.23(f).

Plaintiffs’ complaints claim the statute unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech (advertising) under the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaints also claim the “sale” portion of the statute vio-
lates substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it im-
pinges upon the right to engage in private intimate conduct without governmental in-
trusion. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508
(2003). (Reliable Consultants, Inc. also presents an additional substantive-due-
process claim under a parallel provision in the Texas Constitution. That state-law
claim is subsumed within the following dis-
cussion of the federal constitutional claim.)

The complaints, however, do not include plaintiffs’ advertisements, if any, or de-
scribe with any specificity the sexual de-
VICES they seek to sell. The complaints
were dismissed for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6).

II.

For starters, and contrary to the majori-
ty’s position, Maj. Opn. at 741, the pro-
scribed conduct is not private sexual con-
duct. Instead, for obscene devices, the
statute proscribes only the sale or other
promotion (such as advertising) of those
deVICES, including, but not limited to, a
dildo or artificial vagina.

For our de novo review of a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal, we, needless to say, “ac-
cept all factual allegations in the [com-
plaint] as true and examine whether the
allegations state a claim sufficient to avoid
dismissal”. E.g., Grisham v. United
States, 103 F.3d 24, 25 (5th Cir.1997) ( cita-
tion omitted). To avoid such dismissal, the
complaint must provide “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face”. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, —
U.S. ——, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “Factual allegations
[in the complaint] must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level,
on the assumption that all the allegations
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful
in fact).” Id. at 1965 (quotation marks,
citations, and footnote omitted). In other
words, with some exceptions, our review is
limited to the complaint, including any at-
tachments. See Hogan v. City of Houston,
819 F.2d 604, 604 (5th Cir.1987); Fin.
Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440
F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir.2006) (allowing re-
view of documents in the public record)
citation omitted).

A.

As the majority properly holds, the com-
mercial-speech claim (advertising) may be
premature. Maj. Opn. at 742. This is
especially true for an as-applied challenge,
which may be the only basis for seeking to
have the statute held unconstitutional for
that claim. See Board of Trustees of
SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482–88, 109
S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (quot-
ing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436
U.S. 447, 462 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56
L.Ed.2d 444 (1978)); see also Richard H.
Fallon, As–Applied and Facial Challenges
and Third–Party Standing, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 1321, 1344 (2000) (discussing as-ap-
plied challenges as the only basis for at-
tacking statute on commercial speech
grounds).

For example, as noted supra, the com-
plaints neither include nor describe the
advertising, if any, plaintiffs seek to utilize.
On the other hand, pursuant to Rule 8,
only notice pleadings are required. On
that basis, plaintiffs have perhaps stated a
claim sufficient to withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal.

As the majority holds, that issue should
not be decided today. No authority need
be cited for another bedrock principle un-
derlying federalism and comity: federal
courts, if possible, should avoid ruling on
constitutional issues. “The delicate power
of pronouncing [a statute] unconstitutional
is not to be exercised with reference to
hypothetical cases thus imagined". United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960). Remanding the commercial-speech claim avoids the "premature interpretation[ ] of [a] statute[ ] in [an] area[ ] where [its] constitutional application [is] cloudy". Id.

Accordingly, I concur in the majority's vacating the dismissal of the commercial-speech claim and remanding it for further proceedings, if any.

B.

My disagreement with the majority's analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claim is fundamental. In my view, the district court correctly ruled plaintiffs fail to state such a claim.

The majority avoids determining what level of scrutiny to apply to the substantive-due-process claim, stating only:

The Supreme Court did not address the classification [of the level of scrutiny], nor do we need to do so, because the Court expressly held that "individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons."

Maj. Opn. at 744 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472). I believe, however, that the level of scrutiny to be employed is of critical importance to our review.

For the reasons stated by the Eleventh Circuit in its analysis of a statute materially identical to the one in issue, I conclude Lawrence declined to employ a fundamental-rights analysis, choosing instead to apply rational-basis review. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir.2004) (citation omitted); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472 ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." (emphasis added)); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("Not once does [the Court] describe homosexual sodomy as a 'fundamental right' or a 'fundamental liberty interest,' nor does it subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny. Instead, having failed to establish that the right to homosexual sodomy is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' the Court concludes that the application of Texas's statute to petitioners' conduct fails the rational-basis test.").

Furthermore, as also held by the Eleventh Circuit, I agree that, "[t]o the extent Lawrence rejects public morality as a legitimate government interest, it invalidates only those laws that target conduct that is both private and non-commercial". Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, Williams v. King, — U.S. — , 128 S.Ct. 77, 169 L.Ed.2d 18 (2007). The Texas statute regulates, inter alia, the sale of what it defines as obscene devices. Obviously, such conduct is both public and commercial.

Therefore, I would hold: pursuant to the rational-basis standard of review, plaintiffs fail to state a substantive-due-process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in vacating the dismissal of the First Amendment commercial-speech claim (advertising); the dismissal, however, of the Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claim (sale) should be upheld.
Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from my BROTHERS' invalidation of the statute on that basis.

APPENDIX

Texas Penal Code

§ 43.21. Definitions

(a) In this subchapter:

(1) "Obscene" means material or a performance that:

(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex;

(B) depicts or describes:

(i) patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including sexual intercourse, sodomy, and sexual bestiality; or

(ii) patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, sadism, masochism, lewd exhibition of the genitals, the male or female genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state or a device designed and marketed as useful primarily for stimulation of the human genital organs;

(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value.

(2) "Material" means anything tangible that is capable of being used or adapted to arouse interest, whether through the medium of reading, observation, sound, or in any other manner, but does not include an actual three dimensional obscene device.

(3) "Performance" means a play, motion picture, dance, or other exhibition performed before an audience.

(4) "Patently offensive" means so offensive on its face as to affront current community standards of decency.

(5) "Promote" means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same.

(6) "Wholesale promote" means to manufacture, issue, sell, provide, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, or to offer or agree to do the same for purpose of resale.

(7) "Obscene device" means a device including a dildo or artificial vagina, designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.

(b) If any of the depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct described in this section are declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unlawfully included herein, this declaration shall not invalidate this section as to other patently offensive sexual conduct included herein.

§ 43.23. Obscenity

(a) A person commits an offense if, knowing its content and character, he wholesale promotes or possesses with intent to wholesale promote any obscene material or obscene device.

(b) Except as provided by Subsection (h), an offense under Subsection (a) is a state jail felony.

(c) A person commits an offense if, knowing its content and character, he:
APPENDIX—Continued

(1) promotes or possesses with intent to promote any obscene material or obscene device; or

(2) produces, presents, or directs an obscene performance or participates in a portion thereof that is obscene or that contributes to its obscenity.

(d) Except as provided by Subsection (h), an offense under Subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.

(e) A person who promotes or wholesale promotes obscene material or an obscene device or possesses the same with intent to promote or wholesale promote it in the course of his business is presumed to do so with knowledge of its content and character.

(f) A person who possesses six or more obscene devices or identical or similar obscene articles is presumed to possess them with intent to promote the same.

(g) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the person who possesses or promotes material or a device proscribed by this section does so for a bona fide medical, psychiatric, judicial, legislative, or law enforcement purpose.

(h) The punishment for an offense under Subsection (a) is increased to the punishment for a felony of the third degree and the punishment for an offense under Subsection (c) is increased to the punishment for a state jail felony if it is shown on the trial of the offense that obscene material that is the subject of the offense visually depicts activities described by Section 43.21(a)(1)(B) engaged in by:

(1) a child younger than 18 years of age at the time the image of the child was made;

(2) an image that to a reasonable person would be virtually indistinguishable from the image of a child younger than 18 years of age; or

APPENDIX—Continued

(3) an image created, adapted, or modified to be the image of an identifiable child.

(i) In this section, “identifiable child” means a person, recognizable as an actual person by the person’s face, likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic, such as a unique birthmark or other recognizable feature:

(1) who was younger than 18 years of age at the time the visual depiction was created, adapted, or modified; or

(2) whose image as a person younger than 18 years of age was used in creating, adapting, or modifying the visual depiction.

(j) An attorney representing the state who seeks an increase in punishment under Subsection (h)(3) is not required to prove the actual identity of an identifiable child.